Tuesday, 3 April 2012

Outline of Clark's "Knowledge and Grounds"

SYNOPSIS:

Michael Clark argues that the necessary and sufficient conditions for S knowing that p are:
(1) p is true,
(2) S believes that p,
(3) S is justified in believing that p, and
(4) S’s belief that p is fully grounded.


OUTLINE:

STEP 1: Clark observes that Gettier’s examples are stronger than they need to be since he presents cases in which an agent’s grounds for a belief deductively entail the proposition believed, whereas there may also be Gettier-type cases involving non-deductive grounds.

Example: Suppose that Smith forms the true belief that Jones owns a Ford based on the testimony of Brown, who is typically reliable, but who (on the present occasion) has mixed up Jones with someone else. Although Smith’s belief (based on Brown’s testimony) is true and justified, it fails to constitute knowledge because it rests on false grounds. Insofar as Brown’s testimony constitutes non-deductive grounds for believing that Jones owns a Ford, this is a Gettier-style example involving non-deductive grounds.

Upshots: (i) Insofar as Brown’s testimony constitutes non-deductive grounds for Smith’s belief, Gettier-style examples are effective within a non-deductive context. (ii) S knows that p only if her belief that p is not based on false grounds.


STEP 2: Clark argues that adding the fourth condition that an agent’s belief be based on true grounds is still insufficient for knowledge.

Example: Suppose that Smith forms the true belief that Jones owns a Ford based on the testimony of Brown, who is typically reliable, but who (on the present occasion) is simply making up a claim that (unknown to Brown) happens to be true. Although Smith’s belief is true, justified, and rests on true grounds (i.e., Brown’s claim that Jones owns a Ford), it still fails to constitute knowledge. Thus, we have a Gettier-style example involving true grounds.

Upshot: Although Smith’s belief is based on true grounds, Smith lacks knowledge because the grounds on which he accepts these true grounds, viz. that Brown knows them, are false.


STEP 3: Clark claims that if we keep inquiring about someone’s grounds for accepting certain grounds, and the grounds for accepting those grounds, and so on, we eventually come to a place where it would be inappropriate to ask for further grounds.

Example: A series of questions posed to Smith about why he believes Jones owns a Ford will eventually culminate in an answer, which we would deem out of order to question further.

Upshot: There is always some finite list of grounds that can be offered for a belief.


STEP 4: Clark posits that if one of the grounds in the chain of supporting grounds for a certain belief is false, then that belief fails to constitute knowledge.

Example: If any of the beliefs in the chain of Smith’s grounds for believing Jones owns a Ford are false, we may deny that Smith has knowledge. If all the beliefs in the chain are true, then Smith’s belief that Jones owns a Ford is fully grounded.

Upshot: Being fully grounded is a necessary condition for a belief to constitute knowledge.


CONCLUSION:

Clark concludes that if we add the requirement that S’s belief that p be fully grounded to the requirement that p be true, S believe that p, and S’s belief that p be justified, we arrive at conditions that are jointly sufficient for knowledge.


DISCUSSION QUESTION:

1. Is Clark’s analysis of knowledge a successful response to Gettier-style counterexamples? If not, can you recommend any changes that would improve Clark's account?

Monday, 2 April 2012

14th Annual Rocky Mountain Philosophy Conference

University of Colorado at Boulder
April 20 and 21, 2012


KEYNOTE PRESENTATIONS:

Keynote 1: Jerry Fodor
Rutgers University

“From the Darwin Wars”

Friday, April 20, at 6:15 PM
Benson Earth Sciences Room 180

Abstract: This talk will argue that, despite what his followers have often claimed, Darwin’s Theory of Natural Selection does not (in fact, couldn’t) provide a viable account of the mechanism of the evolution of species-phenotypes. The argument is logical/philosophical; it requires empirical premises, but none of them are in dispute. No religious or theological theses will be presented or presupposed.


Keynote 2: Russ Shafer-Landau
University of Wisconsin, Madison

“The Darwinian Argument”

Saturday, April 21, at 11:15 AM
Humanities Room 150

Abstract: I reconstruct a master argument that tries to reveal the essential commitments of those who would argue that moral knowledge is impossible, once we become aware of the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs. At the heart of the debunking strategies is a common claim: given the influence of selective pressures on our moral faculties, it would be a massive coincidence were they reliable. I explore a variety of ways in which this sort of coincidence can be understood, and argue that none of these ways supports moral skepticism.


Keynote 3: Kit Fine
New York University

“Truthmaker Semantics”

Saturday, April 21, at 4:45 PM
Humanities Room 150

Abstract: This talk will outline an alternative to possible worlds semantics.


CONFERENCE SCHEDULE:

Friday, 20 April

Keynote 1: Jerry Fodor
6:15 PM - 7:45 PM — Benson Room 180

Saturday, 21 April

Session A: 9:00 AM - 9:50 AM
A1. Matthew Leonard, Univ. California, Davis
“Mirror Realism”
Commenter: Ben Rohrs
Humanities Room 135

A2. Alexander Stathopoulos, U. of St. Andrews
“A Deflationary View of Peer Disagreement”
Commenter: Dan Lowe
Humanities Room 150

Session B: 10:00 AM - 10:50 AM
B1. Avery Archer, Columbia University
“Competing Aims: Vellman vs. The Guise of the Good”
Commenter: Benjamin Kultgen,
Humanities Room 135

B2. Julia Neufeld, Northern Illinois University
“Conditionals of Freedom, Truth and Grounding, Necessity”
Commenter: Jason Hanschmann,
Humanities Room, 150

Keynote 2: Russ Shafer-Landau
11:15 AM - 12:45 AM — Humanities Room 150

Lunch: 12:45 PM - 2:30 PM

Session C 2:30 PM - 3:20 PM
C1. Matthew Lee, University of Notre Dame
“Are Credences Reducible to Probabilistic Beliefs?”
Commenter: Rebecca Chan
Humanities Room 135

C2. Tyler Paytas, Washington Univ. St. Louis
“You Really Ought to Use a Cleaver to Kill Jones: The Under-Specification of Practical Oughts”
Commenter: Spencer Case
Humanities Room 150

Session D 3:30 PM - 4:20 PM
D1. Andy Yu, University of Oxford
“The Truth about the Necessity and existence of Williamson’s Necessary Existents”
Commenter: Noel Saenz
Humanities Room 135

D2. Samuel Taylor, University of Iowa
“What Seemings Seem to Be”
Commenter: Jon Spelman
Humanities Room 150

Keynote 3: Kit Fine
4:45 PM - 6:15 PM — Humanities Room 150

Tuesday, 27 March 2012

Outline of Gettier’s “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”

SYNOPSIS:

Gettier argues that the tripartite conception of knowledge—according to which an agent, S, counts as knowing that p just in case (i) P is true, (ii) S believes that p and (iii) S is justified in believing that p—provides us with an insufficient basis for knowledge.


OUTLINE:

STEP 1: Gettier describes himself as setting out to impugn the following three closely-related conceptual analyses of knowledge:

(a) S knows that P IFF (i) P is true,
(ii) S believes that P, and
(iii) S is justified in believing that P.

(b) S knows that P IFF (i) P is true,
(ii) S accepts P, and
(iii) S has adequate evidence for P.

(c) S knows that P IFF (i) P is true,
(ii) S is sure that P, and
(iii) S has the right to be sure that P.

Step 2: Gettier introduces two cases that he believes represent counterexamples to (a), (b), and (c).

Case I: Smith has the justified true belief that: “the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket”, but his belief is based on the premise that Jones, who has ten coins in his pocket, will get the job, when in fact it is Smith who will get the job and who also (unwittingly) has ten coins in his pocket.

Case II: Smith has the justified true belief that: “Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona”, but his belief is based on the premise that the aforementioned disjunction is made true by the fact that Jones owns a ford, when in fact Jones does not own a ford but it so happens that (unbeknownst to Smith) Brown is in Barcelona.


CONCLUSION:

Insofar as the subject in Gettier’s examples, Smith, has a belief that is justified, supported by adequate evidence or has the right to be sure, Case I and Case II represent counterexamples to (a), (b) and (c), respectively.


DISCUSSION QUESTIONS:

1. Do you share the intuition that the subject in Gettier's examples, Smith, does not have knowledge?

2. Does the subject in Gettier’s examples, Smith, have the right to be sure? What would Ayer say about Smith’s reasoning?

Thursday, 22 March 2012

Outline of Ayer’s “Knowing as Having the Right to be Sure”

SYNOPSIS:

A. J. Ayer argues that the necessary and sufficient conditions for S knowing that p are:
(1) p is true.
(2) S is sure that p.
(3) S has the right to be sure that p.


OUTLINE:

STEP 1: Ayer begins by noting that it is not a sufficient condition for S to know that p that (i) S is sure that p, and (ii) p is true. The source of S’s belief that p must be generally reliable.

Example: A superstitious person who is sure that he will suffer misfortune for walking under a ladder, who happens to be right, still does not know that he will suffer misfortune. This is because his superstitious belief about ladders is not generally reliable.

Upshot: S knows that p only if her belief that p is formed via a generally reliable process (of reasoning).

STEP 2: Ayer considers whether we can arrive at the standards of knowledge by determining what would be a satisfactory answer to the question: How do you know? He opines that one’s answer to this question is only satisfactory if the source of knowledge is reliable in the particular case.

Examples: If my eyesight is bad or my memory is poor, they may fail to provide an adequate basis for knowledge, even if I turn out to be right. However, attempting to list the conditions under which perception, memory, testimony etc. are reliable may be a moribund affair.

Upshot: Determining if S’s belief is formed via a reliable process may have to be determined on a case by case basis.

STEP 3: Ayer suggests that reliability may be sufficient for knowledge even when an answer to the question, “How do you know?” is not available. The most salient question seems to be whether or not one has the right to be sure.

Example: A man who is reliable at predicting lottery results may be credited with knowledge if his run of success is sufficiently impressive.

Upshot: Whether S knows that p depends, not on her inner states or on whether she arrived at her belief by an accredited route to knowledge, but on whether S is reliable enough for us to concede that she has the right to be sure.

STEP 4: Ayer suggests that debates about whether or not it possible to know that p are actually debates about whether or not one ever has the right to be sure that p.

Example: The sceptic about knowledge is not trying to get us to revise the meaning or use of the verb “to know” but rather is denying that we have the right to be sure.

Upshot: Arriving at a definition of knowledge does not settle the question of whether it possible to have it since whether or not we have the right to be sure remains open to debate.


CONCLUSION:

The central problem confronting contemporary epistemologist is not trying to figure out the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, but rather trying to determine if and when one necessary condition in particular has been met; namely, if and when we have the right to be sure.


DISCUSSION QUESTION:

By Ayer’s lights, who decides if S has the right to be sure that p? Do you agree? Why or why not?

Tuesday, 20 March 2012

The 2012 Princeton-Rutgers Philosophy Grad Conference


Hosted on March 31 and April 01, 2012,
by Princeton and Rutgers Philosophy Departments.

Keynote Speakers:
Adam Elga
Dean Zimmermann


Saturday March 31 (Princeton)

9:30am Breakfast

10:00am Keynote by Adam Elga (Princeton), How to Make Things Riskier by Trying to Make Them Safer

11:30am Coffee Break

11:50am Uwe Peters (King’s College London): How We Don’t Know Our Own Thoughts: Self-Knowledge and Cognitive Phenomenology
Commentator: Patrick Kelly-Decker (Princeton)

1:10pm Lunch

2:10pm Ryan Perkins (Oxford), Of Grounding and Explanation
Commentator: Michaela McSweeney (Princeton)

3:30pm Coffee Break

3:50pm Avery Archer (Columbia), Competing Aims: Velleman vs. The Guise of the Good Theory of Desire
Commentator: Stephanie Leary (Rutgers)

5:10pm Reception

7:30pm Dinner (for speakers, commentators and organizers)


Sunday April 1 (New Brunswick)

11:00 Breakfast

11:30 Justin Khoo (Yale), On Stalnaker’s Unified Theory of Conditionals
Commentator: Carlotta Pavese (Rutgers)

12:40 Lunch Break

1:40 Harjit Bhogal (NYU), The Chancy Past
Commentator: Heather Demarest (Rutgers)

2:50 Break 3:00 Saif Ansari (NYU), The Threshold Account of the Badness of Death Commentator: Daniel Wodak (Princeton)

4:10 Break

4:30 Keynote by Dean Zimmermann (Rutgers): TBD

6:00 Dinner

For abstracts and copies of some of the papers, see here.