Dissertation Summary

The following is my most recent attempt to summarise my dissertation in a couple pages. I am only just approaching the half-way mark, so expect several revised versions of this summary in the near future.

My dissertation attempts to make sense of the idea that desires may be correct or incorrect by articulating and defending a version of the claim that desires aim at the good.

There is a widely held intuition that some desires are infelicitous, bad, or perverse. For example: there is something infelicitous about the desire to drink a can of oil in order to quench one’s thirst; there is something bad about the desire to take the life a known innocent; and there is something perverse about the desire to stick a sharpened pencil in one’s eye even though one believes no good could come from doing so and one recognizes that it would be extremely unpleasant. The first desire seems infelicitous on instrumental grounds; drinking oil is a poor way to quench one’s thirst. The second desire seems bad on ethical grounds; taking the life of a known innocent is morally wrong. The third desire seems perverse on hedonistic grounds; all things being equal, we would expect an agent to avoid unpleasant experiences. One way to capture the idea that a desire may be infelicitous, bad, or perverse—a theoretical proposal that is tied to a longstanding philosophical tradition—is to say that desires aim at the good, and that a desire is inappropriate, bad, or perverse just in case it fails to realise its aim. On this view, the good is the most abstract characterisation of aim of desire. Let us call this proposal the guise of the good theory of desires (henceforth, GG theory).

I wish to articulate and defend a plausible version of GG theory. There are three influential strategies for making sense of GG theory currently found in the literature: the Desire-as-Belief Thesis, the claim that the desire to φ is equivalent to the belief that φ is good; the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis; the claim that the desire to φ is always accompanied by the belief that φ is good; and the Desire-as-Perception Thesis, the claim that the desire to φ is equivalent to perceiving that φ is good. I argue that all three proposals are unacceptable as ways of making sense of GG theory. Instead, I argue that a desire plays the same role in our deliberation as being the recipient of a (self-issued) command, order or request. Let us refer to this proposal as the Desire-as-Imperative Thesis.

Significantly, the notion of an imperative implicated in the Desire-as-Imperative Thesis should not be confused with the Kantian notion of an imperative (i.e., a dictate of pure reason). Rather, the word ‘imperative’ is meant to pick out the category of non-assertoric speech-acts that is typically expressed using the imperative mood of English grammar; a category that includes orders, requests, commands, and entreaties. I hold that desires are like the class of speech-acts that are typically expressed by the imperative mood in at least three respects. First, like speech-acts in the imperative mood, desires are not truth-evaluable. For example, both the desire to close the front door and the request to close the front door is neither true nor false. Second, like speech-acts in the imperative mood, an agent assents to a desire, not by forming a belief, but by forming an intention. For example, one assents to the desire to close the front door or the request to close the front door by forming the intention to close the front door. Third, like speech-acts in the imperative mood, desires are governed by norms that determine if it would be correct or incorrect to assent to them. For example, both the desire to close the front door and request to close the front door are correct just in case it is good to close the front door. On this view, when we say desire aims at the good, we mean that the desire to φ is correct just in case it would be good to φ.

The Normative Aim of Intention/Desire

The main contemporary motivation for the Guise of the Good Theory of Desires--namely, the claim that desires aim at the good (henceforth, GG theory)--comes from Anscombe, who claims that wanting aims at the good in the same sense that judgement aims at truth. Anscombe's claim has lead many GG theorists to draw an analogy between desire and belief. However, I believe that this is mistake. When Anscombe says that wanting aims at the good, she actually has something quite different from our ordinary conception of desires in mind:

'Wanting' may of course be applied to the prick of desire at the thought or sight of an object, even though a man then does nothing towards getting the object. . . . The wanting that interests us, however, is neither wishing nor hoping nor feeling nor desire, and cannot be said to exist in a man who does nothing towards getting what he wants. (Anscombe [2000], Intention. p. 67-68.)

The above passage suggests that Anscombe's notion of wanting is more like an intention than a desire; it entails taking steps towards getting the object wanted. If this is right, then the Anscombean thesis is most aptly interpreted as the claim that intentions aim at the good in the same way that beliefs aim at truth. On this reading, the appropriate analogy is not one between belief and desire, but between belief and intention.

The claim that intentions aim at the good in the same sense that belief aims at the true gives rise to the following question. In what sense does belief aim at the true? We may distinguish between psychological, metaphysical and normative readings of the claim that belief aims at the true. According to psychological reading, beliefs may be said to aim at the true because agents are motivated to form beliefs by a desire for truth. The psychological reading was famously denied by Charles Pierce, who insisted that our motivation for forming beliefs is a desire to alleviate the discomfort caused by doubt. Even if one does not buy into Pierce's positive claim, it seems undeniable that we are often motivated to form beliefs by considerations other than truth. Pride, fear, comfort, and consistency are just a few of the many possible motivations an agent may have for adopting a particular belief. Consequently, the claim that truth is the psychological aim of belief seems implausible.

According to the metaphysical reading, truth is what makes belief the kind of psychological state it is. On this view, if the proposition that constitutes the intentional object of a putative belief turns out to be false, then the attitude in question is not a belief. It should be immediately clear that when we say belief aims at the true, we do not mean that truth is the metaphysical aim of belief; to wit, that a belief only counts as such if the proposition believed is true. Such a view would have the implausible consequence that there are no false beliefs. Moreover, it threatens to collapse the distinction between belief and knowledge, since the latter does seem to have truth as its metaphysical aim; to wit, knowing that p counts as such only if p is true. Consequently, the claim that truth is metaphysical aim of belief also seems implausible.

I believe that the claim that belief aims after truth is best understood in normative terms. According to the normative reading, the belief that p is in some sense incorrect if p is false. Unlike the metaphysical reading, the normative reading does not entail that a belief only counts as such if the believed proposition is true. Thus, the normative reading makes room for the possibility of false beliefs. Moreover, unlike the psychological reading, the normative reading does not entail that we are always motivated to form beliefs by a desire for truth. Consequently, the claim that truth is normative aim of belief is more plausible, and does a better job of capturing what we mean when we say that belief aims after truth, than the psychological and metaphysical readings. Given the normative reading of the claim that belief aims at the true, the claim that intentions aim at the good in the same sense that belief aims at the true entails that the intention to φ is incorrect if φ is not good.

Having said what it means to say that intentions aim at the good, we may now ask why intentions may be said to aim at the good in aforementioned sense. One proposal is to say that the good is the normative aim of intention because an intention to φ is justified if and only if φ is good. However, this is not plausible. First, the intention of φ may be justified if the agent has a justified, but false, belief that φ is good. For example, suppose Mary has the justified belief that it would be good to give to a charity X, when in fact the charity X is a scam and it would in fact not be good to give to X. Quite plausibly, it may still be justified for Mary to adopt the intention to give to charity X, given her justified belief that it would be good to do so. Second, the intention to φ is not justified if the agent has the justified, but false, belief that φ is not good. For example, suppose Bob has the justified belief that allowing his company to dump industrial waste in a river would harm the environment, when in fact the waste in question may actually be beneficial to the environment. Quite plausibly, it may be unjustified for Bob to adopt the intention to allow his company to dump the industrial waste, given his justified belief that doing so would be harmful.

An alternative proposal, the one I wish to endorse, is to say that intentions have the normative aim of the good because intending to φ entails being committed to the goodness of φ. On this view, the claim that a psychological state or speech-act has a particular normative aim is not a claim about when an agent is justified in adopting that psychological state or engaging in that speech-act. Rather, it is a claim about the types of normative commitments an agent takes upon herself by adopting a particular attitude, and the type of rational criticism said commitment entails. Thus, if an agent adopts an intention to φ, and subsequently learns that φ is not good, then that agent is normatively committed to giving up the intention to φ and is rationally criticisable if she fails to do so. In this regard, the normative aim of intention is perfectly analogous to normative aim of belief. Truth is the normative aim of belief because believing that p entails being committed to truth of p. If an agent adopts the belief that p, and subsequently learns that p is not true, then that agent is normatively committed to giving up her belief that p and is rationally criticisable if she fails to do so.

The preceding discussion offers us an analysis of what it means for intentions to aim at the good. But what can we say about the relationship between desires and the good? In answering this question, I exploit an analogy between desire and perceptual experience. To this end, we may say that desires aim at the good in the same sense that perceptual experience aims at the true. However, it is not plausible that perceptual experiences aim at the true in the same way that belief aims at the true. Recall, we unpacked the claim that belief aims at the true in terms of the claim that believing that p entails that one is committed to the truth of p. However, perceiving that p does not entail that one is committed to the truth of p. Moreover, if one perceives that p, one is not in a position to alter one’s perceptual experience if it turns out that p is false. Thus, it would not do to say that perceptual experiences aim at the true in the same sense that belief does.

Instead, I propose that we see perceptual experiences as aiming at the true in a derivative sense. To wit, we may say that a perceptual experience is correct just in case it would yield a correct belief if it were assented to. Given that the belief that p is correct only if p is true, it follows that a perceptual experience that p is correct (in a derivative sense) only if p is true. Analogously, desires may be said to aim at the good in a derivative sense. To wit, we may say that a desire is correct (in a derivative sense) just in case it would yield a correct intention if it were assented to. Since the intention to φ is correct just in case φ is good, it follows that the desire to φ is correct (in a derivative sense) just in case φ is good.

A (Selective) Outline of Velleman's "The Guise of the Good"

Disclaimer: The following is a (selective) outline of what I take to be the central argument of David Velleman's paper, “The Guise of the Good”. A number of Velleman's specific arguments have been omitted, not because I believe they are unimportant or uninteresting, but for the sake of brevity.

SYNOPSIS OF PAPER: Velleman argues that the Guise of the Good theory (henceforth, “GG theory”) errs by either making an evaluative term (henceforth, “the good”) part of the propositional content of the attitude motivating an intentional action (henceforth, “a desire”) or by equating the good with the direction of fit of a desire. The first strategy fails because it entails that an agent can have a desire only if she possesses the concept of the good, and the second strategy fails because it conflates the constitutive aim of an attitude with its direction of fit. Velleman concludes by advancing the positive proposal that desire aims at the attainable.

BRIEF OUTLINE OF PAPER:

I Motivating cognitivism: The Primacy of Rational Guidance (pp. 3-7)

II Sophisticated Cognitivism: The Direction-of-Fit Approach (pp. 7-9)

III The Aim of Desire: Objections to Sophisticated Cognitivism (pp. 10-19)

DETAILED OUTLINE OF PAPER:

I Motivating cognitivism: The Primacy of Rational Guidance

Summary: Velleman defines GG theory as the claim that intentional action aims at the good. GG Theory is motivated by an attempt to reconcile two seemingly incompatible stories of the origin of human action; namely, the story of motivation and the story of rational guidance. Non-cognitivism emphasizes the story of motivation at the expense of the story of rational guidance, and cognitivism emphasizes the story of rational guidance at the expense of the story of motivation. The main motivation for rejecting non-cognitivism and adopting cognitivism, according to Velleman, is a desire to preserve the commonsense story of the origin of human action.

Discussion:

(i) Story of motivation = an agent acts intentionally when her action is caused by a desire for some outcome and a belief that the action will promote it. (p. 3)

(ii) Story of rational guidance = an agent acts intentionally when the action justifying character of a proposition prompts her action via her grasp of that proposition. (p. 4)

Noncognitivism = emphasises story of motivation at the expense of the story of rational guidance.

Weakness of non-cognitivism = it is at odds with the commonsense story. “In the commonsense story, the agent is moved toward action because his reasons justify it; whereas in the noncognitivist story, his reasons justify his action in virtue of moving him toward it.” (p. 5)

Cognitivism = emphasises story of rational guidance at the expense of the story or motivation.

Weakness of cognitivism = entails that an agent can have a desire only if she has evaluative concept. “If the cognitivist seriously means to characterise desire as an attitude toward an evaluative proposition, then he implies that the capacity to desire requires the possession of evaluative concepts. Yet a young child can want things long before it has acquired the concept of their being worth wanting or desirable.” (p. 7)

Upshot: Noncognitivism is unattractive because it fails to preserve the commonsense story of motivation and cognitivism is implausible because it entails that an agent can act intentionally only if it possesses certain evaluative concepts.

II Sophisticated Cognitivism: The Direction-of-Fit Approach

Summary: Sophisticated cognitivism unpacks the claim that the attitude motivating an intentional action (henceforth, I will simply speak of a desire) aims at the good in terms of the attitude's direction-of-fit. On this view, a cognitive attitude (like belief) may be said to aim after truth because its propositional object is regarded as a factum (something that is the case); while a conative attitude (like desire) may be said to aim after the good because its propositional object is regarded as a faciendum (something that is to be made the case). The upshot is that a propositional attitude is characterised, not only by the proposition that embodies its content, but also by the attitude's direction of fit (i.e., whether it represents its propositional object as a factum or faciendum).

Discussion:

cognitive attitude = a proposition is grasped as patterned after the world (or factum).

conative attitude = a proposition is grasped as a pattern for the world to follow (or faciendum).

(i) Simple cognitivism = involves action-justifying propositions.

According to simple cognitivism, desires aim at the good in virtue of their propositional content, which include the predicate “good”. (p. 6)

(ii) Sophisticated cognitivism = involves action-justifying attitudes.

According to sophisticated cognitivism, desires aim at the good in virtue of type of attitude it is—namely, that it is a conative attitude—rather than in terms of its propositional content. (pp. 8ff)

Upshot: According to sophisticated cognitivism, desires justify or provide reasons for action, not because of their propositional content, but because of the way the propositional content of a desire is grasped; namely, as something to be brought about. (p. 9)

III The Aim of Desire: Objections to Sophisticated Cognitivism

Summary: According to Velleman, desire aims, not at the good, but at the attainable. This follows from the following three theses. First, the constitutive aim of belief is whatever distinguishes it from all other states with a cognitive direction of fit; namely, the fact that beliefs are only correct when they are true. Second, what distinguishes desire from all other states with a conative direction of fit is not the fact that it aims after the good, since this is something it shares with all other conative states. Third, what distinguishes desire from all other conative states is the fact that desire aims at the attainable. The upshot is that the central thesis of sophisticated cognitivism—namely, that desire aims at the good—is mistaken.

Discussion:

Velleman exploits an analogy from belief to argue that desires do not aim at the good. He draws a distinction between the direction of fit of belief and the aim of belief (p. 12 ff):

(i) direction of fit of belief = that in virtue of which it is a cognitive state.

(ii) aim of belief = that in virtue of which it is correct just in case it is true

The following is a rough reconstruction of Velleman's argument. (Note: "given" indicates a theoretically motivated claim, and "observed" indicates an empirically motivated claim.)

(1) Belief is a cognitive state in virtue of its direction of fit. (given)

(2) Belief does not share the same aim as other cognitive states. (observed)

(3) Aim of belief = what sets belief apart from other cognitive states. (loosely from (1) and (2))

(4) Aim of desire = what sets desire apart from other conative states. (by analogy from (3))

(5) Sophisticated cognitivism entails that desire aims at the good in virtue of its direction of fit. (given)

(6) Sophisticated cognitivism entails that all conative states have the same direction of fit. (given)

(7) Sophisticated cognitivism entails that all conative states aim at the good. (loosely from (5) and (6))

(8) Sophisticated cognitivism entails that the good is not the aim of desire. (loosely from (4) and (7))

(8) What sets desire apart from all other conative states = being directed at the attainable. (observed)

(9) Aim of desire = being directed at the attainable. (loosely from (4) and (8))

Upshot: Velleman's negative thesis is that, contra sophisticated cognitivism, the constitutive aim of desire is not the good. Velleman's positive thesis is that the constitutive aim of desire is the attainable (p. 17). Given that the constitutive aim of belief is the truth, it follows from Velleman's positive thesis that desire stands to the attainable as belief stands to the truth.

The Desire-plus-Belief Thesis

In my post, Impugning the Desire-as-Belief Thesis, I argued that the Desire-as-Belief Thesis--namely, the claim that desires are a type of belief--is unacceptable as a way of unpacking the Broadly Anscombean View--namely, the claim that desires aim at the good. But even if one rejects the claim that desires are beliefs, one may still think that desiring to φ is always accompanied by the belief that φ is good. Let us refer to this proposal as the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis; the claim that the desire to φ is always paired with the belief that φ is good. The Desire-plus-Belief Thesis is offered as an alternative way of unpacking the Broadly Anscombean View, and should be distinguished from the weaker claim that an agent could only desire to φ if she has certain beliefs about φ. For example, one may think that one could only desire to φ if one also believed that it was possible for one to φ. However, such a proposal would not be a candidate for unpacking the claim that the good is the object of desire, for believing that one could φ may have little or no bearing on whether or not one believes that φ is good. Hence, the thesis that the desire to φ is always accompanied by some belief about φ is not the same as the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis; the latter is specifically concerned with the belief that φ is good.

An unqualified version of the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis seems highly implausible. For example, one may desire to have a cigarette even though one does not believe that it is good to do so. However, even if we find the preceding unqualified version of the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis implausible, we may still be tempted to buy into a qualified version of the thesis, according to which the desire to φ is always accompanied by the belief that φ is good from a certain perspective. For example, even though one does not believe that sleeping with someone who is not one's spouse is good simpliciter, one may still believe that it is good from the perspective of having one's sexual needs satisfied. Hence, according to the qualified version of the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis, an agent can only desire to φ if she believes that it would be good to φ from a certain perspective (even if she does not believe that φing would be good, simpliciter).

One objection to the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis (in both its qualified and unqualified forms) is that there seems to be putative cases of an agent desiring to φ, where the desire does not seem to be accompanied by the belief that φ is good from any perspective at all. Davidson's description of a man who has a “yen to drink a can of paint” even though he does not believe that it would be “worth doing so”, seems to be one such example. One very natural way of unpacking Davidson's claim that the paint drinker sees no “worth” in drinking the paint would be to say that the paint drinker does not believe that drinking the paint is good from any perspective whatsoever.

However, the preceding objection is certainly not the final word on the matter. There are some theorists, such as Warren Quinn and Thomas Scanlon, who would deny that the yen to drink a can of paint qualifies as a desire, in the relevant sense. To this end, Scanlon [1998] distinguishes between a desire and a mere urge. According to Scanlon, the desire to φ is always accompanied by a tendency to see φing as good or desirable. Absent such a tendency, we have, not a desire, but an urge. Moreover, Quinn [1993] notes that in cases like the paint-drinker example, the motivating state fails to rationalise the action or make it intelligible. That is to say, the yen of the paint drinker provides no justification for his actions, nor does it bring us any closer to understanding why the paint drinker did what he did. The upshot, according to Quinn, is that the yen of the paint drinker should not be considered a desire.

Although it is true that the yen of Davidson's paint drinker fails to rationalise or justify his actions, it is not clear (pace Quinn) that playing this rationalising or justificatory role is a necessary condition for a psychological state to be considered a desire.4 There is an alternative conception of desires, according to which, the presence of a desire serves the theoretical function of marking the difference between actions that are intentional—i.e., ones for which an agent is rationally or morally responsible—and actions that are not. Moreover, there is reason to think that the actions of Davidson's paint drinker are intentional by the lights of this alternative conception. For one thing, we may wish to hold that the paint drinker is rationally or morally responsible for his actions. For example, let us suppose that drinking the paint would result in his death, and that the paint drinker is aware of this fact. Let us suppose further that it is morally wrong to knowingly take one's life. Given that the paint drinker is aware that drinking the paint is fatal, we may very well wish to hold that he is morally responsible for taking his own life; to wit, there is nothing about Davidson's description of the painter drinker that would lead us to think that he should be excluded from such responsibility. Assuming that one is morally responsible for φing only if one φs intentionally, and given the view that desiring to φ is what distinguishes between cases in which one φs intentionally, and cases in which one does not φ intentionally, then it follows from the claim that the the paint drinker is morally responsible for drinking the can of paint that his yen to drink the can of paint is a desire. Consequently, if we see desire as playing the theoretical role of distinguishing between those actions that are intentional (understood as action for which an agent is rationally or morally responsible) and those actions that are not, then we may wish to hold that the yen of Davidson's paint drinker may be a desire.

I do not wish to settle the question of which of the two competing accounts just adumbrated is preferrable. The preceding discussion is simply meant to highlight that whether or not one regards the yen of Davidson's paint-drinker as a desire will depend on what one takes the theoretical role of desire to be. Since I do not wish to rule out the alternative account, according to which the yen of Davidson's paint-drinker may count as a desire, I believe we should leave room in our theorising for the possibility of such desires; namely, ones in which the desiring agent does not believe that the desired action is good from any perspective whatsoever. In short, the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis introduces a prejudice against certain accounts of the theoretical role of desire; a prejudice that I believe we do well to avoid at the present stage in our inquiry.

A more serious difficulty with the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis (in both its qualified and unqualified forms) is that it seems too weak to serve as a viable candidate for unpacking the Broadly Anscombean View; namely, the claim that the good is the object of desire. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that desiring to φ is always accompanied by the belief that φ is good. Given this view, it seems more accurate to say that the good is the object of the accompanying belief than that it is the object of the desire itself. However, we have identified the Broadly Anscombean View with the claim that the good is the object of desire, not the claim that the good is the object of a particular kind of belief—namely, one that typically accompanies a desire. The problem is that (unlike the Desire-as-Belief Thesis) the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis preserves the desire's identity as a separate psychological state from that of the belief that accompanies it. Moreover, as far as the Broadly Anscombean View is concerned, it makes the good the object of the wrong psychological state; namely, the belief rather than the desire. Presumably, the defender of the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis would say that being accompanied by a belief that aims at the good is just what we mean when we say that a desire aims at the good. However, it seems odd to say that the desire to φ has the goodness of φ as its object simply because the belief that φ is good has the goodness of φ as its object. Why should the fact that the latter has the good as its object have any bearing on the former, given that they are distinct psychological states? In short, it remains unclear that the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis represents a genuine unpacking of the claim that the good is the object of desire.

Impugning the Desire-as-Belief Thesis

I believe that the Desire-as-Belief Thesis is unacceptable as a way of unpacking the Broadly Anscombean View - namely, the claim that the good is the aim of desire in a sense analogous to how truth is the aim of belief - because of the following pair of asymmetries between desires and beliefs.

Truth-Value Asymmetry

Beliefs are truth-assessable while desires are not. This asymmetry between desires and beliefs is reflected in our ordinary linguistic practice. For example, if I believe that George Washington was the first president of the United States, we ordinarily think of my belief as the sort of thing that could be true or false. By contrast, we do not ordinarily conceive of desires as truth-assessable. For example, if I desire to purchase a flat screen television, we do not ordinarily think of my desire as the sort of thing that could be true or false. Moreover, I believe the following theoretical account may be offered in defence of Truth-Value Asymmetry. First, I hold that a psychological state may be conceived of as truth-assessable just in case it represents the state of affairs that constitutes its intentional object to be the case or it represents a particular proposition to be true. Second, I take the preceding necessary and sufficient conditions to be met by the psychological state of belief. For example, if I believe that George Washington was the first president of the United States, I hold that the state of affairs of George Washington being the first president of the United States is the intentional object of my belief. Moreover, I hold that my belief represents this state of affairs as being the case. (Or, if one prefers, we may say that the belief that George Washington is the first president of the United States represents the proposition, “George Washington is the first president of the United States” to be true.) Third, I take the preceding necessary and sufficient conditions not to be met by the psychological state of desire. For example, if I desire to purchase a flat screen television, I take the state of affairs of purchasing a flat screen television to be the intentional object of my desire. Moreover, I hold that my desire does not represent my purchasing a flat screen television to be the case. The upshot of the three preceding theoretical commitments is that the psychological state of belief is truth-assessable, while the psychological state of desire is not.

Rational-Commitment Asymmetry

One is guilty of irrationality if one knowingly has inconsistent beliefs, but one is not guilty of irrationality if one knowingly has inconsistent desires. This asymmetry is also reflected in how we ordinarily talk and think about desires. According to the present objection, one may have conflicting desires—for example, the desire to have a cigarette, and the desire to stick to one's New Year's resolution to quit smoking (where one recognises that these represent mutually exclusive desires)—without being guilty of irrationality. However, the same is not true of belief. If one believes that it is good to stick to one's New Year's resolution to quit smoking, and one also believes that is good to have a cigarette (where one recognises that these represent mutually exclusive beliefs), then one is guilty of irrationality. Moreover, I believe the following theoretical motivation may be offered in support of Rational-Commitment Asymmetry. First, I hold that beliefs are commitment-involving psychological states. For example, to believe that smoking is good is to be committed to holding that smoking is good. Second, I hold that desires are not commitment-involving psychological states. For example, to desire to have a cigarette is not to be committed to having a cigarette, since one may have such a desire and yet decide not to act on it. Moreover, one may desire to have a cigarette without being committed to the goodness of having a cigarette. Third, I hold that one is only rationally assessable for having a psychological state if it is commitment-involving. The upshot is that one is rationally assessable for having beliefs one recognises to be inconsistent, but one is not rationally assessable for having desires that one recognises to be inconsistent.

In summary, I reject the Desire-as-Belief Thesis because it overlooks two important asymmetries between desire and belief; Truth-Value Asymmetry and Rational-Commitment Asymmetry.

Anti-Humeanism, Anti-Emotivism, and the Desire-as-Belief Thesis

Let us refer to the claim that the good is the object of desire in a sense analogous to how the true is the object of belief as the Broadly Anscombean View. One way of unpacking the Broadly Anscombean view is in terms of the Desire-as-Belief Thesis. In his paper, “Belief, Desire, and Revision”, John Collins defines the Desire-as-Belief Thesis as “the thesis that desire is a particular kind of belief—that to desire A is simply to believe that A would be good."

We may distinguish between weak and strong versions of the Desire-as-Belief Thesis; the claim that some desires are beliefs and the claim that all desires are beliefs, respectively. But this distinction, while significant in its own right, will have little bearing on the present discussion. This is because we are only concerned with the Desire-as-Belief Thesis as a means of unpacking the Broadly Anscombean View; namely, the claim that the good is the object of desire. When we unpack the Broadly Anscombean View in terms of the Desire-as-Belief Thesis, we arrive at the claim that desiring to φ is identical to the belief that φ is good. Now, according to the weak version of the Desire-as-Belief Thesis, only some desires to φ are identical to the belief that φ is good. However, on those occasions in which the desire to φ is not identical to the belief that φ is good, the desire in question does not have the good as its object. Therefore, the Broadly Anscombean View does not apply to such desires. Hence, insofar as we are interested in the Desire-as-Belief Thesis as a means of unpacking the Broadly Anscombean View, we are only concerned with those cases in which a desire may be said to be identical to a belief. Consequently, the distinction between the weak and strong versions of the Desire-as-Belief Thesis is superflous for our present purposes.

In his paper, “Defending Desire-as-Belief”, Huw Price highlights two motivations for the desire-as-belief thesis; a rejection of the Humean theory of desire and a defence of anti-emotivism in moral discourse. He writes:

In modern terminology the Humean view is thus that action is a joint product of an agent's beliefs and desires; and that these are distinct kinds of mental states, desires being distinguished from beliefs in virtue of their motivational role .... In recent years, however, several philosophers have questioned the Humean orthodoxy. They suggest that certain beliefs might be intrisically motivational—in effect, in other words, that some or all desires might themselves be beliefs .... An attractive feature of the suggestion that (some) desires might be beliefs has been its evident potential to undermine emotivist accounts of moral discourse (and so to enable ethical statements to be brought within the scope of a truth-conditional general semantics).

According to Price, the Humean view amounts to the thesis that desires are intrinsically motivational while beliefs are not. Moreover, Price construes emotivist accounts of moral discourse as entailing the denial of the claim that ethical statements display a truth-conditional semantics. I will refer to the rejection of the Humean view as Anti-Humeanism, and the rejection of the emotivism as Anti-Emotivism.

Although, in the passage just cited, Price associates the Desire-as-Belief Thesis with Anti-Humeanism and Anti-Emotivism, it is worth emphasising that the denial of the Desire-as-Belief Thesis is consistent with both. It is common ground between the Humean and the Anti-Humean that desires are intrinsically motivating. However, the Humean denies, and the Anti-Humean affirms, that some beliefs are also intrinsically motivating. But one may consitently subscribe to the claim that some beliefs are intrinsically motivating and yet deny that desires are beliefs. For example, suppose one held that being intrinsically motivational is a necessary but insufficient condition for a psychological state to be a desire. Then one may also consistently hold that desires are distinct psychological states from beliefs (thereby denying the Desire-as-Belief Thesis) and that some beliefs are intrinsically motivational (thereby affirming non-Humeanism).

Moreover, if we identify the content of moral discourse with the content of an intrinsically motivating belief (rather than with the content of a desire), then we may consistently hold that moral discourse displays a truth-conditional semantics and that the content of desire does not. One only needs to add the further assumption that the content of an intrinsically motivating belief displays a truth-conditional semantics. Hence, if we reject the Desire-as-Belief Thesis, it does not follow from this rejection that either Anti-Humeanism or Anti-Emotivism is false.

The preceding observations draw attention to an important feature of Price's account. Price associates the claim that “certain beliefs might be intrinsically motivational” with the claim that “some or all desires might themesleves be beliefs”; either equating the two claims or taking the second to be entailed by the first. However, the equivalence or entailment only holds if we assume that being motivational is a sufficient condition for a psychological state to be a desire. In brief, Price assumes that only desires are intrinsically motivational. However, it seems like both the Humean and the Anti-Humean alike is well within her rights in rejecting this assumption. For example, both the Humean and the Anti-Humean may hold that certain emotions, like love and hatred, are intrinsically motivational. However, it is not immediately clear, nor is it a fundamental assumption of either Humeanism or Anti-Humeanism, that love and hate are desires. In fact, both the Humean and Anti-Humean is free to deny that emotions, like love or hate, are (typically) propositional attitudes.

While I do not wish to either endorse or impugn such a position, I do wish to stress that it is not inconsistent with either Humeanism or Anti-Humeanism. The upshot is that both the Humean and Anti-Humean may reject the claim that only desires are intrinsically motivating. If this suggestion is right, then it is best to see Humeanism as being committed, not to the thesis that desires are the only psychological states that are intrinsically motivating, but rather to the claim that beliefs are not among those psychological states that are. The Anti-Humean, by contrast, wants to insist that at least some beliefs (perhaps, beliefs about the good or about what one should do) are included among the set of psychological states that are intrinsically motivationg. But once it is acknowledge that the set of intrinsically motivating psychological states is not limited to desires, then (as far as Anti-Humeanism is concerned) there is no need to insist that desires are beliefs.

Propositional Content vs. Representational Content

In my last two posts, "Introducing Felicity Conditions" and "Anscombe and Felicity Conditions", I have tried to unpack a particular conception of the correctness conditions of the attitudinal component of the propositional attitude (in contradistinction to the correctness conditions of propositional content of a propositional attitude). Moreover, I hold that the correctness conditions of the attitudinal component of a propositional attitude (or what I refer to as "felicity-conditions" is determined by the attitude's representational component. When this claim is conjoined with the claim that the felicity-conditions of a propositional attitude may differ from the correctness conditions of its propositional content, the upshot is that the representational content of a propositional attitude may also differ from its propositional content. In this post, I want to say why I think this claim should be accepted.

According to the account of desires presently on offer—one that takes its inspiration from Anscombe—desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is felicitous just in case my leaving work at 2pm is an instance of the good. Hence, the felicity-conditions of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm coincide with the felicity-conditions of believing that my leaving work at 2pm is good. Recall, the belief that my leaving work at 2pm is good is felicitous just in case it is true that my leaving work at 2pm is good. This follows from the fact that the felicity conditions of a belief correspond with the truth-conditions of its propositional content. Similarly, my desire that I will leave work at 2pm is felicitous just in case it is true that my leaving work at 2pm is good. This observation makes it tempting to revise the propositional content of the desire to leave work at 2pm so that it coincides with the propositional content of believing that my leaving work at 2pm is good. Hence, we may be tempted to say that the propositional content of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is not the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm” but rather, the proposition, “my leaving work at 2pm is good”.

Unfortunately, it is untenable that the propositional content of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is the proposition “my leaving work at 2pm is good”. Revising the propositional content of the desire in this way simply changes the object of the desire in question. To see that this is so, we merely have to register that desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is different from desiring that my leaving work at 2pm is good. Hence, we need to leave room in our theorising for desires with either propositional content. There are at least three reasons why this is so.

First, the satisfaction-conditions of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is identical to the truth-conditions of the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”, while the satisfaction-conditions of desiring that my leaving work at 2pm is good is identical to the truth-conditions of the proposition, “my leaving work at 2pm is good”. The fact that the desires in question have different satisfaction-conditions suggests that they are in fact distinct desires.

Second, the first desire is the type that typically yields an intention while the second is not. For example, desiring that I will leave work at 2pm may yield the intention to leave work at 2pm. However, it is not typically the case that I can intend that my leaving work at 2pm be a realisation of the good. Moreover, even if I could intend that my leaving work at 2pm be a realisation of the good, it is entirely conceivable that I may successfully carry out that intention without actually bringing it about that I leave work at 2pm. For example, I may intend that my leaving work at 2pm be a realisation of the good by completing some work related project three hours early. But I may complete my project early, and thereby make my leaving work at 2pm a realisation of the good, without actually leaving work at 2pm. Thus, if I did form the intention that my leaving work at 2pm be good, it would still be a different intention to the one I would form if I intended to leave work at 2pm.

Third, desiring that my leaving work at 2pm is good requires that I possess and deploy the concept “good”, while desiring that I will leave work at 2pm does not. Hence, it is important that we preserve the distinction between a desire with the propositional content, “I will leave work at 2pm”, and a desire with the propositional content, “my leaving work at 2pm is good”.

The preceding considerations impugn the claim that desiring that I will leave work at 2pm has the same propositional content as believing that my leaving work at 2pm is good. However, there may still be a way to salvage the idea that the desire that I will leave work at 2pm and the belief that my leaving work at 2pm is good share something in common, content-wise. Towards this end, we may distinguish between the propositional content and representational content of a propositional attitude. Desiring that I will leave work at 2pm has the same propositional content as believing that I will leave work at 2pm; namely, the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”. However, while believing that I will leave work at 2pm represents the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”, to be true, desiring that I will leave work at 2pm does not represent the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm” to be true. Rather, desiring that I will leave work at 2pm represents the truth of the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”, to be a realisation of the good. Given this difference, it seems natural to say that believing that I will leave work at 2pm has a different representational content to desiring that I will leave work at 2pm. After all, how could two propositional attitudes have the same representational content if one represents something to be true and the other represents something to be good. The upshot is that two propositional attitudes that share the same propositional content may nevertheless exhibit different representational contents.

Anscombe and Felicity Conditions

In my previous post, I introduced the notion of felicity-conditions; defined as the correctness-conditions of the attitudinal component of a propositional attitude (in contradistinction to the correctness-conditions of the propositional content of a propositional attitude). In the present post, I want say a little about how the notion of a felicity-condition relates to Anscombe's claim that the good is the object of wanting.

Let us refer to the claim that desires do not have felicity-conditions that are identical to the truth-conditions of their propositional content as the negative thesis. The negative thesis is neutral on the question of whether or not desires have felicity-conditions at all; to wit, it takes no stand on whether or not the attitude of desire has correctness-conditions beyond the correctness-conditions of its propositional content (i.e., the truth-conditions of the propositional attitude). The primary motivation for the negative thesis comes from our ordinary linguistic practice; namely, the fact that we do not ordinarily conceive of desires as true or false. We may unpack this intuition by registering that while beliefs represent a certain proposition as true, desires do not. For example, the belief that I will have a slice of cheesecake represents the proposition “I will have a slice of cheesecake” to be true. However, the desire that I will have a slice of cheesecake does not represent the proposition “I will have a slice of cheesecake” to be true. If it did, then it would make sense to say that the desire that I will have a slice of cheesecake is true when the proposition “I will have a slice of cheesecake” is true, and false when the proposition is false. However, as we already noted, we do not ordinarily speak or think this way.

In addition to the negative thesis, I wish to argue that, like the attitude of belief, the attitude of desire has felicity-conditions. However, while the felicity-conditions of a belief are identical with its truth-conditions, I hold that the same is not true of the felicity-conditions of desire. Let us refer to this claim as the positive thesis. Something along the lines of the positive thesis must be accepted if we wish to buy into Anscombe's theory of desires. Recall, according to Anscombe, desire (or wanting) stands in a roughly analogous relation to the good as belief (or judgement) does to the true. However, the negative thesis—namely, the claim that the attitude of desire lacks a truth-value—offers little support for this claim. To wit, the mere fact that the attitude of desire lacks a truth-value does not show that it stands in a certain relation to the good. Moreover, preserving Anscombe's thesis requires that we see the attitude of desire as having something along the lines of what I have been calling 'felicity-conditions'. On this score, the following passage from Anscombe is instructive:

The conceptual connexion between 'wanting'. . . and 'good' can be compared to the conceptual connexion between 'judgment' and 'truth'. Truth is the object of judgement, and good the object of wanting; it does not follow from this either that everything judged must be true, or that everything wanted must be good.

If the fact that the good is the object of desire does not entail that everything desired must be good, then it follows that it is at least possible that a particular desire may get things wrong. Moreover, it seems safe to assume that Anscombe is also committed to saying that it is possible for desire to sometimes get things right. Hence, by Anscombe's lights, desires may be described as two-valued, such that there are cases in which a desire may be said to get things wrong and cases in which a desire may be said to get things right. This suggests that desires have some kind of correctness-conditions, which determine when a desire can be said to get things right. But since the cases in which a desire gets things wrong or right do not correspond with those cases in which the propositional content of a desire is true or false, the correctness-conditions of the attitude of desire (whatever they happen to be) cannot be identical to the truth-conditions of its propositional content.

One very natural way of understanding the claim that the good is the object of desire is to say that a desire is felicitous just in case its object is an instance of the good. Rephrased in the language of propositional attitudes, we may say that a desire is felicitous just in case the truth of its propositional content is a realisation of the good. For example, desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is felicitous just in case the truth of the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”, is a realisation of the good. However, some caution is required here. The present claim is not that desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is felicitous only if I do leave work at 2pm; to wit, it is not necessary that the propositional content of the desire be true in order for the desire to be felicitous. Rather, it is only necessary that, were the propositional content true, it would be a realisation of the good. This comports with Anscombe's observation that “goodness is ascribed to wanting in virtue of the goodness (not the actualisation) of what is wanted.”

In other words, the felicity-conditions of a desire should not be confused with its satisfaction-conditions. The satisfaction-conditions of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm just are the conditions under which the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm” is true. However, if my leaving work at 2pm is not an instance of the good—because, let us suppose, it would involve my leaving an important project uncompleted—then desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is not felicitous even if I do leave work at 2pm. Thus, desiring that I leave work at 2pm may be infelicitous even if the satisfaction-conditions of the desire have been met. Moreover, desiring that I will leave work at 2pm may be felicitous even if the satisfaction-conditions of the desire have not been met; to wit, even if the proposition “I will leave work at 2pm” is false. For example, if my leaving work at 2pm is a realisation of the good—because, let us suppose, it would allow me to spend some quality time with my family—then desiring that I leave work at 2pm is felicitous even if I do not leave work at 2pm. The upshot is that the felicity-conditions of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm, when construed along Anscombean lines, are different from the satisfaction-conditions of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm.

Let us take stock of what we have seen thus far. First, we noted that although the propositional content of desire has truth-conditions, just like the propositional content of belief, the attitude of desire is ordinarily assumed to lack a truth-value. Using the label 'felicity-conditions' to refer to the correctness-conditions of an attitude (in contradistinction from the correctness-conditions of the propositional content of an attitude), we may say that the felicity-conditions of a desire, assuming that it has felicity-conditions, do not correspond with the truth-conditions of its propositional content. Moreover, I have argued that preserving the Anscombean thesis that the good is the object of desire entails that desires have some kind of correctness-conditions.

Why Questions and Rational Agents

In this post I continue to limn a novel theory of action. I hold that an intentional agent counts as a rational agent if and only if that agent is responsive to should-questions. Examples of should questions include: “Should Sue have a third glass of wine?”, “Should I believe in God?” and “Should I desire revenge?” To ask if Sue should have a third glass of wine is to ask if having a third glass of wine is good. This gives rise to the following question. If having a desire already involves an appearance of the good (as I have claimed), then does not Sue’s desire for a third glass of wine already entail an affirmative answer to the question “is having a third glass of wine good?” I hold that in the case of animals that are unable to deliberate and thereby arrive at judgements about what is good this is in fact the case. However, agents with the capacity for rational deliberation may arrive at judgements about the good that are at odds with their desires. In such agents what appears to be good a la desire may be different from what is judged to be good.

What is judged to be good reflects the perspective of the agent. What appears to be good a la desire reflects the perspective of some subsystem of the agent. On this score, the analogy with theoretical reasoning is rather straightforward. For example, we may say that from the perspective of the visual subsystem it is true that a partially submerged stick is bent. Even so, from an agent-level perspective, it may be false that the partially submerged stick is bent. Thus, both theoretical and practical cognitions exhibit two distinct levels of evaluation—namely, sub-agential evaluations and agent-level evaluations. The sub-agential evaluations in theoretical and practical reasoning are (perceptual) appearances and desires respectively:

(T2): Appearances are sub-agential perspectives on the true

(P2): Desires are sub-agential perspectives on the good

The agent-level evaluations in theoretical and practical cognitions are theoretical and practical judgements respectively:

(T3): Theoretical judgements are agent-level perspectives on the true

(P3): Practical judgements are agent-level perspectives on the good

Sub-agential evaluations, (T1) and (P1), may be had by both rational and proto-rational animals alike. However, in the case of proto-rational animals, an appearance of the good a la desire, leads to intentional action without agent-level evaluations. For such agents, there is only one level of evaluation—namely, the sub-agential. However, for rational animals there are two levels of evaluation: the sub-agential (as represented by desires) and the agent-level (as represented by practical judgements).

Rational deliberation is the process by which competing sub-agential evaluations are weighed against each other in order to arrive at a unified agent-level evaluation of the true/good. The motivation for rational deliberation comes from a desire, inherent in all rational agents as such, for a unified perspective on the true/good. In cases in which all the relevant sub-agential systems agree on what is true/good (which may very well be the majority of cases) a unified agent-level perspective is easy to come by. In such cases, the need for deliberation is minimal and there may be very little difference in the cognitive activity of a rational and proto-rational animal. However, in cases in which two (or more) sub-agential evaluations are at odds with each other, a unified agent-level evaluation can only be arrived at by endorsing one and rejecting the other. In such cases, the advantages of having a capacity for rational deliberation become most apparent.

In cases in which a proto-rational animal experiences two competing sub-agential evaluations, which ever exerts the greater volitional force ultimately determines what the animal believes (in the case of appearances) or which action is performed (in the case of desires). For such animals there is no agent-level evaluation or all-things-considered judgement about what should be believed or done. For such animals, should-questions are simply not applicable. This imposes a significant limitation on the ability of proto-rational animals to achieve right belief or action. Which of the two competing sub-agential evaluation happens to exert the greater motivational force may not be the one that actually gets things right. Consider the partially submerged stick example. Suppose that while it appears true that the stick is bent, from the perspective of the visual sub-system, it also appears true that the stick is straight from the perspective of the tactile sub-system. We can imagine a proto-rational animal for which the deliverances of the visual system exerts greater motivational force vis-à-vis its beliefs than the tactile system. Such an animal would form the belief that the partially submerged stick is bent when it is in fact straight.

Contrast this with rational agents that have the capacity for agent-level evaluations. Confronted with competing appearances (each relative to a particular perspective), the rational agent can only arrive at a unified agent-level assessment by endorsing one of the sub-agential evaluations and rejecting the other. It decides which of the sub-agential evaluations to endorse based on which best coheres with its beliefs, values and commitments. For example, we can suppose that the rational agent has observed the stick being submerged and removed from the water and that it also has the belief that sticks are not the kind of things that can bend and straighten themselves out at will. Moreover, it may also believe that optical illusions are far more common than tactile illusions. When the deliverances of the visual and tactile subsystems are considered in the light of these beliefs, the rational agent may be led to see the tactile subsystem as a more reliable guide to the true, in the particular case. This may then prompt the rational agent to judge that the partially submerged stick is actually straight. I will refer to beliefs that are the product of rational deliberation as judgements. Judgements represent a special subset of beliefs that only animals with the capacity for rational deliberation can have. Judgements have a greater chance of getting things right than beliefs that are not judgements since they are not simply the product of what sub-agential evaluation happens to be stronger.

The upshot of a capacity for judgements is that an animal is more versatile in forming true beliefs in novel circumstances. What appears to be true/good is simply a product of the type of subsystems we have, given our evolutionary history. The fact that it appears to be true that a partially submerged stick is bent is simply an upshot of the type of visual system we happen to have. If instead of light waves, which are subject to refraction, our visual system actually detected delta-waves, which are not subject to refraction, then our visual systems would not tell us that partially submerged sticks are bent. Likewise, the fact that I may desire sweets (perhaps contrary to my better judgement) is also primarily the product of my evolutionary history.

Given how natural selection works, our subsystems offer the types of evaluations that they do because they tended to get things right in the environment of our biological ancestors. However, when we are confronted with unfamiliar circumstances (ones that our ancestors may not have frequently encountered) there is a greater chance that one or more of our subsystems would get things wrong. Rational deliberation serves as a corrective against the fallibility of our subsystems which (though open to modification via training) cannot be adapted at the rate that our agent-level evaluations can. In brief, agent-level evaluations increase our chances of getting things right in novel circumstances since they may serve as a corrective against the errors of our less plastic sub-agential evaluations. This gives rational animals a clear advantage over proto-rational animals in arriving at true beliefs and good actions.