Wednesday 30 March 2011

A (Selective) Outline of Velleman's "The Guise of the Good"

Disclaimer: The following is a (selective) outline of what I take to be the central argument of David Velleman's paper, “The Guise of the Good”. A number of Velleman's specific arguments have been omitted, not because I believe they are unimportant or uninteresting, but for the sake of brevity.


SYNOPSIS OF PAPER: Velleman argues that the Guise of the Good theory (henceforth, “GG theory”) errs by either making an evaluative term (henceforth, “the good”) part of the propositional content of the attitude motivating an intentional action (henceforth, “a desire”) or by equating the good with the direction of fit of a desire. The first strategy fails because it entails that an agent can have a desire only if she possesses the concept of the good, and the second strategy fails because it conflates the constitutive aim of an attitude with its direction of fit. Velleman concludes by advancing the positive proposal that desire aims at the attainable.


BRIEF OUTLINE OF PAPER:
I Motivating cognitivism: The Primacy of Rational Guidance (pp. 3-7)
II Sophisticated Cognitivism: The Direction-of-Fit Approach (pp. 7-9)
III The Aim of Desire: Objections to Sophisticated Cognitivism (pp. 10-19)


DETAILED OUTLINE OF PAPER:
I Motivating cognitivism: The Primacy of Rational Guidance
Summary: Velleman defines GG theory as the claim that intentional action aims at the good. GG Theory is motivated by an attempt to reconcile two seemingly incompatible stories of the origin of human action; namely, the story of motivation and the story of rational guidance. Non-cognitivism emphasizes the story of motivation at the expense of the story of rational guidance, and cognitivism emphasizes the story of rational guidance at the expense of the story of motivation. The main motivation for rejecting non-cognitivism and adopting cognitivism, according to Velleman, is a desire to preserve the commonsense story of the origin of human action.

Discussion:
(i) Story of motivation = an agent acts intentionally when her action is caused by a desire for some outcome and a belief that the action will promote it. (p. 3)

(ii) Story of rational guidance = an agent acts intentionally when the action justifying character of a proposition prompts her action via her grasp of that proposition. (p. 4)

Noncognitivism = emphasises story of motivation at the expense of the story of rational guidance.

Weakness of non-cognitivism = it is at odds with the commonsense story. “In the commonsense story, the agent is moved toward action because his reasons justify it; whereas in the noncognitivist story, his reasons justify his action in virtue of moving him toward it.” (p. 5)

Cognitivism = emphasises story of rational guidance at the expense of the story or motivation.

Weakness of cognitivism = entails that an agent can have a desire only if she has evaluative concept. “If the cognitivist seriously means to characterise desire as an attitude toward an evaluative proposition, then he implies that the capacity to desire requires the possession of evaluative concepts. Yet a young child can want things long before it has acquired the concept of their being worth wanting or desirable.” (p. 7)

Upshot: Noncognitivism is unattractive because it fails to preserve the commonsense story of motivation and cognitivism is implausible because it entails that an agent can act intentionally only if it possesses certain evaluative concepts.


II Sophisticated Cognitivism: The Direction-of-Fit Approach
Summary: Sophisticated cognitivism unpacks the claim that the attitude motivating an intentional action (henceforth, I will simply speak of a desire) aims at the good in terms of the attitude's direction-of-fit. On this view, a cognitive attitude (like belief) may be said to aim after truth because its propositional object is regarded as a factum (something that is the case); while a conative attitude (like desire) may be said to aim after the good because its propositional object is regarded as a faciendum (something that is to be made the case). The upshot is that a propositional attitude is characterised, not only by the proposition that embodies its content, but also by the attitude's direction of fit (i.e., whether it represents its propositional object as a factum or faciendum).

Discussion:
cognitive attitude = a proposition is grasped as patterned after the world (or factum).
conative attitude = a proposition is grasped as a pattern for the world to follow (or faciendum).

(i) Simple cognitivism = involves action-justifying propositions.
According to simple cognitivism, desires aim at the good in virtue of their propositional content, which include the predicate “good”. (p. 6)

(ii) Sophisticated cognitivism = involves action-justifying attitudes.
According to sophisticated cognitivism, desires aim at the good in virtue of type of attitude it is—namely, that it is a conative attitude—rather than in terms of its propositional content. (pp. 8ff)

Upshot: According to sophisticated cognitivism, desires justify or provide reasons for action, not because of their propositional content, but because of the way the propositional content of a desire is grasped; namely, as something to be brought about. (p. 9)


III The Aim of Desire: Objections to Sophisticated Cognitivism
Summary: According to Velleman, desire aims, not at the good, but at the attainable. This follows from the following three theses. First, the constitutive aim of belief is whatever distinguishes it from all other states with a cognitive direction of fit; namely, the fact that beliefs are only correct when they are true. Second, what distinguishes desire from all other states with a conative direction of fit is not the fact that it aims after the good, since this is something it shares with all other conative states. Third, what distinguishes desire from all other conative states is the fact that desire aims at the attainable. The upshot is that the central thesis of sophisticated cognitivism—namely, that desire aims at the good—is mistaken.

Discussion:
Velleman exploits an analogy from belief to argue that desires do not aim at the good. He draws a distinction between the direction of fit of belief and the aim of belief (p. 12 ff):

(i) direction of fit of belief = that in virtue of which it is a cognitive state.
(ii) aim of belief = that in virtue of which it is correct just in case it is true

The following is a rough reconstruction of Velleman's argument. (Note: "given" indicates a theoretically motivated claim, and "observed" indicates an empirically motivated claim.)

(1) Belief is a cognitive state in virtue of its direction of fit. (given)

(2) Belief does not share the same aim as other cognitive states. (observed)

(3) Aim of belief = what sets belief apart from other cognitive states. (loosely from (1) and (2))

(4) Aim of desire = what sets desire apart from other conative states. (by analogy from (3))

(5) Sophisticated cognitivism entails that desire aims at the good in virtue of its direction of fit. (given)

(6) Sophisticated cognitivism entails that all conative states have the same direction of fit. (given)

(7) Sophisticated cognitivism entails that all conative states aim at the good. (loosely from (5) and (6))

(8) Sophisticated cognitivism entails that the good is not the aim of desire. (loosely from (4) and (7))

(8) What sets desire apart from all other conative states = being directed at the attainable. (observed)

(9) Aim of desire = being directed at the attainable. (loosely from (4) and (8))

Upshot: Velleman's negative thesis is that, contra sophisticated cognitivism, the constitutive aim of desire is not the good. Velleman's positive thesis is that the constitutive aim of desire is the attainable (p. 17). Given that the constitutive aim of belief is the truth, it follows from Velleman's positive thesis that desire stands to the attainable as belief stands to the truth.

Tuesday 22 March 2011

2011 Intermountain West Graduate Philosophy Conference

Thursday, April 7 – Saturday, April 9
University of Utah

Conference Schedule


Thurs, April 7: All Sessions in the Philosophy Department (CTIHB)

2:00-6:00 Registration (CTIHB-Philosophy Department)

2:00-2:50 “Representationalism and the Phenomenology of Attention” (LNCO 2100)
Speaker: Brian Cutter (University of Texas, Austin)
Commentator: Manuel Cabrera (UCLA)

3:00-3:50 “Naturalism without Physicalism” (LNCO 2100)
Speaker: Manuel Cabrera (UCLA)
Commentator: Matt Mosdell (U. of Utah)

4:00-4:50 “Unpacking the Guise of the Good Theory” (LNCO 2100)
Speaker: Avery Archer (Columbia University)
Commentator: Matt Berk (U. of Utah)

5:15-7:00 Plenary Address: “Divine Hiddenness and Theistic Responses” (Tanner Philosophy Library)
Justin McBrayer (Fort Lewis College)


Friday, April 8: All Sessions in the Philosophy Department (CTIHB)

9:30-10:20
A. “A Dilemma for Quine’s Epistemology” (459)
Speaker: Matthew Baddorf (Rochester)
Commentator: Blake Vernon (U. of Utah)

B. “Morality without Demands: A Critique of Scalar Consequentialism” (406)
Speaker: Spencer Case (University of Colorado)
Commentator: Steve Tensmeyer (BYU)

10:30-11:20
A. “Interpreting Probability in Statistical Mechanics” (459)
Speaker: Joshua Hershey (Princeton University)
Commentator: Christopher Lean (U. of Utah)

B. “Defending Universalism from Relativistic Outlaws” (406)
Speaker: Matthew Gorski (University of Notre Dame)
Commentator: TBD

11:30-12:20
A. “On the Value of Uncertainty” (459)
Speaker: Lucas Matthews (University of Utah)
Commentator: Stephanie Shiver (U. of Utah)

B. “The Prototype Structure of Moral Concepts” (406)
Speaker: John J. Park (Duke University)
Commentator: Spencer Case (University of Colorado)

12:30-1:30 Lunch (on your own)

1.30-2.20
A. “Introducing Substantive Metaphysics Epistemically” (MBH 112)
Speaker: Lucas Halpin (UC-Davis)
Commentator: TBD

B. “Moral Skepticism: An Innocent Companion” (MBH 302)
Speaker: Matthew Lutz (University of Southern California)
Commentator: Matthew Lee (University of Notre Dame)

2:30-3:00: reception with tea and hors d’oeuvres (philosophy dept. lounge)

3:00-5:00: Keynote address – “You and I” (CTIHB 406 - Tanner Philosophy Library)
Michael Thompson (University of Pittsburgh)

6:00-8:00: Faculty-hosted dinner (Leslie Francis): catered by Sugar House BBQ

Saturday, April 9: All Sessions in the Philosophy Department

9:30-10:20
A. “Charitable Neo-Logicism” (459)
Speaker: Sebastian Petzolt (Oxford University)
Commentator: Matthew Barney (U. of Utah)

B. “Wrongs without Rights” (406)
Speaker: Nicolas Cornell (Harvard University)
Commentator: Matt Berk (U. of Utah)

10:30-11:20
A. “Against Old Facts Under New Modes” (459)
Speaker: Gabriel Rabin (UCLA)
Commentator: Landon McBrayer (U. of Utah)

B. “On Answerability in the Realm of Criminal Responsibility” (406)
Speaker: Nicholas Sars (Bowling Green University)
Commentator: Steve Capone (U. of Utah)

11:30-12:20 “Saving ‘Stability for the Right Reasons’ from Rawls: Why We Should Drop the Idea of Overlapping Consensus” (406)
Speaker: Gregg Strauss (University of Illinois-Urbana)
Commentator: Kai Kaululaau (Cal. State, LA)


12:30 Lunch, closing.

Tuesday 15 March 2011

2011 Waterloo PGSA Conference

The University of Waterloo Philosophy Graduate Student Conference - 2011

Conference Schedule:

Friday, April 1

Session 1
Hagey Hall 373

10:00 AM Ivan Kasa Stockholm/MIT
“Neo-Fregean Abstractionism and Mathematical Truth”
This paper aims to restore a more balanced view on how Bob Hale and Crispin Wright’s Neo-Fregean theory of abstractionism relates to questions raised in Benacerraf’s classic Mathematical Truth. I claim that, contrary to received opinion, the prevalent strands of thought in Mathematical Truth cannot be taken to support abstractionism as a response to epistemological worries surrounding a homogenous Tarskian semantics.

11:00 AM Yuna Won Yonsei University, South Korea
“Modified Acceptability Condition of Indicative Conditionals”
This paper will deal with conditionals having a true antecedent and consequent – I will call them idle conditionals. Most of theories of conditionals have regarded them as true but uninteresting conditionals. However, most idle conditionals are rarely used in our daily lives and even seem to be unacceptable. Most theories of conditionals have ignored this issue and thought that philosophical theories do not need to reflect all mundane intuitions. It means those theories cannot explain why we are not willing to assert and accept idle conditionals. I will suggest Modified Acceptability Condition (MAC) to explain the phenomenon and show that MAC can be generally accepted by existing theories. Furthermore, MAC will solve some puzzling cases neglected in most of theories of conditionals. Finally, I will show that it will bring some benefits to the existing theories.

12:00 PM Avery Archer Columbia University
“Unpacking the Guise of the Good Theory of Desires”
According to the Guise of the Good Theory of Desires, desires are associated with the good in a sense roughly analogous to how beliefs are associated with the true. In this paper, I consider the three most common strategies for unpacking Guise of the Good Theory of Desires — namely, The Desire-as-Belief Thesis, The Desire-plus-Belief Thesis, and The Desire-as-Perception Thesis. I argue that all three approaches are unacceptable. I conclude by laying the foundation for a fourth way of unpacking the Guise of the Good Theory; namely, The Desire-as-Imperative Thesis. According to the Desire-as-Imperative Thesis, desiring to φ is equivalent to being the recipient of an imperative to φ. I argue that the Desire-as-Imperative Thesis offers us a way to unpack the Guise of the Good Theory of Desires that avoids the difficulties confronting the other three approaches.



Friday, April 1

Session 2
Hagey Hall 373

2:30 PM Matt LaVine University at Buffalo
“Truth and Fictional Discourse”
One of the most intuitive positions with respect to giving an account of truth-in- fiction is that determining what is true in a particular story begins and ends with determining what the storyteller says. Unfortunately, when this is understood as identifying truths in fiction with those things directly stated or implied (in a strictly logical sense) by the storyteller, problems seem to arise. Lewis famously demonstrated some of these. He then replaced the intuitive picture with one in which the storyteller’s claims are supplemented by collective belief worlds of the intended audience as truth-in-fiction truth-makers. Interestingly enough, in doing so, Lewis focused on coming up with truth-conditions for sentences of the form, ‘in fiction, p’, much more so than answering the question, ‘in virtue of what do these truth-conditions hold?’ In this paper we investigate problems that arise from Lewis neglecting this latter question and try to give our own tentative answer. This answer will come from a tweaking of Searle’s horizontal conventions posited in his paper, “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse.” Finally, this answer, which brings us back rather closely to the intuitive position, will be used to meet the difficulties that Lewis’s picture ran into.

3:30 PM Rhys McKinnon University of Waterloo
“Responding to Prompts and Challenges”
In this paper I propose a principle of interpretation for the content of challenges and prompts to assertions based on the criterion of what constitutes wholly adequate responses. I suggest that this is a unifying principle for the linguistic data, inasmuch as wholly adequate responses generally consist in giving one’s reasons for an assertion. I argue that the linguistic data is best explained by a reason-based norm such as Jennifer Lackey’s Reasonable to Believe Norm of Assertion (RTBNA). Consequently, I argue against John Turri’s claim that the data is best explained by the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA).

4:30 PM Andrew Parker Wilfrid Laurier University
“Hacker’s Davidson: On Incommensurability”
In my paper I examine P.M.S Hacker’s arguments for relativism, conceptual schemes and un-translatability between languages. Hacker’s strategy to save “incommensurable conceptual schemes” is to argue- contra Davidson- that there can be “untranslatable languages”. I will argue that Hacker’s road to “different conceptual schemes” is paved with “different languages” not “different concepts”. Although Hacker rejects Davidson’s “salient point”- that nothing can force us to decide if a disagreement between interlocutors lies in their beliefs rather than their concepts- I argue Hacker begs the question by postulating a non-empirical “conceptual scheme” in his account of “incommensurability”. I argue- contra Hacker- that rather than postulating “incommensurable conceptual schemes” we are left with the fact that humans have many different ways of talking about one and the same world.


Saturday, April 2

Session 1
Hagey Hall 373

10:00 AM Steven James University of Texas at Austin
“De Re Hallucination: A Distinctive Kind of Object Dependence”
Veridical perceptions and their subsequent perceptual beliefs give rise to object-dependent mental states. Hallucinatory phenomena force us to account for merely putatively object-dependent mental states and one familiar attempt to do so appeals to subjects’ related object-independent mental states. This fails to properly account for a particular class of hallucination; namely, de re hallucination. I identify what is needed in light of this result and make a suggestion for how theoretical progress can be made.

11:00 AM Yang Liu Columbia University
“The Sorites Paradox and Fuzzy Logic”
This paper studies degree theoretic approach to vagueness. The aim is to provide an explanation for the Sorites paradox from degree theorists' perspective. The paper includes a discussion of degrees and tolerance, both of which are taken to be fundamental features of language governing the use of vague predicates. A de- fense of degree theory is inserted in its due place. The analysis will then lead to the introduction of a basic propositional fuzzy logic which will serve as a conceptual framework within which the Sorites are treated. The paper shows that there is way of treating tolerance within degree theory by introducing a fuzzy notion of validity.

12:00 PM Justin Donhauser University at Buffalo
“Whales Are(n’t) Fish”
Contra the possibility of complete reduction of all domain-specific taxonomies to that of a unitary “final science,” several philosophers defend the view John Dupré dubs “promiscuous realism” and others variously call “pluralistic realism,” “semirealism,” and “perspectival realism.”1 In Dupré’s words ‘promiscuous realism’ [henceforth, PR] is the view that, “there are countless legitimate, objectively grounded ways of classifying objects in the world. And these may often cross-classify one another in indefinitely complex ways” (1993, 18). This essay is a critical discussion and defense of PR, which clarifies what the view should and should not entail. It is shown that PR is not a species of realism if it is compatible with a remark Dupré (1999; 2002) makes implying that a subset of the members of a biological kind can cease to be members of that kind without a change in the properties of those members. Toward that end, I provide an explicatory gloss of PR [§1], endorse Dupré’s original defense of the claim that whales are fish [§2], and show that PR is incompatible with Dupré’s follow-up claim that they are not and identify his error [§3]. Subsequently, inspired by some remarks of Diana Raffman and adopting positions advanced by Anjan Chakravartty, I offer a theory of how terminological vagueness and processes of abstraction in theory construction generate the legitimately crosscutting taxonomies espoused by PR [§4]. In closing, I briefly recapitulate the beneficial features of PR that bar errors like Dupré’s and evaluate the benefits of having equally unprivileged crosscutting taxonomies [§5].


3:30 PM Keynote Address
Dr. Diana Raffman University of Toronto
“Psychological Hysteresis and the Dynamic Sorites Paradox”
Abstract TBA

7:00 PM Conference Dinner

Ennio’s Restaurant
384 King Street n., Waterloo