Outline of Feldman's and Conee's "Internalism Defended"

SYNOPSIS:

Richard Feldman and Earl Conee defend the claim that S’s beliefs are justified only by things that are internal to S’s mental life (henceforth, J-internalism) against two types of objections: (1) those that claim that there are some justified beliefs for which there are no internal justifying states, and (2) those that claim that there are insurmountable difficulties in specifying the nature of the connection between beliefs and their corresponding justifying internal states.  Feldman and Conee argue that neither class of objections pose an unanswerable challenge to J-internalism.

OUTLINE:

Step 1: Feldman and Conee begin by distinguishing between two types of J-internalism: accessibilism and mentalism (pp. 1-2*).

Argument: Accessibilism holds that the epistemic justification of S’s beliefs depend solely on factors to which S has reflective access.  Mentalism holds that the epistemic justification of S’s beliefs depend solely on factors that are internal to S’s mental life. Accessibilism and mentalism are coextensive only if we assume that S has reflective access to every aspect of her mental life relevant to justification.

Upshot: There are at least two broad kinds of J-internalism: accessibilism and mentalism.

Step 2: Feldman and Conee characterise mentalism in terms of a supervenience and a mental duplicate claim (p. 2).

Argument: The supervenience thesis (S) holds that the justification of S’s beliefs supervene on S’s occurrent and dispositional mental states, events and conditions.  The mental duplicates thesis (M) holds that if two individuals, S1 and S2, are exactly alike mentally, then they are exactly alike justificationally.  Since the claim that justification supervenes on mental states entails that two individuals with the same mental states have the same justification, (S) entails (M).

Upshot: Mentalism may be characterised in terms of a supervenience thesis and a mental duplicates thesis, where the former entails the latter.

Step 3: Feldman and Conee argue that mentalism is the preferable characterisation of J-internalism (pp. 2-3).

Argument: In the philosophy of mind, internalism is the thesis that the content of S’s attitudes depend solely on factors internal to the cognitive apparatus of the agent.  This is meant to exclude social and environmental factors as determiners of the content of a subject’s mental states.  In short, mental content supervenes on a subject’s inner states.  Likewise, mentalism is meant to exclude plainly external factors as determiners of justification.  In short, justification supervenes on a subject’s mental states.

Upshot: Mentalism preserves the parallel between J-internalism and internalism in the philosophy of mind.

Step 4: Feldman and Conee consider five examples in which a change or difference in the mental life of subjects result in a change or difference in justification (pp. 4-5).

Argument:  In the first four examples the justificatory standing of an agent changes depending on what items of information are within the subject’s ken. In the fifth example, a purely internal difference decisively determine the subject’s justificatory standing.

Upshot: While the five examples considered do not establish that J-internalism is true, they suggest that J-internalism is consistent with our pre-theoretical intuitions.

Step 5: Feldman and Conee distinguish between two broad classes of objections to J-internalism (p. 5).

Argument: The first class of objections (i.e., those put forward by Alvin Plantinga and Alvin Goldman) claim that there are some justified beliefs for which there are no internal justifying states. The second class of objections (i.e., those put forward by William Alston and Ernest Sosa) claim that there are insurmountable difficulties in specifying the nature of the connection between beliefs and their internal justifying states.

Upshot: The defender of J-internalism must respond to two broad classes of objections if the plausibility of her belief is to be maintained.

Step 6: Feldman and Conee consider Alvin Plantinga’s objections to evidentialist versions of J-internalism; the thesis that an agent is justified by her evidence (pp. 5-6).

Argument: Plantinga maintains that evidence must either be propositional, sensory, or impulsional. Since any type of evidentialism that held that evidence constituted by beliefs (i.e., propositional) or experiences (i.e., sensory) could not account for mathematical knowledge, J-internalism must also include evidence that is constituted by a sense of conviction (i.e., impulsional).  However, since a sense of conviction accompanies all beliefs, allowing for impulsional evidence would result in all beliefs being justified.

Upshot: There cannot be a plausible account of evidentialism.

Step 7: Feldman and Conee respond to Plantinga’s objection to evidentialism (pp. 6-7).

Argument: Feldman and Conee point out that: (1) We often believe things we find counterintuitive or implausible and disbelieve things we find intuitive and plausible. So it is not true that all beliefs are accompanied by a sense of conviction (or at impulsional).  (2) Even if all beliefs were impulsional, there may still be defeaters that outweigh the impulsional evidence of a given belief, rendering the belief justificationally impotent. (3) According to some plausible views, we have an aprori insight that allows us to grasp simple mathematical propositions.  This allows us to say that mathematical beliefs are justified without implying that all beliefs are justified.

Upshot: Plantinga’s objection to evidentialism fails.

                          

Step 8: Feldman and Conee consider Alvin Goldman’s objection to J-internalism (p. 7.

Argument: Goldman argues that internal states cannot account for the justification of stored beliefs.  At any given time, there are many things we know that we are not considering. Since we know them, we also believe them, and the belief in question is justified. But given that the belief in question is nonocurrent, it could not be justified by a conscious mental state.

Upshot: J-internalist are stuck with the unacceptable result that stored beliefs are not justified, unless some internal justifier can be found.

Step 9: Feldman and Conee respond to Goldman’s objection to J-internalism (pp. 7-8)

Argument: Feldman and Conee argue that there are occurrent and dispositional senses of justified, just as there are occurrent and dispositional senses of belief.  Nonoccurrent beliefs may enjoy dispositional justification.  Moreover, there is no reason why the numerous ordinary justified beliefs a subject is not consciously considering could not justify her stored beliefs.

Upshot: Goldman’s objection to J-internalism fails.

Step 10: Feldman and Conee respond to Goldman’s objection to J-internalism based on the possibility of forgotten evidence (pp. 8-10).

Argument: Goldman points out that an agent’s belief may remain justified long after she has forgotten the original source of justification.  However, Feldman and Conee point out that: (1) the vivacity (or sense of certainty) that accompanies such a memory belief may provide justification for that belief, and (2) the agent’s justified beliefs about the reliability of her memory, may also provide her with justification for a memory belief even after she has forgotten the original justificatory source of the memory belief.

Upshot: The forgotten evidence objection to J-internalism fails.

Step 11: Feldman and Conee consider William Alston’s objection to J-internalism (p. 11).

Argument: Alston argues that if an agent believes some proposition, P, based on some evidence, E, then E can provide justification for P only if the agent has the higher-order belief that E provides justification for P.  However, typically, when we believe some proposition, P, based on some evidence, E, we never actually stop to consider if E justifiers P.  Consequently, if we buy into this view, then many of the beliefs we ordinarily take to be justified turn out not to be. 

Upshot: Given that J-internalsim requires higher-order beliefs about the justificatory efficacy of our evidence, many beliefs we ordinarily take to be justified turn out not to be.

Step 12: Feldman and Conee respond to Alston’s objection to J-internalism (pp. 11-13)

Argument: According to the evidentialist account favoured by Feldman and Conee, possessing the right evidence by itself secures the justification for the corresponding beliefs, independent of whether or not the agent considers the justificatory efficacy of said evidence.

Upshot: Alston’s objection to J-internalism fails.

Step 13: Feldman and Conee consider Ernest Sosa’s objection to J-internalism (p. 13).

Argument: Although some experiences directly fit the introspective beliefs that describe them (such as my experience of a white triangle against a black background), other experiences do not (such as my experience of a white 25-sided figure against a black background).  This poses the question: why does the experience of a triangle justify the introspective belief while the experience of a 23-sided figure does not.

Upshot: If the J-internalist is unable to explain this difference, then it remains unclear how, by their lights, any experience may be said to justify a belief.

Step 14: Feldman and Conee respond to Ernest Sosa’s objection to J-internalism (pp. 13-14).

Argument: Feldman and Conee point out that while we have the ability to perceptually recognise a triangle, we lack the ability to perceptual recognise a 23-sided figure.  However, if we imagine an agent who had the ability to perceptually recognise the latter, then that agent’s experience would be able to justify the corresponding introspective belief.  However, since such an agent would not be internally identical to us, this does not pose a problem for the claim that agents that are alike internally are alike in terms of justification.

Upshot: Sosa’s objection to J-internalism fails.

CONCLUSION

Given that J-internalism, broadly construed, suffers from no fatal defects, philosophers may move beyond the debate regarding whether or not J-internalism is feasible to flushing out a specific, detailed account of internalist justification.

*Page numbers based on the American Philosophical Quarterly article (Volume 38, Number 1, January 2001)

How Monkeys Mirror Human Irrationality

Outline of Nozick's "Knowledge"

SYNOPSIS:

Robert Nozick argues that S knows that p if and only if:

(1) p is true.

(2) S believes that p.

(3) If p weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that p.

(4) If p were true, S would believe that p and not-(S believes that not-p).

When (3) and (4) hold, S’s belief is said to “track the truth”.

OUTLINE:

Step 1: Nozick begins by impugning the standard causal account of knowledge.

Argument: The causal theory suffers from at least two weakness: (i) It fails to apply to cases of mathematical and ethical knowledge. (ii) It faces difficulties in specifying the appropriate type of causal connection.  For example, consider the case of an envatted brain that is caused (via direct electro-chemical stimulation) to have the belief that it is in a vat. Such a brain would not know it is in a vat even though the fact that it is envatted is causally connected to the belief that it is.

Upshot: We need to replace the causal requirement with a knew condition for knowledge.

Step 2: Nozick introduces a third requirement for knowledge which he thinks immunizes it from Gettier counterexamples.

Argument: Suppose S believes that (p):“someone in the office owns a Ford” based on his belief that Brown owns a Ford, when it is in fact someone else in the office, Jones, that owns a Ford, and not Brown.  S would fail to satisfy the subjunctive conditional: “If p weren’t true, S wouldn’t  believe that p”, since he would continue to believe (p) even if Jones did not own a Ford.

Upshot: We can avoid Gettier counter-examples if we adopt the following subjunctive conditional as a necessary condition for knowledge: “If p weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that p”.

                           

Step 3: Nozick claims that the preceding subjunctive conditional illuminates difficulties relating to the “relevant alternatives” analysis of knowledge.

Argument: Compare an agent driving through a country side with only real barns and one driving through a countryside with mostly fake barns and one real barn. If both formed the true belief that he was looking at a barn, the relevant alternative analysis suggests that, given that the latter is unable to rule out the possibility that he is looking at a fake barn, only the former has knowledge. We can make sense of this by noting that if the second agent were looking at a fake barn, he would believe it was real.  He therefore fails to fulfil the preceding subjunctive conditional. 

Upshot: We can make sense of why an agent lacks knowledge when he is unable to rule out relevant alternatives if we adopt the following necessary condition for knowledge:  “If p weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that p”.

Step 4: Nozick concedes that the preceding subjunctive conditional is not sufficient for knowledge.

Argument:  Since the envatted brain, in our previous example, is caused to believe it is in a vat by those who put it in a vat, it would not believe that it was in a vat if it were not envatted.  The envatted brain therefore fulfils the preceding subjunctive conditional.

Upshot: The subjunctive conditional, “If p weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that p”, is not sufficient for knowledge because it does not guarantee that S’s belief is sensitive to the truth.

Step 5: Nozick introduces a second subjunctive conditional in order to make sense of why the envatted brain does not know it is in a vat.

Argument: If the envatted brain were not electrically stimulated to believe that it was in a vat by its envatters, it would not believe it was in a vat even if it remained true that it was in a vat.  Hence, the following counterfactual is not true of the envatted brain: “If p were true, S would believe that p”.

Upshot: We can accommodate the intuition that the envatted brain lacks knowledge if we adopt the following necessary condition for knowledge: “If p were true, S would believe that p”.

Step 6: Nozick argues that his second subjunctive conditional can handle Gilbert Harman’s dictator example.

Argument: A newspaper reports, truly, that a dictator has been killed, but later, falsely, denies the story. Everyone comes to believe the false report, except for S, who read the original story but failed to learn about the retraction.  Given the assumption that S would have believed the false report had he read it, Harman claims that S does not know that the dictator has been killed. Nozick’s second subjunctive conditional is able to preserve this intuition: Since S would have believed the false report, it is not the case that if it were true that the dictator was killed, S would believe that the dictator was killed.

Upshot:  Nozick’s second subjunctive conditional allows us to preserve the intuition that the subject in Harman’s dictator example lacks knowledge.

Step 7: Nozick observes that the sceptic may be seen as denying that we fulfil Nozick’s first subjunctive conditional.

Argument: If we were all envatted brains or deceived by an evil demon, we would continue to believe as we do.  Thus, the sceptic may argue that one of the following two claims is true of us: “If p were false, we wouldn’t believe that p” or “If p were false, we might believe that p”. Either would entail that we fail to satisfy the following subjunctive conditional: “If p were false, S wouldn’t believe that p.”

Upshot: According to the sceptic, we do not have knowledge because we fail to satisfy Nozick’s first subjunctive conditional.

Step 8: Nozick maintains that sceptical scenarios (henceforth, SK) are not in the not-p neighbourhood of the actual world, and therefore do not prevent us from satisfying his first subjunctive conditional.

Argument: Even if p were false, it would not be true that SK.  This is because there are no not-p worlds, in the neighbourhood of the actual world, where SK obtains. Consequently, the fact that S would continue to believe p if SK obtained, does not prevent S from fulfilling the subjunctive conditional, “If p were false, S wouldn’t believe that p”. 

Upshot: Sceptical scenarios do not prevent us from satisfying Nozick’s first subjunctive conditional.

Step 9: Nozick concedes that the sceptic is right when she insists that we do not know that not-SK.

Argument: Given that Nozick’s first subjunctive conditional is necessary for knowledge, S can know that he is not a brain in a vat only if the following were true: If S were a brain in a vat, he would not believe he was not a brain in a vat.  However, since S would still believe he was not a brain in a vat even if he were a brain in a vat, his belief does not satisfy Nozick’s first subjunctive conditional. 

Upshot: Given that we would believe that we were not brains in a vat even if we were, we do not know that we are not brains in a vat. 

Step 10: Nozick argues that acknowledging that the sceptic is right when she says that we do not know not-SK does note entail that we do not know things that entail the denial of SK. 

Argument: It does not follow that if S knows that p: “I am awake and sitting in a chair in Jerusalem” and knows that p logically implies q: “I am not a brain in a tank at Alpha Centuri”, that S knows q. This is because the fact that S’s belief that p co-varies with the truth of p, does not mean that, in cases in which S knows that p logical implies q, S’s belief that q also co-varies with the truth of q.  Hence, knowledge, which requires the co-variation of the fact that p and the belief that p, is not closed under known logical implication.

Upshot: The sceptic’s challenge that I do not know that I am awake and sitting in Jerusalem because I do not know that I am not a brain in a tank, which presupposes that knowledge is closed under known logical implication, misses its mark. 

CONCLUSION:

Nozick concludes that a belief counts as knowledge only if it tracks the truth.

DISCUSSION QUESTION:

1. Is Nozick’s truth-tracking account simply a version of the causal theory of knowledge? Why or why not?

2. What does it mean to say that knowledge is closed under known logical entailment?  Why does Nozick think that this view of knowledge is mistaken? Do you agree with Nozick? Why or why not?

3. Does Nozick hold that the sceptic is mistaken when she insists that we do not know that we are not brains in a tank at Alpha Centauri?  Why or why not? Do you agree? Why or why not?

4. Does Nozick hold that the sceptic is mistaken when she insists that, given that I do not know that I am not a brain in a tank, I do not know that I am currently sitting and reading a book? Why or why not? Do you think Nozick’s argument succeeds? Why or why not?

Outline of Goldman's "A Casual Theory of Knowing"

SYNOPSIS:

Alvin Goldman argues that S knows that p, where p is an empirical proposition, if and only if the fact that p is causally connected in an “appropriate” way with S’s believing p.

OUTLINE:

Step 1: Goldman hypothesises that what goes wrong in Gettier examples—i.e., cases in which S allegedly has a justified true belief that p but does not know that p—is  that there is a lack of a causal connection between S’s believing that p and the fact that p.

Argument: In Gettier’s second example, in which Smith comes to believe the disjunction “Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona” based on the false belief that “Jones owns a Ford”, the fact that makes the disjunction true (viz., Brown is in Barcelona) is not causally connected to Smith’s believing the disjunction.

Upshot: We must add the requirement of causal connection between the fact that p and S’s believing that p to the traditional analysis to avoid Gettier’s objections.

Step 2: Goldman begins an examination of different cases of empirical knowledge with knowledge based on perception.

Argument: Suppose that there is a vase before S which is being obscured from S’s view by a laser photograph of a different vase and that S comes to believe that there is a vase before him based on the photograph.  In such a case, according to Goldman, S does not count as seeing the vase since there is no causal connection between the real vase and S’s belief that there is a vase. 

Upshot: Our ordinary concept of sight (i.e., knowledge acquired by sight) includes a causal requirement.

                          

Step 3: Goldman continues his examination of different cases of empirical knowledge with knowledge based on memory.

Argument: Neither (i) believing (or knowing) a fact as some time t0 and then believing (or knowing) it at a later time t1, nor (ii) having the impression of remembering (e.g., having one’s brain artificially stimulated to produce a memory impression) are sufficient for remembering (or knowledge based on memory). We must add a causal connection between the earlier and later case of believing (or knowing) in order for it to count as a case or remembering.

Upshot: A causal connection between an earlier belief (or knowledge) that p and a later belief (or knowledge) that p is a necessary ingredient in memory.

Step 4: Goldman continues his examination of different cases of empirical knowledge with knowledge based on inference.

Argument: Goldman contrasts the case in which an eruption leaves lava on the countryside which remains in place until someone, S, perceives it and the case in which the lava is removed and then (centuries later) someone else (unaware of the real volcano) places lava on the country side to make it look as if there had been an eruption.  If, in the latter case, S comes to perceive the latter, and then infers that there was an eruption, S would not count as knowing that there is an eruption.  This is because the eruption is not causally connected to S’s belief that there was an eruption.

Upshot: A necessary condition of S having inferential knowledge that p is that his believing that p be connected with the fact that p by a causal chain.

Step 5: Goldman concludes his examination of different cases of empirical knowledge with knowledge based on testimony.

Argument: Cases of knowledge based on testimony begin with the fact that p causing a subject, T, to believe that p and subsequently assert that p, which eventually leads to another subject, S, believing that p based on T’s assertion. Here, as before, there must be a causal chain connecting the fact that p to S’s believing that p in order for the belief to count as knowledge.

Upshot: There is a causal requirement for knowledge based on testimony.

Step 6: Goldman concedes that the requirement that S knows that p only if the fact that p caused S’s belief that p is too strong.

Argument: Assuming that we can know facts about the future, and precluding the possibility of backward causation, S’s belief that p cannot always be caused by the fact that p in order for S to know that p.  Moreover, I may come to know that there was smoke coming out of my chimney last night based on an inference from the fact that there was a fire in my fireplace last night, even though the smoke is not the cause of the fire in my fireplace.

Upshot: We must weaken the requirement that there be a causal connection between the fact that p and S’s belief that p to include cases in which the fact that p and S’s belief that p share a common cause.

Step 7: Goldman considers John Saunder’s and Narayan Champawat’s counterexample to Michael Clark’s analysis of knowledge.

Argument: Suppose that Smith forms the belief that “Jones owns a Ford” based on the testimony of Brown, who is generally reliable.  However, (unknown to Brown or Smith) Jones actually sold his Ford the day before and bought a Volkswagon.  Jones subsequently wins a Ford in raffle, making Smith’s belief true.  Although Smith’s belief is true and fully grounded (i.e., all his grounds are true) he still does not know that Jones owns a Ford.

Upshot: Clark’s requirement that a belief be fully grounded fails to provide a sufficient condition for knowledge due to the lack of a causal connection between Smith’s belief and the fact believed.

Step 8: Goldman considers Keith Lehrer’s counterexample to Clark’s analysis of knowledge.

Argument: Suppose that Smith forms the belief that “Someone in the office owns a Ford” based on an inference from his belief that Jones owns a Ford and his belief that Brown owns a Ford, both of whom are in his office.  However, since Brown does not own a Ford, one of Smith’s grounding beliefs is false. However, Smith still knows that someone in the office owns a Ford even though his grounds include a false belief.

Upshot: Clark’s requirement that a belief be fully grounded is not necessary for knowledge.

Step 9: Goldman maintains that “causal chains” may include, not only admixtures of causes  and inferences, but also causes and logical connections.

Argument: Smith forms the belief that (p), “Someone in the office owns a Ford”, based on the conjunction of the belief that (q) “Jones owns a Ford” and  (r) “Jones works in his office”.  Given that (q) and (r) logically entail (p), and given that (q) and (r) combine to cause Smith’s belief that (p),  it follows that there is a causal connection between the fact that (p) and Smith’s believing that (p).

Upshot: If X and Y are logically related, and Y is a cause of Z, then X also counts as a cause of Z.

Step 10: Goldman argues that since his causal analysis of knowledge does not require that a knower be able to justify or provide evidence in favour of the proposition known it is able to account for cases of knowledge that the traditional analysis excludes.

Argument: S may know that Abraham Lincoln was born in 1809 based on a warranted inference from an Encyclopaedia entry even after S has forgotten how he came to learn this fact, so long as there is a causal connection between S’s belief and the fact that Lincoln was born in 1809.

Upshot: The justification requirement of the traditional analysis is not necessary for knowledge.

CONCLUSION:

Goldman concludes that S knows that p just in case the fact that p is casually connected in an “appropriate” way with S’s believing that p, where “appropriate” causal processes include: perception, memory, inferences (in which a proposition counts as warrant-providing only if it is true), or some combination of the aforementioned. Goldman concedes that the preceding causal analysis is not part of the meaning of the expression “S knows p”.  However, he maintains that it specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge.

DISCUSSION QUESTION:

1. Do you agree that the agent in Goldman’s volcano example does not have knowledge? Why or why not?

2. What does Goldman mean when he says that S knows that p only if S’s believing that p is causally connected to the fact that p? What are the implications of this view for knowledge about the future?

3. Do you agree that S knows that p only if S’s believing that p is causally connected (in Goldman’s sense) to the fact that p? Why or why not?

4. Does Goldman’s analysis of knowledge successfully avoid Gettier-style counterexamples? Why or why not?