The Concept-Deployment Asymmetry Objection

I wish to raise an objection to the Desire-as-Belief Thesis; the claim that the desire to ϕ is equivalent to the belief that ϕ is good. According to this objection, believing that ϕ is good requires that one deploy the concept of the good while desiring to ϕ does not. Call this the concept-deployment asymmetry objection.

My argument for concept-deployment asymmetry runs as follows: We begin by drawing a distinction between apprehending that X is F and apprehending X as F, where X is some state of affairs or proposition and F is an evaluative concept, such as goodness or truth. It is worth noting, at the very outset, that the distinction between apprehending that and apprehending as is a theoretical one; it is not intended to capture the semantic significance of the expressions in ordinary English. The theoretical distinction hinges on the observation that there are two different ways in which an attitude may count as evaluative vis-à-vis goodness or truth. We may gain a firmer handle on this distinction by contrasting what it means to say that the belief that it is good to give to charity is evaluative vis-à-vis the good versus what it means to say that it is evaluative vis-à-vis the truth.

There is a straightforward sense in which the belief that it is good to give to charity is evaluative vis-à-vis the good. I maintain that this sense is tied to the propositional content of the belief. That is to say, the belief that it is good to give to charity is evaluative vis-à-vis the good in virtue of its propositional content. That this is so, is suggested by the fact that if we keep the attitude of belief fixed, but alter its propositional content so that the concept of the good no longer features therein, the attitude of belief no longer counts as evaluative vis-à-vis the good. For example, believing that it is raining outside does not entail an evaluation of its raining outside as good. However, the belief that it is raining outside and the belief that it is good to give to charity are both the same type of attitude—namely, a belief. They only differ in terms of their propositional content. The former has the propositional content, “it is raining outside” and the latter has the propositional content, “it is good to give to charity”. Given that the only difference between the two beliefs has to do with their propositional content, and given that this difference is enough to make the latter, but not the former, evaluative vis-à-vis the good, it follows that whether or not a belief counts as evaluative vis-à-vis the good depends on its propositional content.

Let us now contrast the sense in which the belief that it is good to give to charity is evaluative vis-à-vis the good, with the sense in which it is evaluative vis-à-vis the truth. We begin by noting that believing that it is good to give to charity entails apprehending the proposition, “it is good to give to charity” as being true. Hence, there is a straightforward sense in which the belief that it is good to give to charity is evaluative vis-à-vis the truth. However, and herein lays the rub, if one believes that it is good to give to charity, one's belief counts as evaluative vis-à-vis the truth in virtue of the intrinsic nature of the attitude, regardless of its propositional content. That this is so is suggested by the fact that (1) the belief that it is good to give to charity is evaluative vis-à-vis the truth, even though the concept of truth does not feature as part of the propositional content of the belief and (2) if we keep the attitude of belief fixed, but alter the attitude's propositional content, it remains evaluative vis-à-vis the truth. For example, there is a sense in which both the belief that it is good to give to charity and the belief that the founder of charity X is telling the truth are evaluative vis-à-vis the truth, even though the concept of truth only features as part of the propositional content of the latter. This is the same sense in which all beliefs, regardless of their propositional content, may be said to be evaluative vis-à-vis the truth.

To believe a proposition just is to assess that proposition as true. This suggests that the sense in which the belief that it is good to give to charity is evaluative vis-à-vis the truth has to do with the intrinsic nature of the attitude itself, independent of its particular propositional content. The upshot is that the sense in which the belief that it is good to give to charity is evaluative vis-à-vis the good (a sense that is tied to the propositional content of the belief) and the sense in which the belief that it is good to give to charity is evaluative vis-à-vis the truth (a sense that is tied to the nature of the attitude itself, independent of its propositional content) instantiate two different ways in which an attitude may be evaluative vis-à-vis goodness or truth.

I use the expression apprehending that X is F to pick out the sense in which the belief that giving to charity is good is an evaluation vis-à-vis the good. I use the expression apprehending X as F to pick out the sense in which all beliefs may be said to be evaluations vis-à-vis the truth. One upshot of this way of putting things is that when we say that an attitude is an instance of apprehending that X is F, we are essentially making a claim about its propositional content, and not a claim about attitudes of a particular type. By contrast, when we say that an attitude is an instance of apprehending X as F, we are essentially making a claim about all attitudes of a particular type, regardless of their propositional content. Hence, when we say that believing that it is good to give to charity is an instance of apprehending that X is F (where X is the state of affairs of giving to charity, and F is the evaluative concept of goodness) we are actually making a claim about the propositional content of the belief, rather than a claim about the type of attitude that beliefs are.

By contrast, when we say that believing that it is good to give to charity is an instance of apprehending X as F (where X is the proposition, “it is good to give to charity”, and F is evaluative concept, true) we are actually making a claim about the type of attitude a belief is, rather than a claim about its propositional content. Since GG theory is, at heart, a claim about the type of attitude a desire is, and not simply a claim about the propositional content of a particular desire, I believe GG theory is best understood as the claim that desires involve apprehending X as F (where X refers to that which is desired and F refers to the evaluative concept of the good). In fact, it would do violence to GG theory to construe it as committed to the claim that desires involve apprehending that X is F (where X refers to that which is desired and F refers to the evaluative concept of the good) since this would make GG theory a thesis about desires with a certain propositional content—namely, ones in which the evaluative concept of the good figures—rather than a theory about desires, simpliciter.

With the distinction between apprehending that X is F and apprehending X as F in hand, we may now unpack GG theory—i.e., the claim that desire aims at the good—by saying that desiring to ϕ entails apprehending ϕ as good. On this view, the aim of a propositional attitude is specified by the apprehending as relation rather than the apprehending that relation. This makes sense given that the apprehending that relation varies as we alter the propositional content of an attitude, while the apprehending as relation remains the same as we alter the propositional content of an attitude. Hence, the apprehending as relation is able to capture the intuition that the aim of a propositional attitude remains the same regardless of its propositional content.

Moreover, while the apprehending as relation specifies the aim of a propositional attitude, the apprehending that relation bestows a propositional attitude with a certain evaluative flexibility. For example, it is in virtue of apprehending that X is F (where F is the evaluative concept of the good) that a belief is able to be evaluative vis-à-vis the good. Or, to give another example, consider the belief that apples are delicious. It is in virtue of apprehending that X is F (where F is evaluative concept delicious) that the belief that apples are delicious is able to be evaluative vis-à-vis the delicious. (This point generalises, pari passu, to the belief that Brussels sprouts are disgusting, the belief that roses are beautiful, and so on.) Hence, the apprehending that relation is that which allows the attitude of belief to be evaluative vis-à-vis something other than truth. In short, it gives belief evaluative promiscuity.

This brings us to the final step of our argument in favour of concept-deployment asymmetry. Let us say that an agent deploys some concept, F, when she has attitude Y, just in case F features as part of the propositional content of Y. Believing that ϕ is good requires that one deploy the concept of the good because it entails apprehending that ϕ is good. By contrast, desiring that ϕ does not require that one deploy the concept of the good because it entails apprehending ϕ as good, but does not entail apprehending that ϕ is good. This, I claim, represents a fundamental asymmetry between desiring to ϕ and believing that ϕ is good. Consequently, the Desire-as-Belief Thesis, which holds that the two are equivalent, must be false.

CFP: Indiana Philosophical Association Spring 2012 Meeting

Call for Papers and Panels
Indiana Philosophical Association
Spring Meeting, 20-21 April 2012
DePauw University in Greencastle, Indiana

Keynote Speaker:
Margaret Urban Walker
Marquette University

Papers. Papers in any area of philosophy are welcome. Submitted papers should be limited to 14 double-spaced pages and prepared for blind review. They should also be accompanied by a separate page that includes a title, an abstract (limited to 150 words), and author information (name, affiliation, and contact information). Materials should be submitted as either RTF or PDF files to Jared Bates at bates@hanover.edu. Submission deadline is 29 February 2012.

Graduate Paper Prize. The IPA will present an award to the best paper submitted by a graduate student. The award will be accompanied by a cash prize of $100. Graduate student papers submitted for the competition should be identified as such on the title sheet.

Panels. We also invite submissions of panel discussions in any area of philosophy. Panels should be limited to three speakers. Submitted panels should comprise abstracts of all authors’ papers, each limited to 500 words and prepared for blind review. They should also be accompanied by a separate page that includes a panel title, a brief general abstract (limited to 150 words) and author information (names, affiliations, and contact information). Materials should be submitted as indicated for papers above. Authors may submit both a paper and a panel, though at most one of these may be placed on the program.

Suggestions for commentators and sessions chairs (including self-nominations) are welcome. Information about local arrangements will be announced closer to the meeting. See the IPA homepage for information on the undergraduate paper prize.

Deadline for Submissions: 29 February 2012
Deadline for Notifications: 15 March 2012

Philip Kitcher on Ethics

Blog Talk Radio Episode 38: Dr. Philip Kitcher by Think Atheist (December 11th, 2011)

Dissertation Summary

The following is my most recent attempt to summarise my dissertation in a couple pages. I am only just approaching the half-way mark, so expect several revised versions of this summary in the near future.

My dissertation attempts to make sense of the idea that desires may be correct or incorrect by articulating and defending a version of the claim that desires aim at the good.

There is a widely held intuition that some desires are infelicitous, bad, or perverse. For example: there is something infelicitous about the desire to drink a can of oil in order to quench one’s thirst; there is something bad about the desire to take the life a known innocent; and there is something perverse about the desire to stick a sharpened pencil in one’s eye even though one believes no good could come from doing so and one recognizes that it would be extremely unpleasant. The first desire seems infelicitous on instrumental grounds; drinking oil is a poor way to quench one’s thirst. The second desire seems bad on ethical grounds; taking the life of a known innocent is morally wrong. The third desire seems perverse on hedonistic grounds; all things being equal, we would expect an agent to avoid unpleasant experiences. One way to capture the idea that a desire may be infelicitous, bad, or perverse—a theoretical proposal that is tied to a longstanding philosophical tradition—is to say that desires aim at the good, and that a desire is inappropriate, bad, or perverse just in case it fails to realise its aim. On this view, the good is the most abstract characterisation of aim of desire. Let us call this proposal the guise of the good theory of desires (henceforth, GG theory).

I wish to articulate and defend a plausible version of GG theory. There are three influential strategies for making sense of GG theory currently found in the literature: the Desire-as-Belief Thesis, the claim that the desire to φ is equivalent to the belief that φ is good; the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis; the claim that the desire to φ is always accompanied by the belief that φ is good; and the Desire-as-Perception Thesis, the claim that the desire to φ is equivalent to perceiving that φ is good. I argue that all three proposals are unacceptable as ways of making sense of GG theory. Instead, I argue that a desire plays the same role in our deliberation as being the recipient of a (self-issued) command, order or request. Let us refer to this proposal as the Desire-as-Imperative Thesis.

Significantly, the notion of an imperative implicated in the Desire-as-Imperative Thesis should not be confused with the Kantian notion of an imperative (i.e., a dictate of pure reason). Rather, the word ‘imperative’ is meant to pick out the category of non-assertoric speech-acts that is typically expressed using the imperative mood of English grammar; a category that includes orders, requests, commands, and entreaties. I hold that desires are like the class of speech-acts that are typically expressed by the imperative mood in at least three respects. First, like speech-acts in the imperative mood, desires are not truth-evaluable. For example, both the desire to close the front door and the request to close the front door is neither true nor false. Second, like speech-acts in the imperative mood, an agent assents to a desire, not by forming a belief, but by forming an intention. For example, one assents to the desire to close the front door or the request to close the front door by forming the intention to close the front door. Third, like speech-acts in the imperative mood, desires are governed by norms that determine if it would be correct or incorrect to assent to them. For example, both the desire to close the front door and request to close the front door are correct just in case it is good to close the front door. On this view, when we say desire aims at the good, we mean that the desire to φ is correct just in case it would be good to φ.

Velleman on the Aim of Desire

In his paper, “The Guise of the Good”, David Velleman argues that desires aim, not at the good, but at the attainable. Velleman begins by drawing two important distinctions. Firstly, he distinguishes between cognative attitudes (i.e., attitudes in which a proposition is grasped as patterned after the world), and conative attitudes (i.e, attitudes in which a proposition is grasped as a pattern for the world to follow). Examples of cognative attitudes include beliefs, assumptions, and imaginings. Examples of conative attitudes include desires, hopes, and wishes. Secondly, he distinguishes between the direction of fit of an attitude (i.e., that in virtue of which it is a cognative or conative attitude) and the constitutive aim of an attitude (i.e., that in virtue of which it is correct or incorrect).

With the preceding pair of distinctions in place, Velleman then advances the following three-stage argument: First, he argues that the constitutive aim of belief is what distinguishes it from all other states with a cognitive direction of fit; namely, the fact that beliefs are correct just in case they are true. Second, he argues that what distinguishes desire from all other states with a conative direction of fit is not the fact that it aims after the good, since this is something it shares with all other conative states. Third, he argues that what distinguishes desire from all other conative states is the fact that desire aims at the attainable. He therefore concludes that desires aim at the attainable.

Stage 1: Velleman on Constitutive Aims

Velleman takes as his starting point the stipulation that the constitutive aim of a psychological state-type is whatever sets it apart from all other psychological state-types; to wit, what makes a psychological state-type the state-type that it is. Hence, to say that belief aims at the true, according to Velleman, is to say that the truth-aim is what distinguishes belief from all other states with a cognitive direction of fit. Velleman motivates this claim by exploiting a comparison of believing that p, on the one hand, and fantasising that p and assuming that p, on the other. Velleman notes that all three psychological states have a cognitive direction of fit; all three, according to Velleman, involve a proposition being grasped as patterned after the world. However, while believing that p is deemed correct if and only if p is true, fantasising that p and assuming that p are not deemed correct if and only if p is true. Thus, by Velleman's lights, it is the fact that a psychological state-type has the correctness conditions that it does that makes it the psychological state-type that it is.

Stage 2: Velleman's Negative Thesis

Next, Velleman argues that the good cannot be the constitutive aim of desire since desires are not the only psychological states that aim at the good. Velleman takes as his point of departure the assumption, widely held by proponents of GG theory, that desires aim at the good in virtue of their direction fit. On this view, to say that desires aim at the good just is to say that desires have a conative direction of fit. However, Velleman points out that having a conative direction of fit is something that desires have in common with all other conative attitudes, including wishes and hopes. The upshot is that all conative attitudes may be said to aim at the good. Given that the constitutitive aim of desire is what makes it the psychological state-type that it is, it follows that the good cannot be the constitutive aim of desire. We may call this Velleman’s negative thesis.

Stage 3: Velleman's Positive Thesis

Finally, Velleman argues that the constitutive aim of desire is the attainable. By this, Velleman does not mean that one can desire that p only if p is attainable. Rather, he means that one can desire that p only if one believes that p is attainable. Thus, Velleman allows that I may desire something that is in fact unattainable, if I mistakenly believe it to be attainable. For example, I can desire that I arrive in the airport at 3pm, even though it is not physically possible for me to arrive in the airport at 3pm, so long as I believe (albeit mistakenly) that it is physically possible for me to do so. Velleman observes that one can wish for something that one believes to be unattainable. For example, I can wish I were never born even though I believe that undoing my own birth is not something that is attainable. However, according to Velleman, one cannot desire something that one believes to be unattainable. Hence, I could not desire that I were never born if I believed that undoing my own birth was not attainable. According to Velleman, this distinction between desires and wishes generalises to all other conative states; only desires aim at the attainable. Thus, Velleman concludes that desires stand to the attainable as belief stands to the true. We may call this Velleman's positive thesis.