Philip Kitcher on Ethics

Blog Talk Radio Episode 38: Dr. Philip Kitcher by Think Atheist (December 11th, 2011)

Dissertation Summary

The following is my most recent attempt to summarise my dissertation in a couple pages. I am only just approaching the half-way mark, so expect several revised versions of this summary in the near future.

My dissertation attempts to make sense of the idea that desires may be correct or incorrect by articulating and defending a version of the claim that desires aim at the good.

There is a widely held intuition that some desires are infelicitous, bad, or perverse. For example: there is something infelicitous about the desire to drink a can of oil in order to quench one’s thirst; there is something bad about the desire to take the life a known innocent; and there is something perverse about the desire to stick a sharpened pencil in one’s eye even though one believes no good could come from doing so and one recognizes that it would be extremely unpleasant. The first desire seems infelicitous on instrumental grounds; drinking oil is a poor way to quench one’s thirst. The second desire seems bad on ethical grounds; taking the life of a known innocent is morally wrong. The third desire seems perverse on hedonistic grounds; all things being equal, we would expect an agent to avoid unpleasant experiences. One way to capture the idea that a desire may be infelicitous, bad, or perverse—a theoretical proposal that is tied to a longstanding philosophical tradition—is to say that desires aim at the good, and that a desire is inappropriate, bad, or perverse just in case it fails to realise its aim. On this view, the good is the most abstract characterisation of aim of desire. Let us call this proposal the guise of the good theory of desires (henceforth, GG theory).

I wish to articulate and defend a plausible version of GG theory. There are three influential strategies for making sense of GG theory currently found in the literature: the Desire-as-Belief Thesis, the claim that the desire to φ is equivalent to the belief that φ is good; the Desire-plus-Belief Thesis; the claim that the desire to φ is always accompanied by the belief that φ is good; and the Desire-as-Perception Thesis, the claim that the desire to φ is equivalent to perceiving that φ is good. I argue that all three proposals are unacceptable as ways of making sense of GG theory. Instead, I argue that a desire plays the same role in our deliberation as being the recipient of a (self-issued) command, order or request. Let us refer to this proposal as the Desire-as-Imperative Thesis.

Significantly, the notion of an imperative implicated in the Desire-as-Imperative Thesis should not be confused with the Kantian notion of an imperative (i.e., a dictate of pure reason). Rather, the word ‘imperative’ is meant to pick out the category of non-assertoric speech-acts that is typically expressed using the imperative mood of English grammar; a category that includes orders, requests, commands, and entreaties. I hold that desires are like the class of speech-acts that are typically expressed by the imperative mood in at least three respects. First, like speech-acts in the imperative mood, desires are not truth-evaluable. For example, both the desire to close the front door and the request to close the front door is neither true nor false. Second, like speech-acts in the imperative mood, an agent assents to a desire, not by forming a belief, but by forming an intention. For example, one assents to the desire to close the front door or the request to close the front door by forming the intention to close the front door. Third, like speech-acts in the imperative mood, desires are governed by norms that determine if it would be correct or incorrect to assent to them. For example, both the desire to close the front door and request to close the front door are correct just in case it is good to close the front door. On this view, when we say desire aims at the good, we mean that the desire to φ is correct just in case it would be good to φ.

Velleman on the Aim of Desire

In his paper, “The Guise of the Good”, David Velleman argues that desires aim, not at the good, but at the attainable. Velleman begins by drawing two important distinctions. Firstly, he distinguishes between cognative attitudes (i.e., attitudes in which a proposition is grasped as patterned after the world), and conative attitudes (i.e, attitudes in which a proposition is grasped as a pattern for the world to follow). Examples of cognative attitudes include beliefs, assumptions, and imaginings. Examples of conative attitudes include desires, hopes, and wishes. Secondly, he distinguishes between the direction of fit of an attitude (i.e., that in virtue of which it is a cognative or conative attitude) and the constitutive aim of an attitude (i.e., that in virtue of which it is correct or incorrect).

With the preceding pair of distinctions in place, Velleman then advances the following three-stage argument: First, he argues that the constitutive aim of belief is what distinguishes it from all other states with a cognitive direction of fit; namely, the fact that beliefs are correct just in case they are true. Second, he argues that what distinguishes desire from all other states with a conative direction of fit is not the fact that it aims after the good, since this is something it shares with all other conative states. Third, he argues that what distinguishes desire from all other conative states is the fact that desire aims at the attainable. He therefore concludes that desires aim at the attainable.

Stage 1: Velleman on Constitutive Aims

Velleman takes as his starting point the stipulation that the constitutive aim of a psychological state-type is whatever sets it apart from all other psychological state-types; to wit, what makes a psychological state-type the state-type that it is. Hence, to say that belief aims at the true, according to Velleman, is to say that the truth-aim is what distinguishes belief from all other states with a cognitive direction of fit. Velleman motivates this claim by exploiting a comparison of believing that p, on the one hand, and fantasising that p and assuming that p, on the other. Velleman notes that all three psychological states have a cognitive direction of fit; all three, according to Velleman, involve a proposition being grasped as patterned after the world. However, while believing that p is deemed correct if and only if p is true, fantasising that p and assuming that p are not deemed correct if and only if p is true. Thus, by Velleman's lights, it is the fact that a psychological state-type has the correctness conditions that it does that makes it the psychological state-type that it is.

Stage 2: Velleman's Negative Thesis

Next, Velleman argues that the good cannot be the constitutive aim of desire since desires are not the only psychological states that aim at the good. Velleman takes as his point of departure the assumption, widely held by proponents of GG theory, that desires aim at the good in virtue of their direction fit. On this view, to say that desires aim at the good just is to say that desires have a conative direction of fit. However, Velleman points out that having a conative direction of fit is something that desires have in common with all other conative attitudes, including wishes and hopes. The upshot is that all conative attitudes may be said to aim at the good. Given that the constitutitive aim of desire is what makes it the psychological state-type that it is, it follows that the good cannot be the constitutive aim of desire. We may call this Velleman’s negative thesis.

Stage 3: Velleman's Positive Thesis

Finally, Velleman argues that the constitutive aim of desire is the attainable. By this, Velleman does not mean that one can desire that p only if p is attainable. Rather, he means that one can desire that p only if one believes that p is attainable. Thus, Velleman allows that I may desire something that is in fact unattainable, if I mistakenly believe it to be attainable. For example, I can desire that I arrive in the airport at 3pm, even though it is not physically possible for me to arrive in the airport at 3pm, so long as I believe (albeit mistakenly) that it is physically possible for me to do so. Velleman observes that one can wish for something that one believes to be unattainable. For example, I can wish I were never born even though I believe that undoing my own birth is not something that is attainable. However, according to Velleman, one cannot desire something that one believes to be unattainable. Hence, I could not desire that I were never born if I believed that undoing my own birth was not attainable. According to Velleman, this distinction between desires and wishes generalises to all other conative states; only desires aim at the attainable. Thus, Velleman concludes that desires stand to the attainable as belief stands to the true. We may call this Velleman's positive thesis.

The Normative Aim of Intention/Desire

The main contemporary motivation for the Guise of the Good Theory of Desires--namely, the claim that desires aim at the good (henceforth, GG theory)--comes from Anscombe, who claims that wanting aims at the good in the same sense that judgement aims at truth. Anscombe's claim has lead many GG theorists to draw an analogy between desire and belief. However, I believe that this is mistake. When Anscombe says that wanting aims at the good, she actually has something quite different from our ordinary conception of desires in mind:

'Wanting' may of course be applied to the prick of desire at the thought or sight of an object, even though a man then does nothing towards getting the object. . . . The wanting that interests us, however, is neither wishing nor hoping nor feeling nor desire, and cannot be said to exist in a man who does nothing towards getting what he wants. (Anscombe [2000], Intention. p. 67-68.)

The above passage suggests that Anscombe's notion of wanting is more like an intention than a desire; it entails taking steps towards getting the object wanted. If this is right, then the Anscombean thesis is most aptly interpreted as the claim that intentions aim at the good in the same way that beliefs aim at truth. On this reading, the appropriate analogy is not one between belief and desire, but between belief and intention.

The claim that intentions aim at the good in the same sense that belief aims at the true gives rise to the following question. In what sense does belief aim at the true? We may distinguish between psychological, metaphysical and normative readings of the claim that belief aims at the true. According to psychological reading, beliefs may be said to aim at the true because agents are motivated to form beliefs by a desire for truth. The psychological reading was famously denied by Charles Pierce, who insisted that our motivation for forming beliefs is a desire to alleviate the discomfort caused by doubt. Even if one does not buy into Pierce's positive claim, it seems undeniable that we are often motivated to form beliefs by considerations other than truth. Pride, fear, comfort, and consistency are just a few of the many possible motivations an agent may have for adopting a particular belief. Consequently, the claim that truth is the psychological aim of belief seems implausible.

According to the metaphysical reading, truth is what makes belief the kind of psychological state it is. On this view, if the proposition that constitutes the intentional object of a putative belief turns out to be false, then the attitude in question is not a belief. It should be immediately clear that when we say belief aims at the true, we do not mean that truth is the metaphysical aim of belief; to wit, that a belief only counts as such if the proposition believed is true. Such a view would have the implausible consequence that there are no false beliefs. Moreover, it threatens to collapse the distinction between belief and knowledge, since the latter does seem to have truth as its metaphysical aim; to wit, knowing that p counts as such only if p is true. Consequently, the claim that truth is metaphysical aim of belief also seems implausible.

I believe that the claim that belief aims after truth is best understood in normative terms. According to the normative reading, the belief that p is in some sense incorrect if p is false. Unlike the metaphysical reading, the normative reading does not entail that a belief only counts as such if the believed proposition is true. Thus, the normative reading makes room for the possibility of false beliefs. Moreover, unlike the psychological reading, the normative reading does not entail that we are always motivated to form beliefs by a desire for truth. Consequently, the claim that truth is normative aim of belief is more plausible, and does a better job of capturing what we mean when we say that belief aims after truth, than the psychological and metaphysical readings. Given the normative reading of the claim that belief aims at the true, the claim that intentions aim at the good in the same sense that belief aims at the true entails that the intention to φ is incorrect if φ is not good.

Having said what it means to say that intentions aim at the good, we may now ask why intentions may be said to aim at the good in aforementioned sense. One proposal is to say that the good is the normative aim of intention because an intention to φ is justified if and only if φ is good. However, this is not plausible. First, the intention of φ may be justified if the agent has a justified, but false, belief that φ is good. For example, suppose Mary has the justified belief that it would be good to give to a charity X, when in fact the charity X is a scam and it would in fact not be good to give to X. Quite plausibly, it may still be justified for Mary to adopt the intention to give to charity X, given her justified belief that it would be good to do so. Second, the intention to φ is not justified if the agent has the justified, but false, belief that φ is not good. For example, suppose Bob has the justified belief that allowing his company to dump industrial waste in a river would harm the environment, when in fact the waste in question may actually be beneficial to the environment. Quite plausibly, it may be unjustified for Bob to adopt the intention to allow his company to dump the industrial waste, given his justified belief that doing so would be harmful.

An alternative proposal, the one I wish to endorse, is to say that intentions have the normative aim of the good because intending to φ entails being committed to the goodness of φ. On this view, the claim that a psychological state or speech-act has a particular normative aim is not a claim about when an agent is justified in adopting that psychological state or engaging in that speech-act. Rather, it is a claim about the types of normative commitments an agent takes upon herself by adopting a particular attitude, and the type of rational criticism said commitment entails. Thus, if an agent adopts an intention to φ, and subsequently learns that φ is not good, then that agent is normatively committed to giving up the intention to φ and is rationally criticisable if she fails to do so. In this regard, the normative aim of intention is perfectly analogous to normative aim of belief. Truth is the normative aim of belief because believing that p entails being committed to truth of p. If an agent adopts the belief that p, and subsequently learns that p is not true, then that agent is normatively committed to giving up her belief that p and is rationally criticisable if she fails to do so.

The preceding discussion offers us an analysis of what it means for intentions to aim at the good. But what can we say about the relationship between desires and the good? In answering this question, I exploit an analogy between desire and perceptual experience. To this end, we may say that desires aim at the good in the same sense that perceptual experience aims at the true. However, it is not plausible that perceptual experiences aim at the true in the same way that belief aims at the true. Recall, we unpacked the claim that belief aims at the true in terms of the claim that believing that p entails that one is committed to the truth of p. However, perceiving that p does not entail that one is committed to the truth of p. Moreover, if one perceives that p, one is not in a position to alter one’s perceptual experience if it turns out that p is false. Thus, it would not do to say that perceptual experiences aim at the true in the same sense that belief does.

Instead, I propose that we see perceptual experiences as aiming at the true in a derivative sense. To wit, we may say that a perceptual experience is correct just in case it would yield a correct belief if it were assented to. Given that the belief that p is correct only if p is true, it follows that a perceptual experience that p is correct (in a derivative sense) only if p is true. Analogously, desires may be said to aim at the good in a derivative sense. To wit, we may say that a desire is correct (in a derivative sense) just in case it would yield a correct intention if it were assented to. Since the intention to φ is correct just in case φ is good, it follows that the desire to φ is correct (in a derivative sense) just in case φ is good.

11th Annual NYU-Columbia Graduate Student Philosophy Conference

Schedule:

9:30 AM Breakfast and Coffee

10:15 AM Shifts of Attention and the Content of Perception
Adrienne Prettyman (University of Toronto)

11:30 AM Against Epistemic Akrasia
Sophie Horowitz (MIT)

12:45 PM Lunch

2:00 PM A Two-Pronged Strategy for Solving the Platonistʼs Access Problem
Sharon Elizabeth Berry (Harvard)

3:15 PM Itʼs All too Hard! (The Demandingness of Rationality & Morality)
Aness Webster (University of Southern
California)

4:30 PM Coffee Break

5:00 PM Knowing about Things
Stephen Yablo (MIT)

9:30 PM Party (at 510 E 20th St, Apt 1H)
Saturday, April 9th 2011

5 Washington Place, New York

Important: to access the building, non-NYU students should register ahead of time by sending an email to gradconf@philcolumbia.com.

For further information, visit our website at www.philcolumbia.com/gradconf or email us at

gradconf@philcolumbia.com.