In his paper, “Inquiry and the Doxastic Attitudes”, Michele
Palmira proposes a new “sui generis doxastic attitude which differs, both
functionally and normatively, from suspended judgment, full belief, credences,
and acceptance”(p. 1). He calls this
proposed attitude “hypothesis”. I agree
with Palmira that there is a need to posit a sui generis attitude with the
normative and functional profile he ascribes to hypotheses. However, I take issue with what Palmira
claims to be one major upshot of the attitude’s existence. Specifically, he takes the existence of the
attitude of hypothesis to be inconsistent with the following thesis defended by
Jane Friedman:
(BICON)
Necessarily: One is in an inquiring state of mind about some
matter if, and only if, one is suspended about that matter.[1]
Palmira takes as his point of departure the observation that
inquiry often involves three distinct stages:
Three-stage model of inquiry
- One is open-minded about how to answer the question Q.
- One is inclined to answer Q in a given way while taking the question to be still open.
- One closes Q.
In both stages 1 and 2, a certain question, Q, is regarded as open by the inquiring
agent. A question, Q, is open for
some agent, S, just in case S does not believe or know that some proposition, P, constitutes a complete answer to Q.
What distinguishes stage 1 from stage 2 is that in the latter, the
inquiring agent takes some particular answer to Q to be more likely to be true than all competing alternative
answers. Hence, while in stage 1, an
agent may see two or three candidate answers to Q to be equally likely to be correct, given her available
information, during stage 2, the agent comes to view one particular answer to
be more likely to be correct and focuses her attention to gathering information
relevant to the assessment of that particular answer. It is the act of zeroing
in on a particular answer to a question one takes to be open for the purpose of
engaging in more narrowly constrained investigation into said answer that
Palmira identifies with the attitude of hypothesizing. Moreover, by Palmira’s lights, the shift from
stage 1 to stage 2 of inquiry is marked by a shift from suspending Q to hypothesizing PQ,
where the expression “PQ” means that some
proposition P is a complete answer
to Q.[2] In sum, Palmira insists that the distinction
between stages 1 and 2 of inquiry is best captured by saying that while in
stage 1 one has the attitude of suspending Q,
in stage 2 one has the attitude of hypothesizing PQ.
This brings us to Palmira’s criticism of (BICON). (BICON) predicts that the inquiring agent
would be suspended at both stages of her inquiry. This follows from the fact that (BICON)
states that being in an inquiring frame of mind towards Q entails that one is suspended about Q. Since both stages 1 and 2
involves being in an inquiring frame of mind towards a question, it follows
from (BICON) that both stages 1 and 2 entail that one is suspended about that
question. Palmira puts the objection as
follows:
Importantly, (BICON) contains an answer to the focal question of this paper: since being in an inquiring state of mind towards a given matter just is being suspended about it, and since one is in such an inquiring state of mind at both stages of open inquiry, it follows that one just is suspended at both stages of open inquiry. (p. 5)
Hence, according to Palmira, (BICON) does not leave room for
the idea that stages 1 and 2 of inquiry implicate different doxastic attitudes:
suspending and hypothesizing, respectively. This is Palmira’s first line of
criticism. His second line of criticism
is that (BICON) runs into what he describes as the Unity of Inquiry Problem. This second line of criticism begins with the observation that the
inquiring agent is disposed to make different inquisitive moves during stages 1
and 2. For example, suppose I am
considering the following question:
Q1: Where did life on earth come from?
During stage 1, my investigation may focus on figuring out
what are some of the candidate answers to Q1. This initial period of investigation may
culminate in my thinking that there are at least three equally likely answers
to Q1:
P1Q1:
Life on earth originated from non-life.
P2Q1:
Life on earth came from some other planet.
P3Q1:
Life on earth was created by an intelligent designer.
Suppose that after further investigation I come to regard P1Q1 as being the most
likely answer to Q1. At that point, I would have transitioned from
stage 1 to stage 2 of my inquiry into Q1. Plausibly, my investigation will no longer be
concerned with figuring out what are the candidate answers to Q1, as was the case during the first
stage of my inquiry into Q1. Instead, my investigation will now be
concerned with the evidence for and against life on earth originating from
non-life.
According to Palmira, the defender of (BICON) can only
accommodate the above shift in the focus of my investigation by holding that
the question I am suspended about has also shifted. Whereas I was initially suspended about Q1, I am now suspended about something
along the lines of Q2:
Q2: Did life on earth originate from
non-life?
Hence, Palmira insists that (BICON) implies that at the
different stages of inquiry the inquiring agent is suspended about different
questions. However, this would undermine
the idea that the inquiry I am engaged in is a single unified activity. Moreover, since (BICON) implies that I am
inquiring about Q1 only if I am
suspended about Q1, the fact that
during the second stage of my inquiry I am suspended about Q2 rather than Q1 implies
that I am no longer inquiring into Q1. Here is the objection in Palmira’s own words:
[I]f we accepted the idea that one holds an attitude of suspended judgement at both the first and the second stage of the inquiry, we would not be able to capture the unity of subject-matter of the inquiry one is pursuing, for the content of the inquiring state of mind would change across stages and there is no other way to specify which [subject-matter of inquiry] is at stake. This is the Unity of Inquiry Problem. (Palmira, 2018: 6).
While I agree with Palmira that (BICON) should be rejected[3],
I find his objections to the left-to-right side of (BICON) unconvincing. Let us call the left-to-right side of (BICON)—i.e., the
claim that being in an inquiring frame of mind entails suspension—the inquirer-as-suspender thesis. Palmira’s first line of criticism is meant to
show that the inquirer-as-suspender thesis does not leave room for the
suggestion that stages 1 and 2 of inquiry implicates different doxastic
attitudes; suspending Q1 and
hypothesizing P1Q1, respectively. However, this criticism only gets off the
ground if we assume that being in an inquiring frame of mind towards Q at some time, t, entails that suspending Q is the only Q-related doxastic
attitude one has at t. However, this is not what the inquirer-as-suspender
thesis claims. What the inquirer-as-suspender
thesis claims is that being in an inquiring frame of mind towards Q at t
entails that suspending Q be among
the set of doxastic attitudes one has at t. Whether or not the set of attitudes in
question is one that only has suspending Q as a member is a matter about which the inquirer-as-suspender thesis is
entirely silent.
Moreover, the claim that suspending Q is the only Q-related attitude one may have when one
is inquiring about Q is one Friedman
explicitly rejects. By her lights, suspension accompanies (and is perhaps even a
pre-requisite for) every other inquiring attitude. Hence, Friedman is open to the
possibility of an inquiring agent having other Q-related attitudes alongside suspending Q at a given point in time. This
means that if Palmira wishes to deny that an agent may rationally suspend Q at some time, t, and also hypothesizing PQ at time, he will need to provide us with some positive grounds for thinking
that these two attitudes in particular are incompatible.
Palmira regards hypothesizing as a
doxastic attitude. It may therefore be
argued that simultaneously suspending and hypothesizing violates the rational
prohibition against inconsistent doxastic attitudes. According to the present
suggestion, suspending Q entails that
one has a doxastic attitude of committed neutrality with respect to Q.
However, insofar as hypothesizing PQ entails treating one possible answer to Q as more plausible than all other potential answers, hypothesizing is a doxastic
attitude that is not neutral with respect to Q. Hence, an agent that
simultaneously suspends Q and
hypothesizes PQ has
conflicting doxastic attitudes, or at least so the objection goes.
However, the preceding line of argument
trades on an equivocation. There are two
distinct ways in which the expression “doxastic attitude” has been used in the literature. Sometimes, it used narrowly to refer to the
attitudes of believing, disbelieving, and suspending. Call this usage of the expression “doxastic
attitude” DA-Narrow. However, at other times, the expression “doxastic
attitude” is employed to refer more broadly to all attitudes that display a mind-to-world
direction of fit, including assuming, supposing, imagining, and hypothesizing. Call this broader usage DA-Wide. When Palmira says that hypothesizing is a doxastic
attitude, he clearly has DA-Wide in mind.
However, the prohibition against inconsistent doxastic attitudes only
applies to DA-Narrow. For example, it is
common for a philosopher who believes P to assume (for the sake of reductio argumentation) that not-P.
Although the philosopher’s belief and assumption are inconsistent, we
certainly would not regard her as irrational for assuming something inconsistent
with what she believes. Why not? Because assuming P does not entail that one is rationally committed to the truth of P.
Hence, one may assume not-P without violating one’s rational commitment to the truth of P.
The upshot is that the prohibition against inconsistent doxastic
attitudes does not apply to DA-Wide.
The salient question, then, is not
whether an agent’s doxastic attitudes, understood in terms of DA-Wide, line up
but rather whether an agent’s rational commitments line up. We must therefore ask if hypothesizing PQ entails that one is rationally committed to the truth of PQ. The answer is clearly no. After all, if hypothesizing PQ entailed being committed to PQ, then hypothesizing PQ at t would entail that Q is settled
for one at t and that one was therefore not engaged in inquiry into Q at t.
In sum, holding that hypothesizing entails a rational commitment to the
truth of PQ would
undermine its status as a penultimate stage of inquiry.
At best, hypothesizing PQ entails being committed to PQ being more likely to be
true than not. However, I may hold that
a proposition is more likely than not to be true and yet suspend about whether
it is true. For example, Suppose the
national polls all predict that Trump has a 70% chance of losing the upcoming United
States presidential election. I may
consistently believe that it is more likely than not that Trump will lose (based
on my available evidence) and yet suspend judgement about whether he would
lose. Consider: during the 2016 presidential
campaign, most national polls placed Trump’s chances of losing to Hillary
Clinton between 70% and 99%, and projected that she would be the clear winner
in states like Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, both of which ultimately went to
Trump. As the eventual 2016 election
results illustrate, sometimes the less likely outcome, given the available
evidence, is the one that is ultimately realized. Recognizing this fact, there is nothing
inconsistent about believing some outcome to be more likely than not (based on
one’s available evidence) and yet deciding to remain agnostic about whether it
will obtain.[5] The upshot is that even if hypothesizing PQ entails a rational commitment to PQ being more likely to be
true than not, it does not follow that it is rationally impermissible to
suspend Q at t and hypothesize PQ at t.
Moreover,
Friedman’s rationale for holding that suspending Q and believing PQ are rationally incompatible is that the former entails treating Q as open while the latter entails
treating Q as settled or closed. However, insofar as hypothesizing is an
inquiring attitude, it does not entail having a settled position on some question. This means that Friedman’s rationale for
holding that suspending and believing are incompatible is missing in the case
of hypothesizing. The upshot is that
there is nothing on Friedman’s account of the relationship between suspension
and inquiry that prevents us from saying that an inquiring agent suspends Q1 at some time t and also hypothesizes P1Q1 at t.
Nor does Palmira supply any other compelling rationale for thinking that
suspending and hypothesizing are incompatible.
This means that the defender of the inquirer-as-suspender thesis remains
entitled to say that the inquiring agent suspends Q1 at both stages 1 and 2, and that at stage 2 she also
hypothesizes P1Q1 alongside suspending Q1. Indeed, the defender of the
inquirer-as-suspender thesis may insist that it is the fact that the inquiring
agent not only suspends Q1, but also
hypothesizes P1Q1, that
distinguishes stage 2 from stage 1. The
upshot is that Palmira’s charge that the defender of the inquirer-as-suspender
thesis is unable to register the difference between stages 1 and 2 in terms of
the doxastic attitudes each stage implicates ultimately flounders.
This brings us to Palmira’s second line of criticism of the inquirer-as-suspender
thesis; namely, that it gives rise to the Unity of Inquiry Problem. Once it is granted that an agent may
simultaneously suspend Q and
hypothesize PQ, there is no need for the defender of the inquirer-as-suspender
thesis to mark the shift from stage 1 to stage 2 in terms of the shift from
suspending Q1 and suspending Q2.
Instead, the defender of the inquirer-as-suspender thesis may claim that
at both stages of inquiry, the agent suspends Q1 and that the difference between stages 1 and 2 is to be
explained in terms of the fact that hypothesizing P1Q1 is absent in the former stage and present in the latter.
Admittedly, the defender of the inquirer-as-suspender
thesis is committed to saying that at whatever point I adopt an inquiring frame
of mind towards Q2, I am also
suspended about Q2. However, it is uncontroversial that an agent
may suspend two different questions at the same time. For example, I may simultaneously suspend
judgement about where life on earth came from and about whether life on earth
originated from non-life. Hence, the
defender of the inquirer-as-suspender thesis may hold that during stage 1, the
inquiring agent only suspends Q1, and
that during stage 2, they come to suspend Q2 in addition to suspending Q1. On the present suggestion, what unifies
stages 1 and 2 as stages of a single instance of inquiry is that both primarily
involve suspending Q1. However, during stage 2, the agent suspends a
secondary question, Q2, in the service
of answering the primary question, Q1. In sum, the agent comes to suspend Q2 in order to facilitate her continued
inquiry into Q1, about which she is
also suspended.
The upshot of the preceding analysis is
a hybrid view of the second stage of inquiry that includes both hypothesizing P1Q1 and suspending Q2.
According to the view currently on offer, what unifies both stages 1 and
2 as stages of inquiry into a single question is the fact that both stages
implicate suspending Q1. However, once I settle on P1Q1 as the most likely
answer to Q1, my inquiring enters a
new phase. This new phase is marked by the adoption of the attitude of
hypothesizing P1Q1. Once this hypothesis has been adopted, this
initiates a sub-inquiry into Q2 as
part of the overarching inquiry into Q1. This sub-inquiry implicates its own instance
of suspension—i.e., suspending Q2.
However, both hypothesizing P1Q1 and suspending Q2 are attitudes I adopt alongside my suspension of Q1 and are adopted in the service of the inquiry facilitated by my suspending Q1. In sum, the defender of the inquirer-as-suspender thesis is both able to mark the shift from stages 1 to 2 of inquiry—i.e., in terms of the shift from merely suspending Q1 to hypothesizing P1Q1 and suspending Q2, in addition to suspending Q1—while also avoiding the Unity of Inquiry Problem—i.e., by holding that both stages of my inquiry into Q1 involve suspending Q1.
However, both hypothesizing P1Q1 and suspending Q2 are attitudes I adopt alongside my suspension of Q1 and are adopted in the service of the inquiry facilitated by my suspending Q1. In sum, the defender of the inquirer-as-suspender thesis is both able to mark the shift from stages 1 to 2 of inquiry—i.e., in terms of the shift from merely suspending Q1 to hypothesizing P1Q1 and suspending Q2, in addition to suspending Q1—while also avoiding the Unity of Inquiry Problem—i.e., by holding that both stages of my inquiry into Q1 involve suspending Q1.
[1] See and cf. Friedman 2017: 302.
[2] See and cf. Friedman 2019: 303.
[3] Archer (forthcoming)
[4] See Palmira (2018: 5).
[5] This comports with my earlier
observation that suspending judgement is the appropriate response to one’s
recognition that the available evidence is inconclusive. It is not merely the appropriate response to the
recognition that the available evidence equally supports P and not-P.
References:
Archer,
Avery (forthcoming). Agnosticism, Inquiry, and Unanswerable Questions. Disputatio.
Archer,
Avery. (2018). Wondering About What You Know. Analysis 78(4): 596-604.
Friedman,
Jane. (2017). Why Suspend Judging? Nous,
51(2): 302-326.
Friedman, Jane. (2013a). Question-Directed
Attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives
27(1): 145-174.
Friedman,
Jane. (2013b). Suspended Judgment. Philosophical
Studies 162(2):165-181.
Palmira,
Michele. (2018). Inquiry and the Doxastic Attitudes. Synthese.
