I will like to introduce a distinction between two senses in which a psychological state, X, may provide one with a reason to adopt a belief or intention. My hope is that the distinction is both clear and intuitive. So here it is:
(1) X provides us with a reason to adopt Y by putting us in touch with a consideration that speaks in favour of adopting Y.
(2) X provides us with a reason to adopt Y by constituting a consideration that speaks in favour of adopting Y.
The
difference between (1) and (2) is the difference between the perceptual
appearance that it is raining outside giving one a reason to believe that it is
raining outside, and the fact that one has the perceptual appearance that there
is a pink elephant in the corner of the room giving one a reason to check
oneself into a hospital. In the first
case, the perceptual appearance provides one with a reason by putting one in
touch with a consideration that is independent of the perceptual appearance
itself and which speaks in favour of adopting the belief that it is raining
outside—namely, the fact that it is raining outside. The fact that it is raining outside is
independent of the perceptual appearance of it raining outside in the sense
that the fact would obtain (and constitute a reason to believe that is raining
outside) even if one did not have the perceptual appearance in question. By contrast, the fact that one has the
perceptual appearance of a pink elephant in the corner of the room does not put
one in touch with some independent consideration in favour of adopting the
intention to check oneself into the hospital.
Rather, the perceptual appearance itself constitutes the relevant
consideration.
Significantly,
when a psychological state provides one with a reason in the first sense, it
does so in virtue of the fact that it is an intentional state with objective
purport. The perceptual appearance that it
is raining provides one with a reason to believe it is raining because it
purports to put one in touch with a mind-independent fact—to wit, the fact that
it is raining. If (following Franz
Brentano) we assume that psychological states are distinctive because they have
the property of intentionality or aboutness, then we
can say that when a psychological state provides one with reasons in the sense
described in (1), it is doing so qua
psychological state.
By contrast, when a
psychological state provides one with a reason in the sense described in (2),
it does not do so qua psychological
state (i.e., in virtue of being a state with the property of aboutness). Rather, it provides one with a reason in the
very same way that any old fact might.
For example, the fact that I’m bleeding profusely gives me a reason to
check myself into the hospital in the very same sense that having the
perceptual appearance that there is a pink elephant gives me a reason to check
myself into the hospital. If this is right, and given that the former lacks the property of
aboutness, then it follows that the latter does not provide rational guidance of the relevant kind in virtue of having the property of aboutness.
Hence, only (1) describes a type of rational significance that is
uniquely had by psychological states.
