SYNOPSIS:
Velleman argues that the Guise of the Good theory (henceforth, “GG
theory”) errs by either making an evaluative term (henceforth, “the good”) part
of the propositional content of the attitude motivating an intentional action
(henceforth, “a desire”) or by unpacking the claim that desire aims at the good
in terms of desire’s direction of fit. The first strategy fails because it
entails that an agent can have a desire only if she possesses the concept of
the good, and the second strategy fails because it conflates the constitutive
aim of an attitude with its direction of fit.
OUTLINE:
Step 1: Velleman
conceives of GG Theory in terms of an attempt to reconcile two seemingly incompatible
stories of the origin of human action; namely, the story of motivation and the story
of rational guidance. (3-5*)
Argument: According to the story
of motivation, an
agent acts intentionally when her action is caused by a desire for some outcome
and a belief that the action will promote it. According to the story of
rational guidance, an agent acts intentionally when the action justifying
character of a proposition prompts her action via her grasp of that
proposition. Noncognitivism emphasizes the story
of motivation at the expense of the story of rational guidance, and cognitivism
emphasizes the story of rational guidance at the expense of the story of
motivation.
Upshot: Noncognitivists and
cognitivists differ in terms of which story of the origin of human action they
privilege: motivation and rational guidance, respectively.
Step 2: Velleman claims that the
main motivation for rejecting noncognitivism and embracing cognitivism is a
desire to preserve the commonsense story of the origin of human action. (5-6)
Argument: In the commonsense
story, the agent is moved toward action because his reasons justify it; whereas
in the noncognitivist story, her reasons justify her action in virtue of moving
her toward it. Consequently, noncognitivism gets things backwards; it does
violence to the common sense story.
Upshot: Those who prefer cogntivism over
noncognitivism are motivated by an attempt to preserve the common sense story.
Step 3:
Velleman rejects simple cognitivism because it imposes the implausible
requirement that an agent possesses the relevant evaluative concept in order to
have a desire. (6-8)
Argument: According to simple cognitivism, desire
aims at the good in virtue of its propositional content, which includes the
evaluative predicate “good”. This means
that an agent could not have a desire unless she possessed the concept of the
good. However, infants have desires long
before they have the concept of the good, or any other evaluative concepts.
Upshot: Simple cogntivism fails to offer a
plausible account of why desire aims at the good.
Step 4: Velleman considers an
alternative to simple cognitivism, dubbed “sophisticated cognitivism”,
according to which desire aims at the good in virtue of its direction of fit.
(8-9)
Argument: According to the
sophisticated cognitivist, cognitive attitudes (like belief) aim at truth
because their propositional object is regarded as a factum (something that is the case), while conative attitudes (like
desire) aim at the good because their propositional object is regarded as a faciendum (something that is to be made
the case). In keeping with this view, a propositional attitude is
characterised, not only by the proposition that embodies its content, but also
by the attitude's direction of fit (i.e., whether it represents its
propositional object as factum or faciendum).
Upshot: According to sophisticated
cognitivism, desire aims at the good because of the way the propositional object
of a desire is grasped; namely, as faciendum.
Step 5: Velleman impugns sophisticated cognitivism on the
grounds that it fails to distinguish between an attitude’s direction of fit and
its constitutive aim. (9-15)
Argument: Belief is a cognitive
attitude (i.e., has a certain direction of fit) because it depicts the world as
being a certain way. In this regard, a belief is like other cognitive
attitudes, like imagining and fantasising.
Truth is the constitutive aim of belief because belief depicts the world
as being a certain way with the aim of getting things right (i.e., representing
truly). Thus, saying that belief has a
certain direction of fit is different from saying that it has a certain
constitutive aim.
Upshot: Sophisticated
cognitivism errs when it fails to distinguish between saying that a desire has
a certain direction of fit (i.e., that it is a conative attitude) and saying
that desire aims at the good (i.e., that it has a certain constitutive aim).
Step 6: Velleman argues that since desires do not represent its object as faciendum, the good is not the constitutive
aim of desire. (15-21)
Argument: Truth is the constitutive aim of belief because belief represents
its propositional object as factum. This is why it is impossible to believe
something under the description of it being false. If desire represents its propositional object
as faciendum, then it should be
impossible to desire something under the description of it being bad. However,
the possibility of perverse desire shows that desire does not represent its
object as faciendum. This follows from the definition of a
perverse desire as desiring something under the description of it being bad or
pointless.
Upshot: Since it is possible to desire something under the description of
it being bad or pointless the good cannot be the constitutive aim of desire.
CONCLUSION:
Neither simple nor sophisticated cognitivism successfully show that
desire aims at the good. As such, the central contention of GG theory remains
unestablished.
*Page numbers based on Velleman,
D. [1992], “The Guise of the Good”, Nous,
26 (1): 3-26.
