Propositional Content vs. Representational Content

In my last two posts, "Introducing Felicity Conditions" and "Anscombe and Felicity Conditions", I have tried to unpack a particular conception of the correctness conditions of the attitudinal component of the propositional attitude (in contradistinction to the correctness conditions of propositional content of a propositional attitude). Moreover, I hold that the correctness conditions of the attitudinal component of a propositional attitude (or what I refer to as "felicity-conditions" is determined by the attitude's representational component. When this claim is conjoined with the claim that the felicity-conditions of a propositional attitude may differ from the correctness conditions of its propositional content, the upshot is that the representational content of a propositional attitude may also differ from its propositional content. In this post, I want to say why I think this claim should be accepted.

According to the account of desires presently on offer—one that takes its inspiration from Anscombe—desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is felicitous just in case my leaving work at 2pm is an instance of the good. Hence, the felicity-conditions of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm coincide with the felicity-conditions of believing that my leaving work at 2pm is good. Recall, the belief that my leaving work at 2pm is good is felicitous just in case it is true that my leaving work at 2pm is good. This follows from the fact that the felicity conditions of a belief correspond with the truth-conditions of its propositional content. Similarly, my desire that I will leave work at 2pm is felicitous just in case it is true that my leaving work at 2pm is good. This observation makes it tempting to revise the propositional content of the desire to leave work at 2pm so that it coincides with the propositional content of believing that my leaving work at 2pm is good. Hence, we may be tempted to say that the propositional content of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is not the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm” but rather, the proposition, “my leaving work at 2pm is good”.

Unfortunately, it is untenable that the propositional content of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is the proposition “my leaving work at 2pm is good”. Revising the propositional content of the desire in this way simply changes the object of the desire in question. To see that this is so, we merely have to register that desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is different from desiring that my leaving work at 2pm is good. Hence, we need to leave room in our theorising for desires with either propositional content. There are at least three reasons why this is so.

First, the satisfaction-conditions of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is identical to the truth-conditions of the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”, while the satisfaction-conditions of desiring that my leaving work at 2pm is good is identical to the truth-conditions of the proposition, “my leaving work at 2pm is good”. The fact that the desires in question have different satisfaction-conditions suggests that they are in fact distinct desires.

Second, the first desire is the type that typically yields an intention while the second is not. For example, desiring that I will leave work at 2pm may yield the intention to leave work at 2pm. However, it is not typically the case that I can intend that my leaving work at 2pm be a realisation of the good. Moreover, even if I could intend that my leaving work at 2pm be a realisation of the good, it is entirely conceivable that I may successfully carry out that intention without actually bringing it about that I leave work at 2pm. For example, I may intend that my leaving work at 2pm be a realisation of the good by completing some work related project three hours early. But I may complete my project early, and thereby make my leaving work at 2pm a realisation of the good, without actually leaving work at 2pm. Thus, if I did form the intention that my leaving work at 2pm be good, it would still be a different intention to the one I would form if I intended to leave work at 2pm.

Third, desiring that my leaving work at 2pm is good requires that I possess and deploy the concept “good”, while desiring that I will leave work at 2pm does not. Hence, it is important that we preserve the distinction between a desire with the propositional content, “I will leave work at 2pm”, and a desire with the propositional content, “my leaving work at 2pm is good”.

The preceding considerations impugn the claim that desiring that I will leave work at 2pm has the same propositional content as believing that my leaving work at 2pm is good. However, there may still be a way to salvage the idea that the desire that I will leave work at 2pm and the belief that my leaving work at 2pm is good share something in common, content-wise. Towards this end, we may distinguish between the propositional content and representational content of a propositional attitude. Desiring that I will leave work at 2pm has the same propositional content as believing that I will leave work at 2pm; namely, the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”. However, while believing that I will leave work at 2pm represents the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”, to be true, desiring that I will leave work at 2pm does not represent the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm” to be true. Rather, desiring that I will leave work at 2pm represents the truth of the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”, to be a realisation of the good. Given this difference, it seems natural to say that believing that I will leave work at 2pm has a different representational content to desiring that I will leave work at 2pm. After all, how could two propositional attitudes have the same representational content if one represents something to be true and the other represents something to be good. The upshot is that two propositional attitudes that share the same propositional content may nevertheless exhibit different representational contents.