Propositional Content vs. Representational Content

In my last two posts, "Introducing Felicity Conditions" and "Anscombe and Felicity Conditions", I have tried to unpack a particular conception of the correctness conditions of the attitudinal component of the propositional attitude (in contradistinction to the correctness conditions of propositional content of a propositional attitude). Moreover, I hold that the correctness conditions of the attitudinal component of a propositional attitude (or what I refer to as "felicity-conditions" is determined by the attitude's representational component. When this claim is conjoined with the claim that the felicity-conditions of a propositional attitude may differ from the correctness conditions of its propositional content, the upshot is that the representational content of a propositional attitude may also differ from its propositional content. In this post, I want to say why I think this claim should be accepted.

According to the account of desires presently on offer—one that takes its inspiration from Anscombe—desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is felicitous just in case my leaving work at 2pm is an instance of the good. Hence, the felicity-conditions of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm coincide with the felicity-conditions of believing that my leaving work at 2pm is good. Recall, the belief that my leaving work at 2pm is good is felicitous just in case it is true that my leaving work at 2pm is good. This follows from the fact that the felicity conditions of a belief correspond with the truth-conditions of its propositional content. Similarly, my desire that I will leave work at 2pm is felicitous just in case it is true that my leaving work at 2pm is good. This observation makes it tempting to revise the propositional content of the desire to leave work at 2pm so that it coincides with the propositional content of believing that my leaving work at 2pm is good. Hence, we may be tempted to say that the propositional content of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is not the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm” but rather, the proposition, “my leaving work at 2pm is good”.

Unfortunately, it is untenable that the propositional content of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is the proposition “my leaving work at 2pm is good”. Revising the propositional content of the desire in this way simply changes the object of the desire in question. To see that this is so, we merely have to register that desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is different from desiring that my leaving work at 2pm is good. Hence, we need to leave room in our theorising for desires with either propositional content. There are at least three reasons why this is so.

First, the satisfaction-conditions of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is identical to the truth-conditions of the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”, while the satisfaction-conditions of desiring that my leaving work at 2pm is good is identical to the truth-conditions of the proposition, “my leaving work at 2pm is good”. The fact that the desires in question have different satisfaction-conditions suggests that they are in fact distinct desires.

Second, the first desire is the type that typically yields an intention while the second is not. For example, desiring that I will leave work at 2pm may yield the intention to leave work at 2pm. However, it is not typically the case that I can intend that my leaving work at 2pm be a realisation of the good. Moreover, even if I could intend that my leaving work at 2pm be a realisation of the good, it is entirely conceivable that I may successfully carry out that intention without actually bringing it about that I leave work at 2pm. For example, I may intend that my leaving work at 2pm be a realisation of the good by completing some work related project three hours early. But I may complete my project early, and thereby make my leaving work at 2pm a realisation of the good, without actually leaving work at 2pm. Thus, if I did form the intention that my leaving work at 2pm be good, it would still be a different intention to the one I would form if I intended to leave work at 2pm.

Third, desiring that my leaving work at 2pm is good requires that I possess and deploy the concept “good”, while desiring that I will leave work at 2pm does not. Hence, it is important that we preserve the distinction between a desire with the propositional content, “I will leave work at 2pm”, and a desire with the propositional content, “my leaving work at 2pm is good”.

The preceding considerations impugn the claim that desiring that I will leave work at 2pm has the same propositional content as believing that my leaving work at 2pm is good. However, there may still be a way to salvage the idea that the desire that I will leave work at 2pm and the belief that my leaving work at 2pm is good share something in common, content-wise. Towards this end, we may distinguish between the propositional content and representational content of a propositional attitude. Desiring that I will leave work at 2pm has the same propositional content as believing that I will leave work at 2pm; namely, the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”. However, while believing that I will leave work at 2pm represents the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”, to be true, desiring that I will leave work at 2pm does not represent the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm” to be true. Rather, desiring that I will leave work at 2pm represents the truth of the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”, to be a realisation of the good. Given this difference, it seems natural to say that believing that I will leave work at 2pm has a different representational content to desiring that I will leave work at 2pm. After all, how could two propositional attitudes have the same representational content if one represents something to be true and the other represents something to be good. The upshot is that two propositional attitudes that share the same propositional content may nevertheless exhibit different representational contents.

Language and Thought

Anscombe and Felicity Conditions

In my previous post, I introduced the notion of felicity-conditions; defined as the correctness-conditions of the attitudinal component of a propositional attitude (in contradistinction to the correctness-conditions of the propositional content of a propositional attitude). In the present post, I want say a little about how the notion of a felicity-condition relates to Anscombe's claim that the good is the object of wanting.

Let us refer to the claim that desires do not have felicity-conditions that are identical to the truth-conditions of their propositional content as the negative thesis. The negative thesis is neutral on the question of whether or not desires have felicity-conditions at all; to wit, it takes no stand on whether or not the attitude of desire has correctness-conditions beyond the correctness-conditions of its propositional content (i.e., the truth-conditions of the propositional attitude). The primary motivation for the negative thesis comes from our ordinary linguistic practice; namely, the fact that we do not ordinarily conceive of desires as true or false. We may unpack this intuition by registering that while beliefs represent a certain proposition as true, desires do not. For example, the belief that I will have a slice of cheesecake represents the proposition “I will have a slice of cheesecake” to be true. However, the desire that I will have a slice of cheesecake does not represent the proposition “I will have a slice of cheesecake” to be true. If it did, then it would make sense to say that the desire that I will have a slice of cheesecake is true when the proposition “I will have a slice of cheesecake” is true, and false when the proposition is false. However, as we already noted, we do not ordinarily speak or think this way.

In addition to the negative thesis, I wish to argue that, like the attitude of belief, the attitude of desire has felicity-conditions. However, while the felicity-conditions of a belief are identical with its truth-conditions, I hold that the same is not true of the felicity-conditions of desire. Let us refer to this claim as the positive thesis. Something along the lines of the positive thesis must be accepted if we wish to buy into Anscombe's theory of desires. Recall, according to Anscombe, desire (or wanting) stands in a roughly analogous relation to the good as belief (or judgement) does to the true. However, the negative thesis—namely, the claim that the attitude of desire lacks a truth-value—offers little support for this claim. To wit, the mere fact that the attitude of desire lacks a truth-value does not show that it stands in a certain relation to the good. Moreover, preserving Anscombe's thesis requires that we see the attitude of desire as having something along the lines of what I have been calling 'felicity-conditions'. On this score, the following passage from Anscombe is instructive:

The conceptual connexion between 'wanting'. . . and 'good' can be compared to the conceptual connexion between 'judgment' and 'truth'. Truth is the object of judgement, and good the object of wanting; it does not follow from this either that everything judged must be true, or that everything wanted must be good.

If the fact that the good is the object of desire does not entail that everything desired must be good, then it follows that it is at least possible that a particular desire may get things wrong. Moreover, it seems safe to assume that Anscombe is also committed to saying that it is possible for desire to sometimes get things right. Hence, by Anscombe's lights, desires may be described as two-valued, such that there are cases in which a desire may be said to get things wrong and cases in which a desire may be said to get things right. This suggests that desires have some kind of correctness-conditions, which determine when a desire can be said to get things right. But since the cases in which a desire gets things wrong or right do not correspond with those cases in which the propositional content of a desire is true or false, the correctness-conditions of the attitude of desire (whatever they happen to be) cannot be identical to the truth-conditions of its propositional content.

One very natural way of understanding the claim that the good is the object of desire is to say that a desire is felicitous just in case its object is an instance of the good. Rephrased in the language of propositional attitudes, we may say that a desire is felicitous just in case the truth of its propositional content is a realisation of the good. For example, desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is felicitous just in case the truth of the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”, is a realisation of the good. However, some caution is required here. The present claim is not that desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is felicitous only if I do leave work at 2pm; to wit, it is not necessary that the propositional content of the desire be true in order for the desire to be felicitous. Rather, it is only necessary that, were the propositional content true, it would be a realisation of the good. This comports with Anscombe's observation that “goodness is ascribed to wanting in virtue of the goodness (not the actualisation) of what is wanted.”

In other words, the felicity-conditions of a desire should not be confused with its satisfaction-conditions. The satisfaction-conditions of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm just are the conditions under which the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm” is true. However, if my leaving work at 2pm is not an instance of the good—because, let us suppose, it would involve my leaving an important project uncompleted—then desiring that I will leave work at 2pm is not felicitous even if I do leave work at 2pm. Thus, desiring that I leave work at 2pm may be infelicitous even if the satisfaction-conditions of the desire have been met. Moreover, desiring that I will leave work at 2pm may be felicitous even if the satisfaction-conditions of the desire have not been met; to wit, even if the proposition “I will leave work at 2pm” is false. For example, if my leaving work at 2pm is a realisation of the good—because, let us suppose, it would allow me to spend some quality time with my family—then desiring that I leave work at 2pm is felicitous even if I do not leave work at 2pm. The upshot is that the felicity-conditions of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm, when construed along Anscombean lines, are different from the satisfaction-conditions of desiring that I will leave work at 2pm.

Let us take stock of what we have seen thus far. First, we noted that although the propositional content of desire has truth-conditions, just like the propositional content of belief, the attitude of desire is ordinarily assumed to lack a truth-value. Using the label 'felicity-conditions' to refer to the correctness-conditions of an attitude (in contradistinction from the correctness-conditions of the propositional content of an attitude), we may say that the felicity-conditions of a desire, assuming that it has felicity-conditions, do not correspond with the truth-conditions of its propositional content. Moreover, I have argued that preserving the Anscombean thesis that the good is the object of desire entails that desires have some kind of correctness-conditions.

Introducing: Felicity Conditions

Beliefs, and desires are widely regarded as examples of propositional attitudes; relational mental states connecting a person to a proposition. Examples of propositions include: “It is raining outside”, and “I will leave work at 2pm”. Examples of propositional attitudes include: believing that it is raining outside, and desiring that I will leave work at 2pm. As their name suggests, propositional attitudes are typically conceived of as being made up of two components: a proposition, which may either be true or false, and an attitude or mode of entertaining that proposition. I have reservations about the claim that beliefs and desires always involve relations between persons and propositions. I hold that on at least some occasions, they may involve relations between persons and actual objects or states of affairs. However, I will not argue for that conclusion here. Instead, I will simply adopt the standard philosophical practice of describing beliefs and desires as propositional attitudes.

Let us say that the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm” is true just in case I do leave work at 2pm, and false otherwise. According to the standard view, I may both believe that I will leave work at 2pm and desire that I will leave work at 2pm. Thus, both beliefs and desires are attitudes that may be taken towards a proposition—i.e., a truth-value bearing item. However, while the belief that I will leave work at 2pm is ordinarily deemed true when the proposition, “I will leave work at 2pm”, is true, and ordinarily deemed false when the aforementioned proposition is false; the desire that I will leave work at 2pm is not ordinarily deemed true when the proposition “I will leave work at 2pm” is true, nor is it ordinarily deemed false when the aforementioned proposition is false. In fact, the categories of truth and falsity are not ordinarily taken to have application to desires.

If the preceding observation regarding desires is right, then it does not follow from the fact that the content of a propositional attitude (which we are, for the purposes of the present blog post, assuming to be a proposition) has a truth-value that the attitude itself has a truth-value. We may accommodate this claim by distinguishing between the correctness-conditions of the propositional content of a propositional attitude and the correctness-conditions of the attitude itself. Hence, we may say that while the propositional content of a desire has truth-conditions, the desire itself does not. In this regard, desires differ from beliefs, since both the propositional content of a belief and the belief itself may be true or false.

In order to avoid confusion, it would be helpful to have different terms to refer to the correctness-conditions of the content of a propositional attitude and the correctness-conditions of the attitude itself. Since we are assuming that the content of all propositional attitudes are propositions, and since all propositions have truth-conditions, let us refer to the correctness-conditions of the propositional content of a propositional attitude as the truth-conditions of the propositional attitude. Moreover, let us refer to the correctness-conditions of the attitude itself as the felicity-conditions of the propositional attitude. The distinction between truth-conditions and felicity-conditions will provide us with the theoretical machinery we need to characterise the aforementioned contrast between beliefs and desires; namely, that although both beliefs and desires have truth-value bearing propositional content, only the former is ordinarily conceived of as being either true or false. We may say that in the case of beliefs, the felicity-conditions of the attitude are identical to the truth-conditions of the attitude's propositional content. Thus, not only is the propositional content of the belief true or false, but so is the belief itself.

It is not part of our ordinary linguistic practice to talk about the propositional content of a propositional attitude. The notion of propositional content is a theoretical one. Hence, it seems plausible that when we ordinarily talk about beliefs being true or false, we have their felicity-conditions (i.e., the correctness-conditions of the attitude) in mind. This assumption would also go some way towards explaining why we do not ordinarily conceive of desires as being true or false. While the propositional content of a desire has a truth-value, the desire itself does not. Thus, the felicity-conditions of a desire—if it has felicity-conditions at all—are not identical to the truth-conditions of its propositional content. Since our ordinary intuitions about which propositional attitudes have a truth-value track the propositional attitude's felicity-conditions (rather than the truth-conditions of its propositional content), the fact that the felicity-conditions of desire are not identical to the truth-conditions of its propositional content would explain why we do not ordinarily conceive of desires as true or false.

To recap, we have distinguished between the truth-conditions of a propositional attitude and the felicity-conditions of a propositional attitude. The former, we have identified with the correctness-conditions of the propositional content of a propositional attitude and the latter we have identified with the correctness-conditions of the attitude itself. Moreover, we noted that our ordinary intuitions about which propositional attitudes are true or false seem to correspond with the felicity-conditions of a propositional attitude, rather than with the truth-conditions of its propositional content.