UW Graduate Student Conference

THE 5TH BIENNIAL UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
GRADUATE STUDENT CONFERENCE IN PHILOSOPHY
November 13 & 14, 2009
Theme: Moral Psychology

CONFERENCE SCHEDULE:

Friday

3:30 PM KEYNOTE ADDRESS

“Responsibility and Mental Agency”
Pamela Heironymi (UCLA)
Savery Hall, Room 264

5:30 PM RECEPTION (Savery Hall Third Floor Philosophy Department Table)


Saturday (all sessions in Savery Hall Room 264)

9:00 – 9:30 LIGHT BREAKFAST PROVIDED (Savery Hall Room 264)

9:30 – 10:20 SESSION 1: “Responsibility and Affective Skills in the Psychopath”
Garrett Pendergraft (University of California, Riverside)
COMMENTS: Janice Moskalik (University of Washington)

10:30 – 11:20 SESSION 2: “Irresistible Motivation”
Todd Beattie (Princeton University)
COMMENTS: Jason Benchimol (University of Washington)

11:30 – 12:20 SESSION 3: “Hard Feelings and Forgiveness”
Grant Rozeboom (Stanford University)
COMMENTS: Patrick Smith (University of Washington)

12:20 – 1:30 LUNCH

1:30 – 2:20 SESSION 4: “Evaluation without Hyper-intellectualisation”
Avery Archer (Columbia University)
COMMENTS: Rachel Fredericks (University of Washington)

2:30 – 3:20 SESSION 5: “Liberal Universalism and How We Understand the Past”
George Tsai (University of California, Berkeley)
COMMENTS: Amy Reed (University of Washington)

3:30 – 4:20 SESSION 6: “Is Self-Binding Morally Wrong?”
Jeff Sebo (New York University)
COMMENTS: Fareed Awan (University of Washington)

4:30 – 5:20 SESSION 7: “Why So Serious? An Inquiry On Racist Jokes”
Luvell Anderson (Rutgers University)
COMMENTS: Elizabeth Scarbrough (University of Washington) &
Jonathan Rosenberg (University of Washington)

5:30 – 7:00 BANQUET (Savery Hall Third Floor Philosophy Department Table)

8:00 – ? PARTY (at the “Philosophy House”)

Towards a Teleological Logic (Part 2)

How are we to formerly represent the claim that the purpose of the human eye is to perceive visual stimuli? One suggestion, which will ultimately prove insufficient, may be put as follows: Let E refer to the set of human eyes, and let P refer to the set of things that perceive visual stimuli. The claim that the purpose of the human eye is to perceive visual stimuli may be formerly represented as follows:

(1.1) (∀x)(E(x) → P(x))

According to (1.1), for something to be a member of the set of human eyes is sufficient for that thing to be a member of the set of things that perceive visual stimuli. However, (1.1) clearly fails to capture what we mean when say that the purpose of the human eye is to perceive visual stimuli. Cases of blindness represent a counterexample to (1.1), but they do not represent a counterexample to the claim that the purpose of the eyes is to perceive visual stimuli. Thus, the former is not equivalent to the latter. The take home message seems to be that the claim that something has a telos allows for exceptional cases, and therefore cannot be represented by the universal quantifier. Another suggestion, which will also prove to be insufficient, is to replace the universal with an existential quantifier. This yields:

(1.2) (∃x)(E(x) & P(x))

(1.2) offers a clear advantage over (1.1) since it does not require that all members of the set of eyes also be members of the set of things that perceive visual stimuli. However, (1.2) also fails to capture what we mean when we say that the purpose of the human eye is to perceive visual stimuli since we can imagine a situation in which the former is false and the latter is true. For example, suppose that a global pandemic, a virulent eye-infection let us say, rendered everyone on earth blind. In such a case (1.2) would be false, and yet we would still wish to say that the telos of the human eye is to perceive visual stimuli.

I believe that (1.1) and (1.2) both fail because they attempt to represent the claim that the human eye has a certain telos by focusing solely on how things are in the actual world. However, I believe that our concept of what it means for something to have a purpose is an essentially modal notion; one that appeals to how things are in worlds other than the actual world.

In attempting to formerly represent our notion of purposiveness I will be taking as my starting point the accessibility relation introduced by Saul Kripke. Within the Libnizian framework, to say that φ is necessarily true means that φ obtains in all metaphysically possible worlds. By contrast, Kripke-style possible world semantics relativises the notion of necessary truth to a subset of the metaphysically possible worlds; namely, the set of accessible worlds. The upshot is that modal statements (it is necessary that φ, it is possible that φ) need not take the same truth value in all possible worlds.

For example, suppose that Δ is the only world accessible from Γ and that Γ and Δ are both accessible from Δ. Moreover, let us suppose that Δ ⊩ φ and that Γ⊮ φ. On the present model, it is necessarily true that φ relative to Γ since φ obtains in all worlds accessible from Γ. However, it is not necessarily true that φ relative to Δ since φ does not obtain in all worlds accessible from Δ. Significantly, Kripke-style semantics allows for the possibility that a given world may fail to be accessible from itself (as is the case with Γ but not the case with Δ in our preceding example). As we shall soon see, this feature of Kripke-style semantics will be crucially important when we attempt to formerly represent the concept of purposiveness. As has become standard, I will be defining the relation of accessibility as an (uninterpreted) binary relation R(Γ,Δ) that holds between possible worlds Γ and Δ just in case Δ is accessible from Γ. If we let Γ denote the actual world, then we have the following two fundamental translational schema for possible world sematics:

(2.1) □φ =def φ is true at every world Δ such that R(Γ,Δ)

(2.2) ◊φ =def φ is true at some world Δ such that R(Γ,Δ)

There are numerous applications of Kripke-style semantics. For example, in physics the accessibility relation is construed in terms of nomological accessibility. φ is nomologically necessary just in case φ is true at all possible worlds that are nomologically accessible from the actual world. In short, φ is true at all possible worlds that obey the physical laws of the actual world. In deontic logic, the accessibility relation is construed in terms of morally perfect worlds. φ is obligatory just in case φ obtains in all morally perfect worlds and permissible just in case it obtains in some morally perfect world.

An important difference between nomological necessity and obligatoriness (or deontic necessity) is that the class of nomologically accessible worlds includes the actual world (since the actual world is a member of the class of worlds that obeys the physical laws of the actual world), but the class of morally perfect worlds does not include the actual world (since the actual world is not a member of the class of morally perfect worlds). Thus, if we were to restrict the universe to the class of morally perfect worlds, the actual world would be omitted. The accessibility relation enables us to avoid this unwelcome result by allowing for imperfect moral worlds in our universe (a class that includes the actual world), while restricting deontic access to those worlds that are morally perfect.

The notion of purposiveness seems to fall somewhere between nomological necessity and obligatoriness. When applied to purposiveness, the accessibility relation may be seen as restricting access to the set of teleologically ideal worlds, defined as the set of worlds in which all aims are achieved, all functions are fulfilled and all purposes are realised. (Henceforth, I will refer to teleologically ideal worlds as T-worlds.) This yields the following fundamental translational schema for purposiveness:

(2.4) □φ =def φ is true at all T-worlds

(2.5) ◊φ =def φ is true at some T-world

Like nomological necessity, and unlike obligatoriness, purposiveness is a descriptive concept, it tells us something about the way the world actually is, and not merely about how the world ought to be. We may identify the descriptive dimension of purposiveness with the fact that an object’s purpose is determined by facts about the actual world. For example, in the case of a biological system, its purpose is determined by what that system was selected for in the actual world. In the case of a human artefact, its purpose is determined by the intentions of the human designer in the actual world. Thus, just as we can only tell which worlds are nomologically accessible by inquiring about which physical laws obtain the actual world, we can only tell which possible worlds are teleologically accessible by inquiring into what a biological system was selected for, or what an artefact was designed for in the actual world.

However, since purposes often go unfulfilled in the actual world, the actual world is not a member of the class of T-worlds. Consequently, there is also a prescriptive dimension to the concept of purposiveness. In this respect, purposiveness is like obligatoriness; both concepts construe the accessibility relation in terms of a set of worlds that excludes the actual world.

Percontations: The Nature of Probability

Towards a Teleological Logic (Part 1)

Teleology, broadly construed, is the study of design or purpose. Let us say that some object is teleological just in case it has an aim, function or purpose (what I will henceforth refer to as an object’s “telos”). For example, we may say that the telos of a hammer is to drive nails, and that the telos of the eyes is to perceive visual stimuli. Thus, both hammers and eyes may be described as teleological objects. Alternatively, we may say that an object is teleological just in case it displays design. In the case of artefacts, like hammers, the design is due to human ingenuity. In the case of biological systems, like the visual system, the design is due to evolution by natural selection. In sum, the telos of an object is the aim or purpose for which it is designed.

But how are we to formally represent the idea that some object has a telos? I wish to propose a Kripke-style modal semantics that has specific application to teleological objects. For example, let A be “X has eyes” and B be “X perceives visual stimuli”. To say that B is the telos of A means that, if all goes well (e.g., if the visual system is functioning as it ought), B follows from A. Of course, as in the case of blindness, having eyes is not always sufficient for perceiving visual stimuli; B does not always follow from A. In order to preserve the idea that B is the telos of A even in cases in which A is not sufficient for B, we must relativize the sufficiency claim. In keeping with our emphasis on design, we may say that A is prototypically sufficient for B, where the word “prototypical” is treated as a monadic modal operator. I will use □ to represent this operator. The claim that B is the telos of A may be formally represented as follows:

□(A → B) (literally: “prototypically, A is sufficient for B”)

The semantic elements here are in large part analogous to that of standard deontic logic. Roughly, let Γ be a world in which A: “X has eyes” gets ⊤, and let Δ be a world in which B: “X perceives visual stimuli” gets ⊤. We may represent the fact that B is the telos of A in terms of the two-place relation ΓAΔ (literally: “Γ aims at Δ”). I will refer to any world that is aimed at by another world as a “target world”. Target worlds are ones in which the relevant aim, function or goal is fulfilled. The □ and ◊ of standard modal logic becomes:

□P = in all target worlds, it is true that P

◊P = in some target world, it is true that P

Significantly, the □ and ◊ of teleological logic satisfies Aristotle’s modal square of opposition; which is widely taken to be a minimal requirement for a modal logic. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

(1A) □P = It is prototypical that P
(1B) ~◊~P = It is not true, in some target world, that not P

(2A) □~P = It is prototypical that not P
(2B) ~◊P = It is not true, in some target world, that P

(3A) ~□~P = It is not prototypical that not P
(3B) ◊P = It is true, in some target world, that P

(4A) ~□P = It is not prototypical that P
(4B) ◊~P = It is true, in some target world, that not P

Each of the above A-B pairs are equivalent. (1) and (2) represent contraries (cannot both be true), and (3) and (4) are subcontraries (cannot both be false). (1) and (3), and (2)and (4), respectively, are subalternatives (the former implies the latter). (1) and (4), and (2) and (3), respectively, are contradictories (cannot have the same truth value). This represents a rough outline of what may be referred to as a teleological (modal) logic. I will have more to say about the axioms, motivations and applications of a teleological logic in future posts.

Philosophy Workshop Series - New School

Beginning this semester, the Department of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research will be hosting an ongoing series of workshops on a range of themes inspired or influenced by the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The workshop, in continuation of the workshops organized by Alice Crary last Spring, aims to foster intellectual community and conversation in an informal setting among those working not only on Wittgenstein but also more generally on themes in analytic and European philosophy, including ethics, aesthetics, action, normativity, mind, and meaning.

This semester we have scheduled three events. Each will feature a presentation, followed by a careful and brief consideration by a commenter and then a general discussion.

Thursday October 29th, 11-1pm, Rm. 802 at 80 Fifth Avenue
Speaker: James Dow, CUNY, "Shoegenstein on Self-Ascription and Immunity to Error"Commentator: Adam Gies, NSSR

Thursday November 19th, 11-1pm, Rm. 802 at 80 Fifth Avenue
Speaker: Will Small, University of Chicago, "Intention, Belief, and the Future"Commentator: Felix Koch, Columbia University

Thursday December 17th, 11-1pm, Rm. 802 at 80 Fifth Avenue
Speaker: Alex Madva, Columbia University, "Wittgenstein, the Psychology of Unconscious Bias, and the Publicity of Moral Experience"Commentator: TBA

As the dates approach we will send out a reminder email and an a bstractof the presentation. If you come, please come with your coffee and bagels and in a frame of mind conducive to collegial conversation! All are welcome.

We aim to make available the paper a week before each meeting. If you wish to receive the paper beforehand or have any question about theevents please send an email to Mark Theunissen (theunm57@newschool.edu)

USC/UCLA Graduate Student Conference

Saturday, February 27th, 2010

At the University of Southern California, Los Angeles

The graduate students of the University of Southern California and the University of California, Los Angeles, invite graduate students to submit papers in all areas of contemporary philosophy to be considered for presentation at the fifth annual USC/UCLA graduate student conference.

Submission Guidelines:

The deadline for submitting papers is November 1, 2009. Papers should be suitable for a 25-30 minute presentation (less than 4,500 words). Submissions should be suitable for blind review and include a cover letter and one-paragraph abstract. Please email papers as .doc or .pdf attachments to: uclausc.conference@gmail.com

For more information, please contact Alida Liberman at aliberma@usc.edu.

Notice of acceptance will be sent by December 20, 2009.

If electronic submission is impossible,please mail submissions to:

USC Mudd Hall of Philosophy
c/o A. Liberman
3709 Trousdale Parkway
Los Angeles, CA 90089

Intelligent Emotions

It has been suggested, most notably by Robert Solomon, that emotions are ways of engaging the world. This is an idea I find very appealing. Solomon has also insisted that emotions are a form of intelligence. The second claim—that emotions are a form or intelligence—is based on the thesis that emotions involve concepts. For example, Solomon claims that fear involves the concept of danger and that being angry involves the concept of offensiveness. There are at least two ways of interpreting what it means for emotions to involve concepts. On one reading, having an emotion requires that the agent be able to deploy certain concepts. So, being afraid actually requires that the agent possess and deploy the concept of danger. At times, Solomon seems committed to this view. However, he also attributes something like emotions (let’s call them proto-emotions) to animals that clearly lack conceptual capacities. (For example, he describes roaches that scatter when the light is turned on as exhibiting “something like” fear.)

I am reluctant to attribute anything like fear to roaches and other invertebrates that only exhibit (what ethologists refer to as) “fixed action patterns”; preferring to reserve the attribution of contentful mental states only to creatures that are capable of “instrumental learning”. Still, there seems to be a danger of hyper-intellectualisation in the claim that having an emotion requires the possession and deployment of certain concepts. It seems to me very implausible that, for example, a human infant can only be said to experience fear if it has the concept (in any robust sense of the word) of danger. I should, however, hasten to add that whether one finds the aforementioned proposal tenable depends on how one defines a concept. I tend to think of a concept as (at the very least) an inferentially promiscuous item; the upshot being that an infant who cannot employ the concept of danger in an inferentially promiscuous manner does not count as possessing the concept of danger. Still, there seems to be many different conceptions of concepts, and so there appears to be some wriggly room on this particular point.

Even so, I wish to point out that there is a weaker (and what I believe to be more plausible) reading of the claim that emotions involve concepts. On the weaker reading, emotions involve concepts in the sense that we must deploy certain concepts if we are to fully characterise or describe certain emotions. For example, when we describe what it means to be afraid, we must deploy the concept of danger. Otherwise, our description of the emotion will be incomplete. (In other words, merely referring to a set of physiological processes won’t be enough.) However, being afraid does not require that the agent experiencing the fear actually have and deploy the concept of danger. In short, we need to distinguish between needing concepts to describe a phenomenon or state of affairs and needing concepts to instantiate a phenomenon or state of affairs. For example, one needs the concept of mammary glands to describe what it is to be a mammal, but one does not need the concept of mammary glands to instantiate being a mammal. I believe an analogous point holds with respect to the emotions.