In my previous post, Shopping for an Efficient Cause (Part 1), I presented an argument against Reid's "same shop" argument. In this post, I will say why I think the previous argument fails and point towards a more effective strategy for combating the Shop Argument.
As we noted earlier, Reid accepts the first three premises aforementioned argument. Moreover, premise 4 follows from premises 2 and 3. However, premise 5 does not follow from premises 1 and 4. Premise 5 confuses the claim of premise 4, that sensory receptions and rational judgements have different efficient causes (a thesis Reid would accept), with the thesis that the sensory faculty and the rational faculty have different efficient causes (a thesis Reid would reject).
Although we are the efficient cause of our rational judgements, we are not (by Reid’s lights) the efficient cause of our rational faculty. What is at issue in the Shop Argument is not the acts of judging or sensing but rather the faculties involved. Reid’s point is that the faculties (not the actions they perform) both come from the same shop. Thus, although we are the efficient cause of our rational judgements, God is the efficient cause of our rational faculty. Since God is also the efficient cause of our sensory faculty, then both the rational and sensory faculties do come from the same shop after all. Consequently, the sceptic’s attempted refutation of the first step of the Shop Argument fails.
Though unsuccessful, the sceptical argument just limned is instructive since we are now closer to explaining what makes reason sui generis vis-à-vis the senses. Reason is not sui generis because the rational faculty comes from a different shop to the sensory faculty. What sets reason apart from the senses is that we are the efficient cause of our rational judgements but not of our sensory deliverances. Herein also lies the explanation for the unilateral relationship between reason and the senses I promised to provide earlier. Since I am the efficient cause of my rational deliberation, I am unconstrained in my attempts to weigh evidence and arguments. The same, however, is not true of my sensory deliverances—i.e., I am not free to decide whether or not I see a red flower before me. I am of course free to doubt the reliability of what I see. For instance, for whatever reason (i.e., I just ate a handful of ‘magic’ mushrooms) I may decide to doubt that the red flower I see before me is really there. However, my doubting the reliability of what I see does not change the fact that I am seeing it. Thus, when it comes to the content of my sensory deliverances I am (at least in this respect) completely passive.
The upshot of the above observations is as follows: We noted that it is because I am the efficient cause of my rational judgements that I am free to weigh and evaluate evidence. Without such freedom, my beliefs would amount to mere effects at the end of a long causal chain leading back to the first cause (i.e., God), and my personal rational agency would be lost. However, that which qualifies reason to engage in its evaluative capacity is the very thing that the sensory faculty lacks.
This observation also explains my earlier claim that the senses can never be used to evaluate our rational judgements. In sum, the fact that I am the efficient cause of my rational judgements allows reason, given the right circumstances, to effectively evaluate the reliability of the senses. Since we are not the efficient cause of our sensory deliverances, the sensory faculty lacks the unfettered (which is to say ‘autonomous’) evaluative capacity necessary to assess the reliability of our rational deliberations. This difference between reason and the senses gives rise to the unilateral relationship between the two that serves as the basis for the sui generis thesis. In my next post on this topic I will outline the implications of the sui generis thesis for Reid’s Shop Argument.
As we noted earlier, Reid accepts the first three premises aforementioned argument. Moreover, premise 4 follows from premises 2 and 3. However, premise 5 does not follow from premises 1 and 4. Premise 5 confuses the claim of premise 4, that sensory receptions and rational judgements have different efficient causes (a thesis Reid would accept), with the thesis that the sensory faculty and the rational faculty have different efficient causes (a thesis Reid would reject).
Although we are the efficient cause of our rational judgements, we are not (by Reid’s lights) the efficient cause of our rational faculty. What is at issue in the Shop Argument is not the acts of judging or sensing but rather the faculties involved. Reid’s point is that the faculties (not the actions they perform) both come from the same shop. Thus, although we are the efficient cause of our rational judgements, God is the efficient cause of our rational faculty. Since God is also the efficient cause of our sensory faculty, then both the rational and sensory faculties do come from the same shop after all. Consequently, the sceptic’s attempted refutation of the first step of the Shop Argument fails.
Though unsuccessful, the sceptical argument just limned is instructive since we are now closer to explaining what makes reason sui generis vis-à-vis the senses. Reason is not sui generis because the rational faculty comes from a different shop to the sensory faculty. What sets reason apart from the senses is that we are the efficient cause of our rational judgements but not of our sensory deliverances. Herein also lies the explanation for the unilateral relationship between reason and the senses I promised to provide earlier. Since I am the efficient cause of my rational deliberation, I am unconstrained in my attempts to weigh evidence and arguments. The same, however, is not true of my sensory deliverances—i.e., I am not free to decide whether or not I see a red flower before me. I am of course free to doubt the reliability of what I see. For instance, for whatever reason (i.e., I just ate a handful of ‘magic’ mushrooms) I may decide to doubt that the red flower I see before me is really there. However, my doubting the reliability of what I see does not change the fact that I am seeing it. Thus, when it comes to the content of my sensory deliverances I am (at least in this respect) completely passive.
The upshot of the above observations is as follows: We noted that it is because I am the efficient cause of my rational judgements that I am free to weigh and evaluate evidence. Without such freedom, my beliefs would amount to mere effects at the end of a long causal chain leading back to the first cause (i.e., God), and my personal rational agency would be lost. However, that which qualifies reason to engage in its evaluative capacity is the very thing that the sensory faculty lacks.
This observation also explains my earlier claim that the senses can never be used to evaluate our rational judgements. In sum, the fact that I am the efficient cause of my rational judgements allows reason, given the right circumstances, to effectively evaluate the reliability of the senses. Since we are not the efficient cause of our sensory deliverances, the sensory faculty lacks the unfettered (which is to say ‘autonomous’) evaluative capacity necessary to assess the reliability of our rational deliberations. This difference between reason and the senses gives rise to the unilateral relationship between the two that serves as the basis for the sui generis thesis. In my next post on this topic I will outline the implications of the sui generis thesis for Reid’s Shop Argument.
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