tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post7712117883096463045..comments2024-01-03T17:27:11.545+01:00Comments on The Space of Reasons: Moore On Sense DataAVERY ARCHERhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-20911334143760469292007-02-07T08:59:00.000+00:002007-02-07T08:59:00.000+00:00Thanks for the info Benj, I'll be sure to check it...Thanks for the info Benj, I'll be sure to check it out!AVERY ARCHERhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-23094835355543171672007-02-07T03:51:00.000+00:002007-02-07T03:51:00.000+00:00Alan is right -- in 1957's 'Visual sense-data', Mo...Alan is right -- in 1957's 'Visual sense-data', Moore concludes that the sense-datum is not "identical with that part of the opaque object's surface which you are seeing" (this is p 136 of the Swartz reprint).Benj Helliehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16339446607278376739noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-7200338620855752022007-02-04T11:53:00.000+00:002007-02-04T11:53:00.000+00:00The following helpful comments were provided by Al...The following helpful comments were provided by Alan Millar:<br /><br />[In response to paragraph 2]:<br /><br /><i>It is important to distinguish between contingent and necessary dependence. It might be that the sense-data with which we are acquainted depend on the features of the objects around us in that the sense-data with which we are acquainted would not be as they are unless brought about as a result of the causal impact of things in our surroundings with features that the sense-data in some way reflect. This kind of dependence is contingent. The idea is that as a matter of contingent fact one would not usually be acquainted with the sense-data with which one is acquainted unless … . This allows for the possibility that it is possible to be acquainted with sense-data, as in cases of hallucination, even though my being acquainted with those sense-data does not depend causally on what is around me. But when Moore takes seriously the view that sense-data are mind-dependent he has in mind a different kind of dependence. The idea is that sense-data depend essentially on the mind of the subject who is acquainted with them. If that is so, then it would not be possible for there to be such data but for the mind of the person acquainted with them.<br /><br />Was your idea that if sense-data were object-dependent then they would pose no epistemological problem concerning our knowledge of the physical world?</i><br /><br />[In response to (1)]:<br /><br /><i>As I recall he continued to take seriously the idea that they are essentially mind-dependent and non-physical. You might like to check out what I think is his last essay on the matter. This is 'Visual Sense-Data' in C. Mace (ed.) British Philosophy in Mide-Century (Allen and Unwin, 1957).</i><br /><br /><i>Alan</i>AVERY ARCHERhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.com