tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post6360197008518512303..comments2024-01-03T17:27:11.545+01:00Comments on The Space of Reasons: On Reasons and Animals: Ben's Reply to MeAVERY ARCHERhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-35573519801681479722010-05-05T18:52:39.707+01:002010-05-05T18:52:39.707+01:00Avery,
One more thing. I wanted to be a bit clear...Avery,<br /><br />One more thing. I wanted to be a bit clearer what I mean by 'metaphorical' ways of speaking.<br /><br />My favorite view of metaphor is given by Max Black in 'Models and Metaphors'. He argues for an 'interaction view' of metaphor, on which a metaphorical expression is not reducible to a literal paraphrase because it essentially involves an interaction between literal expressions and ideas associated with them in order to transmit some further idea(s). Metaphors, for Black, are extensions of our language that, among other things, allow us to apply it to new insights. He argues against other views, on which metaphors are merely poetic or otherwise expendable devices. Black thinks that to banish metaphor would be to banish the communication of some ideas.<br /><br />I bring this up because I want to note that by calling a way of speaking metaphorical, I do not mean to in any way disparage that way of speaking. It would be a mistake to think that metaphors only convey expendable information. Likewise, it would be a mistake to think that something is shown to be less important or less real just because our way of speaking about that thing is metaphorical. Relevant to this discussion, it would be a mistake to associate the claim that talk of monkeys having reasons is metaphorical with the claim that monkeys do not really have reasons or that the sense in which they may be said to have reasons is not really important.Ben M-Ynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-69530589717567063612010-05-05T18:01:40.422+01:002010-05-05T18:01:40.422+01:00Avery,
First off, sorry to have misread you and a...Avery,<br /><br />First off, sorry to have misread you and attributed to you a position you do not hold. Sorry also for arguing against your position on the basis of this mis-attribution. I am glad to be put straight, and glad that you do not hold that the monkey is given a justification on the basis of his transition of thought.<br /><br />In order to get clearer on your view, let me ask you some questions. (point me to earlier posts if you've already answered them there).<br /><br />1. How does the notion of entitlement you are interested in relate to the notion of explanation? In particular, you note that you understand entitlement to be an externalist notion. And you understand justification to be an internalist notion. On which side of the divide would you place explanation? My interest in this issue has to do with my interest in the appeal to the connection between the having of psychological states (esp., those that motivate behavior) and the having of reasons. On familiar theories of reasons, they either/both justify or/and explain. It seems that on your view reasons entitle (and may also justify). So I wonder in what ways your view may be revisionary and in what ways it may map onto more familiar views about reasons.<br /><br />2. I wonder how at odds our two interpretations of what is going on when we talk about non-human animals having reasons really are. I claim that this talk is metaphorical in the sense that it involves projection of our agential perspective, which perspective includes capacities that the animal on which we project it does not (and is not normally thought to) have. If I now have it right, your view claims that this ordinary talk of non-human animals having reasons is not metaphorical. They have reasons in the sense that they have considerations that give them entitlements. And entitlements do not require the capacity to take them up in any way. Here is a question about what might mark a difference between our views: Do you think that the notion of entitlement itself is independent of our capacity to take up and think about entitlements? I would be inclined to think it is not. That is, we attribute entitlement to a creature on the basis of the sort of projection I have been describing. But this attribution is apt because of our capacities. The externalist aspect of the notion of entitlement blocks the objection that it is not apt to attribute entitlement to a creature that cannot take it up as such. But is there something about the notion of entitlement as you understand it that also blocks the objection that <br />it would not be apt to attribute entitlement if there were no creature that could take it up (and esp. the creature making the attribution must be able to take it up)?Ben M-Ynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-16691715479686655052010-05-05T00:38:38.757+01:002010-05-05T00:38:38.757+01:00Thanks for taking the time to compose such a lengt...Thanks for taking the time to compose such a lengthy and thoughtful reply, Ben. You may be surprised to learn that I agree with most of what you have to say. First off, I do not believe that Hurley’s monkey is justified or that it is a candidate for justification. In fact, the entire reason I introduce Burge’s distinction between the two types of epistemic warrant – namely, entitlement and justification – is in order to make room for a type of warrant that falls short of justification (See my post: <a href="http://thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com/2010/04/burges-alternative-to-m-rationalism.html" rel="nofollow"> Burge's Alternative to M-rationalism</a>). Following Burge, I see entitlement as an externalist notion, it does not require that the entitled agent have the conceptual resources to “understand or think about the entitlement”. Thus, while I hold that Hurley’s monkey is entitled, I do not hold that it is justified. However, I part ways with Burge in that I use the word ‘reason’ to refer to considerations that provide an agent with entitlement. (Note: Burge reserves the word only for considerations that provide an agent with justifications.) Thus, while I hold that Hurley’s monkey may have a reason, I do not hold that the reasons provide it with a justification for its beliefs. This is because (consistent with Burge) I see justification as an internalist notion; one that requires that the justified agent be able to understand and reflect on her reasons. In short, I hold that one may possess reasons even if one cannot reflect on them.<br /><br />In my post, <a href="http://thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com/2010/04/mcdowell-on-rational-animals.html" rel="nofollow"> McDowell on Rational Animals </a>, I adumbrate a few of my motivations for using the word ‘reasons’ in a way that has application to both types of epistemic warrant. The particular motivation you took issue with, and which generated the present exchange, is my claim that the more inclusive usage of the word ‘reasons’ comports with our ordinary linguistic practice. You appeared to impugn this motivation on the grounds that, when applied to animals, the word is only being used metaphorically. My response was to insist that the usage of word, in the case of animals, is literal; owing to the fact that they are agents with genuine psychological states (i.e., states with representational content). Insofar as it is a possessor of psychological states, Hurley’s monkey can be said to have a perspective. This represents a fundamental difference between Hurley’s monkey and inanimate objects; one that (inter alia) makes the attribution of agency to the former, literal, and to the latter, metaphorical. This is what I took to be the crux of our disagreement. On the question of whether or not Hurley’s monkey is justified, our views seem perfectly consistent. <br /><br />It has been a central contention of my last two posts that the word ‘reasons’ should not be restricted to considerations that justify. This is an important claim given the goals of my project – namely, to widen the philosophical usage of the word ‘reason’ so that it more closely mirrors our ordinary usage of the term. More saliently (given the present point of contention), I think reflection on our ordinary usage of the word ‘reasons’ reveals that it does not only have application to agents that are capable of reflecting on them. Moreover, since I agree with Burge (and you) that justification requires that the justified agent be able to reflect on her reasons, then the only way that this aspect of our ordinary linguistic practice may be preserved would be to widen the application of the word ‘reasons’ to include more than simply justification. Thus, the assumption you attribute to me – namely, that reasons only count as such if they justify – is not one I share. On the contrary, it is precisely this assumption that I am attempting to undermine by insisting on a more inclusive use of term, one that is not limited to justification-conferring psychological transitions.AVERY ARCHERhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.com