tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post4465115010460492983..comments2024-01-03T17:27:11.545+01:00Comments on The Space of Reasons: Impugning the Desire-as-Belief ThesisAVERY ARCHERhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-16994750445250772362011-01-31T14:03:36.008+00:002011-01-31T14:03:36.008+00:00Thanks for stopping by, henadology. I agree that d...Thanks for stopping by, henadology. I agree that desires should be goodness-assessable; this is what I take to be the upshot of a broadly Anscombean account. The arguments in this post are not meant to impugn that idea, but only one way of unpacking that idea; namely, the thesis that desires are a type of belief. In upcoming posts, I will be considering other proposals for unpacking the broadly Anscombean claim.AVERY ARCHERhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-5606891985418713682011-01-24T19:12:44.713+00:002011-01-24T19:12:44.713+00:00If the good is to be the aim of desire in a sense ...If the good is to be the aim of desire in a sense <i>analogous</i> to how truth is the aim of belief, then aren't we supposed to try and conceive of desires, not as truth-assessable, but as <i>good</i>-assessable? <br /><br />The psychological state of desire seems as though it ought to be "good-assessable", with conflicting desires, for example, assessable as good-in-different-ways: smoking is not good for my health, but I may think that it is good for my momentary state of mind, etc. and this is not a good ranking of goods, but there does seem to be such a structure recoverable.<br /><br />Great blog, by the way; keep up the good work.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com