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Thank you, this was informative...."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"Interesting take. Thank you, this was informative. Hope to read more. \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003ECheers, \u003Cbr \/\u003ETimour "},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/2495588503113615792\/comments\/default\/8876144559888944076"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/2495588503113615792\/comments\/default\/8876144559888944076"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2008\/04\/mcdowells-truth-theory-and-frege.html?showComment=1619283396018#c8876144559888944076","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"Timour"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/blank.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2008\/04\/mcdowells-truth-theory-and-frege.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-2495588503113615792","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/2495588503113615792","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-2042808957"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"24 April 2021 at 16:56"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-3661937295740893757"},"published":{"$t":"2020-01-15T03:59:21.828+01:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2020-01-15T03:59:21.828+01:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"Your title was \u0026quot;The Space of Reasons\u0026quot;.  ..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"Your title was \u0026quot;The Space of Reasons\u0026quot;.   I was unclear how that related to essences. I enjoyed your writings.  They made sense. There is book called Place by Peter Ossorio that is about the Space of Reasons.  Place deineate a list  of status dynamic maxims. (creating a logical structure, boundaries on what\u0026#39;s what about Persona and their ways., warnings and reminders about Person\u0026#39;s , worlds, and their behavior, etc).\u003Cbr \/\u003Ehttp:\/\/www.sdp.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/04\/PLACEPrinter-copy.pdf "},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6834740247251688700\/comments\/default\/3661937295740893757"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6834740247251688700\/comments\/default\/3661937295740893757"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2009\/05\/wittgenstein-on-essence-of-grammar-adam.html?showComment=1579057161828#c3661937295740893757","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"brucetrago"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/15667824622447886898"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"32","height":"25","src":"http:\/\/bp1.blogger.com\/_1Q7WN91SrZk\/R504aLxSdfI\/AAAAAAAAAAM\/ZCkYWJ3UskY\/S220\/bruce-in-park.png"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2009\/05\/wittgenstein-on-essence-of-grammar-adam.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6834740247251688700","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6834740247251688700","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-1327192417"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"15 January 2020 at 03:59"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-3594903822029337045"},"published":{"$t":"2019-06-20T17:53:43.637+01:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2019-06-20T17:53:43.637+01:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"David, Thanks for your comment. I agree that Edna ..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"David, Thanks for your comment. I agree that Edna may respond to her picking situation by intending to take can A and not intending to take can B. However, I also think there are other ways she may respond. Among them, I believe she may intend to [take can A rather than B], where the proposition that appears in square brackets is the content of the intention. Consider: it is one thing to intend to vote for Obama and another thing to intend to vote for Obama rather than Trump. (For example, unless one were greatly miss-informed, it would be impossible to have the latter intention even if one had the former, given that Obama never ran against Trump.) What I claim is not that Edna having the intention to take can A rather than B is the only rationally permissible response to a picking situation but that it is one rationally permissible response to a picking situation. If this is granted, then that is all I need for the efficacy of my objection to Lord\u0026#39;s proposal. "},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/4162764392542112619\/comments\/default\/3594903822029337045"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/4162764392542112619\/comments\/default\/3594903822029337045"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2018\/12\/an-objection-to-lords-reasons.html?showComment=1561049623637#c3594903822029337045","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"AVERY ARCHER"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/14313322464414110953"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2018\/12\/an-objection-to-lords-reasons.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-4162764392542112619","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/4162764392542112619","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-248827022"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"20 June 2019 at 17:53"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-3704893287930348307"},"published":{"$t":"2019-03-28T09:42:23.608+01:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2019-03-28T09:42:23.608+01:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"Your example reminded me of Buridan\u0026#39;s Ass, whe..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"Your example reminded me of Buridan\u0026#39;s Ass, where one solution is to intend A and not intend B, even though A and B are equally reasonable choices."},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/4162764392542112619\/comments\/default\/3704893287930348307"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/4162764392542112619\/comments\/default\/3704893287930348307"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2018\/12\/an-objection-to-lords-reasons.html?showComment=1553762543608#c3704893287930348307","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"David Duffy"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/blank.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2018\/12\/an-objection-to-lords-reasons.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-4162764392542112619","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/4162764392542112619","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-2042808957"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"28 March 2019 at 09:42"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-8140644157505217817"},"published":{"$t":"2018-06-19T00:02:10.044+01:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2018-06-19T00:02:10.044+01:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"nice one man "},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"nice one man "},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/1128172842426659295\/comments\/default\/8140644157505217817"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/1128172842426659295\/comments\/default\/8140644157505217817"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2007\/06\/defending-lottery-argument-part-1.html?showComment=1529362930044#c8140644157505217817","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"Anonymous"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/blank.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2007\/06\/defending-lottery-argument-part-1.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-1128172842426659295","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/1128172842426659295","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-2042808957"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"19 June 2018 at 00:02"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-2719197467749186195"},"published":{"$t":"2016-04-19T10:46:00.845+01:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2016-04-19T10:46:00.845+01:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"Thanks for stopping by and for the kind words, Eth..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"Thanks for stopping by and for the kind words, Ethan.  I have fond memories of the UT logic classes. Hope you\u0026#39;re well."},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/8620059771223324302\/comments\/default\/2719197467749186195"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/8620059771223324302\/comments\/default\/2719197467749186195"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2012\/04\/outline-of-nozicks-knowledge.html?showComment=1461059160845#c2719197467749186195","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"AVERY ARCHER"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/14313322464414110953"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2012\/04\/outline-of-nozicks-knowledge.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-8620059771223324302","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/8620059771223324302","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-248827022"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"19 April 2016 at 10:46"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-3550587811688483810"},"published":{"$t":"2016-04-18T22:02:14.079+01:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2016-04-18T22:02:14.079+01:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"Hello Dr. Archer. I came across your blog doing so..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"Hello Dr. Archer. I came across your blog doing some research for E.J. Coffman\u0026#39;s epistemology class at UT and I recognized your name from having you as my formal logic teacher. I wanted to say that this is a great blog post, that your logic class was one of my favorite classes, and that I hope you\u0026#39;re doing well in D.C."},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/8620059771223324302\/comments\/default\/3550587811688483810"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/8620059771223324302\/comments\/default\/3550587811688483810"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2012\/04\/outline-of-nozicks-knowledge.html?showComment=1461013334079#c3550587811688483810","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"Ethan Linehan"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ethan.linehan"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/blank.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2012\/04\/outline-of-nozicks-knowledge.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-8620059771223324302","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/8620059771223324302","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-2042808957"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"18 April 2016 at 22:02"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-7036519559959371086"},"published":{"$t":"2013-12-17T18:42:17.868+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-12-17T18:42:17.868+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"Jason,\nI believe that the beginnings of an answer ..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"Jason,\u003Cbr \/\u003EI believe that the beginnings of an answer to your question is already contained in my response to Richard.  I am not committed to the claim that identity is contingent.  This is because I am not making a metaphysical claim at all.  Rather, I am making a claim about the behaviour of a certain class of words (i.e., ordinary proper names).  There therefore seems to be a broad sense in which Lewis’ work on convention is more relevant to the questions I take up in my post than his work on counterfactuals.  That said, I would be quite curious to hear more about why you think that counterpart theory allows for the possibility that Jupiter and Saturn are the same planet.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EBy my lights, the salient question is this: could the terms ‘Jupiter’ and ‘Saturn’ both designate the same object?  Consider the following counterfactual claim:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E(H): If Jupiter and Saturn were the same planet, then Mars would cease to exist.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EIf we take the framework I introduced in my response to Richard seriously, then the question becomes is there a possible world that makes the antecedent of (H) true, and which does not require that we alter the intentional content with which the terms ‘Jupiter’ and ‘Saturn’ were first baptised?  My inclination is to think not.  It seems to me that the intentional content attached to the terms ‘Jupiter’ and ‘Saturn’ at their baptism entails that they are mutually exclusive of each other.  If this is right, then (H) is more like (G) than it is like (F) in the relevant respect.  \u003Cbr \/\u003E"},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/7036519559959371086"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/7036519559959371086"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1387305737868#c7036519559959371086","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"AVERY ARCHER"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/14313322464414110953"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-248827022"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"17 December 2013 at 18:42"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-2945876447280044914"},"published":{"$t":"2013-12-14T20:21:54.359+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-12-14T20:21:54.359+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"No problem, I can understand. I look forward to yo..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"No problem, I can understand. I look forward to your response."},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/2945876447280044914"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/2945876447280044914"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1387052514359#c2945876447280044914","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"Anonymous"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/06892913480992228908"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-1297785359"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"14 December 2013 at 20:21"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6300013187577105549"},"published":{"$t":"2013-12-14T13:16:14.554+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-12-14T13:16:14.554+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"(Reply to Richard Continued)\n\nHowever, the above l..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"(Reply to Richard Continued)\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EHowever, the above line of thought seems to overlook what some would consider an important disanalogy between the antecedents of (F) and (G). The only way to make the antecedent of (G) true would be to alter one or more of the intentional objects picked out by the numeric symbols ‘2’, ‘1’, and ‘6’.  In other words, when we imagine a possible world that makes ‘2’, ‘1’, and ‘6’ true, we are imagining a world in which any inhabitants of twin-Earth who has an adequate conceptual grasp of ‘2’, ‘1’ and ‘6’ are ipso facto in a different mental state when they think of ‘2’, ‘1’ or ‘6’, than the mental state of inhabitants of Earth who have an adequate conceptual grasp of ‘2’, ‘1’, and ‘6’.  The notion of “adequate conceptual grasp” is in need of serious unpacking. But the basic idea I have in mind has to do with the intention of the agent(s) who baptised the terms.  In short, an inhabitant of a possible world that makes the antecedent of (G) true must be in a different mental state (i.e., have a different intentional object before her mind) to an inhabitant of Earth.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EThe same isn’t true of (F). The terms ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ may have exactly the same intentional object in (F) as they did when the Greek astronomers first baptised the term (I am here assuming that the Greek astronomers in question did not know that Hesperus and Phosphorus were in fact the same object—to wit, the object that we, today, call ‘Venus’). In the case of both the Greeks and the person who utters (F), the intentional object of the term ‘Hesperus’ (i.e., the first or brightest heavenly body visible in the evening), and the intentional object of the term ‘Phosphorus’ (i.e., the last or brightest heavenly body visible in the morning) may be the same.  \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EThe question then becomes do we (or must we) individuate proper names by their extension (such that, to change the object a proper name designates just is to switch to a different proper name), or can we (at least in certain cases) individuate proper names by their intentions (such that, we can change the object of a proper name without switching to a different proper name, so long as the intentional description remains the same).  The more I think about it, the more I like Kripke’s proposal.  That’s unsurprising because there is so much to like about it.  However, it will help me further appreciate the attractions of his view to hear more about why it would be a bad idea to individuate certain kinds of proper names in terms of their intentional objects.  This comports with the conclusion of my post, which is not that Kripke is mistaken, but that more needs to be said to convert the unconverted.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EP.S.: I plan to also respond to Jason’s comments.  (Thanks for joining the conversation, Jason!) However, I have two stacks of papers and a looming grade-submission deadline demanding my immediate attention.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E"},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/6300013187577105549"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/6300013187577105549"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1387026974554#c6300013187577105549","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"AVERY ARCHER"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/14313322464414110953"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-248827022"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"14 December 2013 at 13:16"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-9197296073330082263"},"published":{"$t":"2013-12-14T13:15:03.146+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-12-14T13:15:03.146+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"(Reply to Richard Continued)\n\nI think there is an ..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"(Reply to Richard Continued)\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EI think there is an intuitive sense in which we would say that (F) is false. If we were to attempt to make good on this intuition in terms of a possible world analysis, we would have to conceive of a possible world in which the antecedent of the conditional is true, and the consequent is false.  (Sufficiently described, the “possible world” described in the binary-planet example would be just such a world.)  Hence, insofar as we seem to think that it is possible to assign a truth-value of false to (F), we seem to have some motivation for thinking that there is a possible world that makes the antecedent of (F) true. Since, according to Kripke’s account, the antecedent of (F) is false in all possible worlds, one very natural way of preserving the intuition that (F) may be false is lost on Kripke’s account. \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EOf course, this is not even close to being the final word on the matter.  In assessing what kind of conception of proper names we should adopt, we must weigh the costs and benefits of various alternative conceptions against each other.  For example, there seems to be an intuitive sense in which the following counterfactual is also false:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E(G) If ‘2 + 1= 6’ were true, then mars would cease to exist.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EBut clearly, ‘2 + 1 = 6’ is necessarily false.  So if we happen to think that (G) could be false, and if we also think that (G) can be false only if there is some possible world that makes its antecedent true and consequent false, then so much for our ordinary intuitions. \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EBut the above dismissal of our ordinary intuitions seems to move too fast for me. There seems to be a sense in which we can make the antecedent of (G) false, a sense that is compatible with the claim that ‘2 + 1 = 6’ is false in all possible worlds.  We can imagine a possible world in which numeric symbols ‘2’, ‘1’ and ‘6’ pick out different numbers from the ones they do in the actual world.  Here, we are imagining a case in which the meaning (in some intuitive sense of the word) of the symbols have changed.  This seems to go hand in hand with your point that we have ceased to use the terms in the same way that Earthlings do, and are now using the terms in the way that twin-Earthlings do.  And this, of course, is no challenge to Kripke since he grants that the inhabitants of other worlds may use the same words that we do in different ways.  Why not simply say the same thing about the terms ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ as they appear in (F).  "},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/9197296073330082263"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/9197296073330082263"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1387026903146#c9197296073330082263","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"AVERY ARCHER"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/14313322464414110953"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-248827022"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"14 December 2013 at 13:15"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-3394248284962668835"},"published":{"$t":"2013-12-14T13:13:57.635+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-12-14T13:13:57.635+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"Richard,\nI take myself to be making a claim about ..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"Richard,\u003Cbr \/\u003EI take myself to be making a claim about the ordinary proper names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’.  I do not take myself to be making a claim about the object the proper names designate. Inter alia, I am questioning whether Kripke has provided us with cogent (i.e., non-question-begging) grounds for thinking that the ordinary proper names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are rigid designators.  \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EIn describing these terms as rigid designators, I take Kripke to be saying that the terms ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ refer to Venus not only in this world, but in all possible worlds.  (On this much, we seem to agree.) However, in my post, I have been urging that this conclusion does not come for free.  Insofar as Kripke purports to be making a claim about ordinary proper names (as opposed to some technical terms he has invented and is therefore free to operationalize as he chooses), then we (as inhabitants of Earth and users of language) do seem to have some stake in the matter.  He owes us an explanation of why we should believe that the terms that we all use behave in the way he says that they do.  Whether or not my argument succeeds (and in the light of Tristan’s comments, I am beginning to have my doubts), this is how I would describe its intent.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EIf Kripke’s claims about ordinary proper names is to be factive, it must match certain fundamental features of ordinary usage. Suppose I were to utter the following counterfactual:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E(F) If Hesperus and Phosphorous turned out to be different astronomical bodies, then Mars would not exist.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EI think there is an intuitive sense in which we would say that (F) is false. If we were to attempt to make good on this intuition in terms of a possible world analysis, we would have to conceive of a possible world in which the antecedent of the conditional is true, and the consequent is false.  (Sufficiently described, the “possible world” described in the binary-planet example would be just such a world.)  Hence, insofar as we seem to think that it is possible to assign a truth-value of false to (F), we seem to have some motivation for thinking that there is a possible world that makes the antecedent of (F) true. Since, according to Kripke’s account, the antecedent of (F) is false in all possible worlds, one very natural way of preserving the intuition that (F) may be false is lost on Kripke’s account. \u003Cbr \/\u003E"},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/3394248284962668835"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/3394248284962668835"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1387026837635#c3394248284962668835","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"AVERY ARCHER"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/14313322464414110953"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-248827022"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"14 December 2013 at 13:13"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-213809268959964949"},"published":{"$t":"2013-12-10T21:34:15.432+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-12-10T21:34:15.432+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"Hi Avery,\n\nI had thoughts similar to Richard\u0026#39;s..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"Hi Avery,\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EI had thoughts similar to Richard\u0026#39;s. Also, I wonder what you think about this: \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EDistinctness is correlative to identity, so if identity is contingent then distinctness is too. So, what would a scenario opposite to yours be like? Would there be possible words where Jupiter and Saturn are the same planet? If counterpart theory is true that makes sense; otherwise, things are less clear. \u003Cbr \/\u003E"},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/213809268959964949"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/213809268959964949"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1386711255432#c213809268959964949","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"Anonymous"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/06892913480992228908"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-1297785359"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"10 December 2013 at 21:34"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6980359939066487373"},"published":{"$t":"2013-12-09T22:13:26.670+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-12-09T22:13:26.670+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"Hi Avery, aren\u0026#39;t you conflating Hesperus with ..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"Hi Avery, aren\u0026#39;t you conflating \u003Ci\u003EHesperus\u003C\/i\u003E with \u003Ci\u003Ewhat \u0026#39;Hesperus\u0026#39; denotes\u003C\/i\u003E in your binary world case?\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EKripke would say there are three ways of elaborating upon your case:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E(1) Stipulate that neither of the two planets is (identical to) the actual object Venus, and hence it\u0026#39;s false to say that \u003Ci\u003EHesperus exists\u003C\/i\u003E or that \u003Ci\u003EPhosphorus\u003C\/i\u003E exists in the counterfactual scenario (though of course there are distinct planets that the twin-Earthlings talk about using the terms \u0026#39;Hesperus\u0026#39; and \u0026#39;Phosphorus\u0026#39;)\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E(2) Stipulate that Venus (=Hesperus = Phosphorus) is visible in the evening, such that the twin-Earthlings use \u0026#39;Phosphorus\u0026#39; to denote the new planet (which is not actually Phosphorus) visible in the morning.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E(3) Stipulate that Venus (=Hesperus = Phosphorus) is the planet visible in the morning, such that the twin-Earthlings use \u0026#39;Hesperus\u0026#39; to denote that new planet (not Hesperus) which is visible in the evening.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EIn none of these explications do Hesperus and Phosphorus exist as distinct entities.  (For how could they? That would be for a single object, Venus, to be distinct from itself.)"},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/6980359939066487373"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/6980359939066487373"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1386627206670#c6980359939066487373","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"Richard Y Chappell"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/16725218276285291235"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-1842281698"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"9 December 2013 at 22:13"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-5239000933457609903"},"published":{"$t":"2013-12-08T17:04:51.673+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-12-08T17:04:51.673+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"First off, if there is a possible world correspond..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"First off, if there is a possible world corresponding with the antecedent of (E), then such a possible world would represent a counterexample to (B).  Notice, we are here simply assuming that there is such a possible world in order to instantiate one horn of a potential dilemma.  Of course, I was proceeding under the assumption that this would not be the horn on which Kripke would fall given his characterisation of rigid terms.  In short, my claim that the binary-planet example is a straightforward counterexample to (B) is predicated on the assumption that the binary-planet world is among the set of possible worlds (an assumption that is only being made in order to satisfy one horn of a dilemma).  \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EWith this first horn out of the way, I then turn my attention to the second horn, which is to assume that there are no possible worlds corresponding with the antecedent of (E).  My complaint about this second horn is that it is not one that Kripke seems entitled to on pain of circularity or being question begging.  Given that he is supposed to be offering an argument in favour of the thesis that identity statements involving rigid designators are true in all possible worlds, it seemed to me that it would be question begging to exclude the binary-planet world from the set of possible worlds based on the thesis that rigid designators (like the terms \u0026#39;Hesperus\u0026#39; and \u0026#39;Phosphorus\u0026#39;) must designate the same object in all possible worlds in which they designate.  This is because the claim that rigid designators (like the terms \u0026#39;Hesperus\u0026#39; and \u0026#39;Phosphorus\u0026#39;) must designate the same object in all possible worlds is part of what is supposed to be at issue, in the context of making sense of (E) in light of the intelligibility of the binary planet example.  This then leads me to conclude not that \u0026#39;Hesperus\u0026#39; and \u0026#39;Phosphorus\u0026#39; are not rigid designators, but that there is a need for some independent grounds for thinking that they are, in light of the intelligibility of the binary-planet example. \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003ENow, I agree that your observations present a challenge to a crucial move I make in my argument. However, I hope it is at least a bit clearer how the argument is supposed to go."},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/5239000933457609903"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/5239000933457609903"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1386522291673#c5239000933457609903","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"AVERY ARCHER"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/14313322464414110953"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-248827022"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"8 December 2013 at 17:04"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-37592111802043376"},"published":{"$t":"2013-12-08T17:04:26.810+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-12-08T17:04:26.810+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"After reading your most recent comments, I am not ..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"After reading your most recent comments, I am not quite sure that we are on the same page regarding the rhetorical structure of my argument (though I am nevertheless inclined to agree with the main thrust of your criticism).  Just to be clear, the counterfactual to which I refer in the passage you cite is not (B). Of course, Kripke does think that (B) is true in all possible worlds.  However, that does not mean that (B) is itself a modal claim. The difference is like the difference between saying \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E(C): “Necessarily, 1 + 1 = 2” \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003Eand saying \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E(D): “1 + 1 = 2”.  \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EOf course, we do think that (D) is necessarily true.  But that does not make (D) a modal claim.  Rather, it is a non-modal claim that happens to be true in all possible worlds.  Likewise, I take (B) be a straightforward material conditional, albeit one that Kripke takes to be true in all possible worlds.  Consequently, when I refer to a counterfactual in the passage you cite, what I actually have in mind is the following claim:\u003Cbr \/\u003E \u003Cbr \/\u003E(E): “If Phosphorus and Hesperus turned out to be different heavenly bodies, then Kripke would be left without a cogent illustration for his identity thesis.”\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EThe question I then go on to consider is whether or not there is a possible world corresponding with the antecedent of (E).  Now (if I may briefly lay my cards on the table), it seems to me that antecedent of (E) describes something intelligible (which is what my binary-planet example is meant to illustrate), and that its intelligibility is sufficient to establish that there is a possible world corresponding with the antecedent of (E).  However, since it would be begging the question against Kripke to simply assume that this is so, I frame my argument as a dilemma.  Kripke can either affirm that there is a possible world corresponding with the antecedent of (E), or he can deny that there is.  I then attempt to argue that there are unfavourable consequences for Kripke either way.  \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E"},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/37592111802043376"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/37592111802043376"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1386522266810#c37592111802043376","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"AVERY ARCHER"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/14313322464414110953"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-248827022"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"8 December 2013 at 17:04"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-5319476016097453835"},"published":{"$t":"2013-12-08T02:56:53.172+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-12-08T02:56:53.172+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"Thanks, this is helpful. I agree that there is rea..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"Thanks, this is helpful. I agree that there is reason to think that (B) comes out false on a certain, natural-enough reading or class of readings - namely, to invoke a broadly Lewisian framework, where the \u0026quot;relevant A-worlds\u0026quot; which are required to be C-worlds in order for the counterfactual to be true include worlds where Hesperus is distinct from Phosphorus. (For Kripkean reasons, I think such worlds are metaphysically impossible, but contra Lewis I think counterfactuals can non-vacuously involve these.)\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EIt is perhaps worth noting, however, that since the counterfactual is a flexible device (as Lewis held, but even moreso, since counterpossible scenarios\/worlds can be made relevant on some readings), the sentence (B) could be given another reading, where the relevant A-worlds are more similar to ours, and all metaphysically possible. On such a reading, I think (B) comes out true.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E(This ambiguity makes the claim that the binary-planet example \u0026#39;straightforwardly\u0026#39; constitutes a counterexample to (B) seem a little strong perhaps. Still, I agree that given a certain reading of (B), which seems quite natural to me but does make trouble for some prominent theories of counterfactuals, e.g. Lewis\u0026#39;s, the binary-planet situation is a counterexample.)"},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/5319476016097453835"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/5319476016097453835"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1386471413172#c5319476016097453835","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"Tristan Haze"},"uri":{"$t":"http:\/\/sprachlogik.blogspot.com\/"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/blank.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-2042808957"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"8 December 2013 at 02:56"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-3644857001251961752"},"published":{"$t":"2013-12-07T19:43:19.085+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-12-07T19:43:19.085+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"Great catch, Tristan! I think your criticism is on..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"Great catch, Tristan! I think your criticism is on point. What I should have said (in the passage you cite) is that the binary-planet example is a counterexample to the following conditional:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E(B) Phosphorus exists \u0026amp; Hesperus exists → Phosphorus = Hesperus\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EThat the binary-planet example is a counterexample to (B) is straightforwardly true since it describes a situation in which the antecedent of the conditional is true, and the consequent is false.  However, it does not follow from this that the terms ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are not rigid.  This is because the possible world described in the binary-planet example (assuming that there is such a possible world), is not one in which the object designated by the terms ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ (in the actual world) exists.  Hence, given the definition of a rigid designator as a term that designates the same object in every possible world in which that object exists, the possible world corresponding to the binary planet example (i.e., one in which the object, Venus, does not exist) poses no challenge to the claim that the terms ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are rigid.  The upshot, as you point out, is that the binary-planet example fails to constitute a counterexample to the following claim:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E(A) that names like \u0026#39;H\u0026#39; and \u0026#39;P\u0026#39; are rigid designators.\u003Cbr \/\u003E \u003Cbr \/\u003E(I recognise that the way I just sketched the worry differs slightly from yours, but I think it is getting at the same basic point.) I haven’t had time to work through the implications of this objection for the various points adumbrated in this post.  As you rightly observe, there are some difficult questions relating to the nature of proper names lurking in the background.  However, the basic point of your objection strikes me as a good one.  \u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EThank you for the helpful feedback.\u003Cbr \/\u003E"},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/3644857001251961752"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/3644857001251961752"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1386445399085#c3644857001251961752","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"AVERY ARCHER"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/14313322464414110953"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-248827022"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"7 December 2013 at 19:43"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-8484349101407867198"},"published":{"$t":"2013-12-07T02:59:06.951+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-12-07T02:59:06.951+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"I find this post confusing, but I think it does dr..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"I find this post confusing, but I think it does draw attention to the need to make sense of talk along the lines of \u0026#39;What would have happened if Hesperus had turned out to be distinct from Phosphorus\u0026#39;. How such talk works is a delicate matter not settled by Kripke, and how (or whether) it can be squared with some of Kripke\u0026#39;s main claims, e.g. that names are rigid designators, and that true identity statements involving names are necessary, is a difficult matter.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EI want to focus on this paragraph near the end of your post:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u0026#39;In my binary-planet example, the antecedent of the conditional (Phosphorus exists \u0026amp; Hesperus exists) is true and the consequent (Phosphorus = Hesperus) is false.  It therefore appears to represent a counterexample to Kripke’s claim that Hesperus and Phosphorus are rigid designators.  Now, I have already conceded that the situation described in the antecedent may be impossible.  Moreover, perhaps Kripke should be interpreted as allowing that even a rigid designator may designate different things in impossible worlds.  If so, then perhaps there is also an expectation on Kripke’s part, that we restrict ourselves to counterfactuals with possible antecedents whenever we unpack the definition of rigid designator in terms of possible worlds.\u0026#39;\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EFirstly, and I\u0026#39;m not saying you\u0026#39;ve failed to do this, but it\u0026#39;s important to distinguish the question at issue here - whether \u0026#39;Hesperus\u0026#39; and \u0026#39;Phosphorus\u0026#39; are rigid designators, and whether you have a counterexample to this claim - from the question of whether Kripke has a non-circular argument for the necessity of identity. He may not, and yet names (like \u0026#39;Hesperus\u0026#39; and \u0026#39;Phosphorus\u0026#39;) may still be rigid designators - and furthermore, true identities like \u0026#39;Hesperus is Phosphorus\u0026#39; may still be necessary.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EI am puzzled by your claim that the binary-planet example is an apparent counterexample to the claim:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E(A) that names like \u0026#39;H\u0026#39; and \u0026#39;P\u0026#39; are rigid designators\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003Eespecially given that you concede that a situation in which Hesperus is distinct from Phosphorus may be impossible in a strong sense (e.g. logical or metaphysical).\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EConsider the last sentence of the paragraph I am concentrating on:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u0026#39;If so, then perhaps there is also an expectation on Kripke’s part, that we restrict ourselves to counterfactuals with possible antecedents whenever we unpack the definition of rigid designator in terms of possible worlds.\u0026#39;\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EI\u0026#39;m not sure what to make of this. Here\u0026#39;s an unpacking of the definition of \u0026#39;rigid designator\u0026#39; in terms of possible worlds:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EA term is a rigid designator iff it designates the same object in all possible worlds in which that object exists.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EThis doesn\u0026#39;t on the face of it involve any counterfactuals, and so it\u0026#39;s unclear why Kripke would expect us to \u0026#39;restrict ourselves\u0026#39; to counterfactuals with possible antecedents. We don\u0026#39;t seem to need any counterfactuals at all.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EAnd since Kripke\u0026#39;s definition of \u0026#39;rigid designator\u0026#39; *is* given in terms of *possible* worlds, I don\u0026#39;t see how there\u0026#39;s a counterexample here. It seems very clear that the claim that \u0026#39;Hesperus\u0026#39; and \u0026#39;Phosphorus\u0026#39; are rigid designators in this (the intended) sense *is* compatible with a rigid designator designating something other than what it actually designates in some *impossible* situation.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003ESo, I don\u0026#39;t think the paragraph I have quoted shows that there is a counterexample to the claim (A). Furthermore, the paragraph following it is about a different thing, namely whether Kripke has a non-circular argument from one thesis to another. Accordingly, I don\u0026#39;t think any counterexample to (A) has been given here. Your thoughts?\u003Cbr \/\u003E"},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/8484349101407867198"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/8484349101407867198"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1386385146951#c8484349101407867198","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"Tristan Haze"},"uri":{"$t":"http:\/\/sprachlogik.blogspot.com\/"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/blank.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-2042808957"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"7 December 2013 at 02:59"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-7892947918043160195"},"published":{"$t":"2013-11-12T13:52:47.005+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-11-12T13:52:47.005+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"I don\u0026#39;t think Kripke could complain about the ..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"I don\u0026#39;t think Kripke could complain about the impossibility of your scenario, since his own scenario (involving H2O and XYZ) has the unfortunate consequence of destroying the periodic table and the atomistic theory which underpins it. Far from proving that \u0026quot;water=H20\u0026quot; his example fatally undermines the very concept of \u0026quot;H\u0026quot; and \u0026quot;O\u0026quot;.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003EAnd, of course, Kripke\u0026#39;s argument is completely circular. He says that if we discovered XYZ we would \u003Ci\u003Ehave to\u003C\/i\u003E conclude that it wasn\u0026#39;t water. But we\u0026#39;d only \u003Ci\u003Ehave to\u003C\/i\u003E conclude that if we were already committed to the notion of rigid designators. Otherwise we could simply \u003Ci\u003Edecide\u003C\/i\u003E to say \u0026quot;there are two forms of water: H2O and XYZ\u0026quot;."},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/7892947918043160195"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/7892947918043160195"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1384264367005#c7892947918043160195","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"Philip Cartwright"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/11458571502536123264"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-571291961"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"12 November 2013 at 13:52"}]},{"id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-4743963430003174450"},"published":{"$t":"2013-11-11T17:46:42.715+00:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2013-11-11T17:46:42.715+00:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"This really does seem to show that rigid designato..."},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"This really does seem to show that rigid designators don\u0026#39;t do very well in accommodating changes in what we know about the singular objects. Also it seems to require a very \u0026quot;decided\u0026quot; view on what constitutes the identity of an object (e.g. Phosphorus). Just not very intuitive imo...\u003Cbr \/\u003EAnyway, this is a great thought-provoking post!"},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/4743963430003174450"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/3949761534200395390\/6103875650614811160\/comments\/default\/4743963430003174450"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html?showComment=1384192002715#c4743963430003174450","title":""}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"cyun"},"uri":{"$t":"https:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/10791743453354428004"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"25","height":"32","src":"https:\/\/images-blogger-opensocial.googleusercontent.com\/gadgets\/proxy?url=http:\/\/2.bp.blogspot.com\/-_h2TR9sdDCQ\/U_CiMIp78MI\/AAAAAAAAA4k\/bYpPiNXgRf4\/s1600\/*\u0026container=blogger\u0026gadget=a\u0026rewriteMime=image\/*"}}],"thr$in-reply-to":{"xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","href":"http:\/\/thespaceofreasons.blogspot.com\/2013\/11\/on-kripkes-identity-and-necessity.html","ref":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-6103875650614811160","source":"http://www.blogger.com/feeds/3949761534200395390/posts/default/6103875650614811160","type":"text/html"},"gd$extendedProperty":[{"name":"blogger.itemClass","value":"pid-1428923758"},{"name":"blogger.displayTime","value":"11 November 2013 at 17:46"}]}]}});