tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post8893433930225079611..comments2024-01-03T17:27:11.545+01:00Comments on The Space of Reasons: On Alan Millar’s "The Idea of Experience"AVERY ARCHERhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-43266165755890467332007-01-23T10:47:00.000+00:002007-01-23T10:47:00.000+00:00Here are a few comments Alan has provided via emai...Here are a few comments Alan has provided via email:<br /><br />[In response to paragraph 1]:<br /><i>Is it that perceptual beliefs are left without warrant? The key worry about interiorisation in 'Knowledge and the Internal' is that it makes knowledge a hybrid—a composite 'a standing in the space of reasons' and the satisfaction of the truth requirement.</i><br /> <br />[In response to paragraph 2]:<br /><i>I agree that there is a problem here. But notice that straight off McD's opponents are liable to press him on what is so wrong about the idea that the good and bad cases are on a par with respect to justification. They will claim that the requirement that justification should guarantee truth is too strong. Lots of people have accepted that a belief can be justified and false. If a belief can be justified and false there is will be pairs of good cases in which there is justified true belief and corresponding bad cases in which the belief is false but the justification is the same. I don't suggest that this is a satisfactory position but it is the outcome of widely held views. It begs the question to claim that McD's opponents fail to show how an experience can warrant a belief.</i><br /><br />[Concluding remarks]:<br /><i>I think you are right that 'The Idea of Experience' does not go to the heart of the matter because it does not address the epistemological worries posed by treating experiences as providers of justification for empirical beliefs.</i><br /><br /><i>Alan</i>AVERY ARCHERhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.com