tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post8392534383221434102..comments2024-01-03T17:27:11.545+01:00Comments on The Space of Reasons: A Counterexample to SetiyaAVERY ARCHERhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-73213518901228227142009-08-20T13:21:09.216+01:002009-08-20T13:21:09.216+01:00I’m not really sure I get your phenomenology objec...I’m not really sure I get your phenomenology objection. Is the suggestion that whether or not an action is intentional is determined by phenomenology? That certainly can’t be right. As you pointed out earlier, there have been numerous experiments showing that the phenomenology of agency can be produced in cases in which the agent has performed no actions. Certainly, we would not want to say that the amputee who has the phenomenology of wiggling his fingers is intentionally wiggling his fingers even though there is no actual ‘finger-wiggling’ going on? Moreover, it seems entirely besides the point if there is some other action the amputee is performing intentionally; the fact remains that she is not intentionally wiggling her finger even though it seems to her as if she is. The take home lesson seems to be that phenomenology is not the final court of appeal when it comes to intentional actions.<br /><br />With respect to the Jesse example, it will be agreed upon by all sides that there <i>is</i> an action being performed (namely, catching and throwing the ball) and that Jesse is the one performing the action. The question is whether or not his catching and throwing the ball is intentional. Moreover, the action with which we are presently concerned is the catching and throwing of the ball, and not some other bodily movement (like raising the arm etc.) nor his “trying” to catch or throw the ball. These other activities may also warrant attention, and it may be worthwhile to inquire into their status. Even so, the question: “Did Jesse intentionally catch and throw the ball?” is its own question, and it happens to be the one with which we are presently concerned. Ordinarily, if I ask, “Did John intentionally break the lamp?” I am not asking about John’s phenomenological state or about his muscle contractions. I’m inquiring about John’s goals; did he set out to break the lamp or not? Did he break the lamp in order to achieve some purpose or end? (See the synonyms for the word ‘intention’ in any dictionary.) These, I maintain, are the kinds of questions we should be asking about Jesse.AVERY ARCHERhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-17803033759907849912009-08-19T20:47:45.386+01:002009-08-19T20:47:45.386+01:00Right, my problem with such thought experiments is...Right, my problem with such thought experiments is that they produce the intuition you want by bypassing any phenomenological testing. In my view, this makes the intuitions they produce prima facie unreliable.<br /><br />But again, I do agree with you that there is a problem in the case of basic actions. In the carbon copy case, there is a basic action that the agent is performing intentionally. Similarly, imagine a man being asked to lift a weight he does not believe he can lift. If he manages to lift the weight, we can say that there is something he is clearly doing intentionally: straining his muscles. So the question in the prosthetic limb case is just whether there is anything Jesse is doing intentionally. Theories of trying, or volition, were, at least in part, motivated by attempts to answer the question of what it is he is doing in this case (or what the phantom limb patient is "doing" when he "wiggles" his fingers). And I agree that, unless there is a doing or action involved in moving the prosthetic arm, the case is peculiar and requires a further account.Roman Altshulerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06570099479055051251noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-22416575705106187562009-08-19T00:39:36.102+01:002009-08-19T00:39:36.102+01:00You said:
By the way, recall studies by Wegner, I...You said:<br /><br /><b>By the way, recall studies by Wegner, If I'm remembering correctly,what they show is that in cases where people intend to do something and it happens,they automatically develop the belief that the happening is something they have done, however implausible this might be.</b><br /><br />Wegner’s experiments may have shown that such beliefs are automatic, but they do not show that they are inevitable. For example, suppose Wegner were to subject himself to the experiment knowing full well that he was not causing the relevant occurrence. Although he may still experience the phenomenology of agency, it is also clear that he has the power to call the phenomenology into question. He may say, “it seems to me as if I’m causing phi, but I know better. I’m not really doing phi at all!” In other words, it is important to distinguish between the phenomenology or experience of agency and the belief that one is actually performing the relevant action. Likewise, we can imagine that Jesse’s arm is fitted with a proprioceptive feedback loop that allows him to “feel” his arm performing the relevant movements. Moreover, we can even suppose that Jesse undergoes the phenomenology of agency. Still, he may decide to withhold belief (if he had persuasive reasons to do so) even in the face of the feeling of agency. <br /><br />You said:<br /><br /><b>And there is, I think, a pretty clear sense in which someone can believe X despite being consciously and willfully committed to agnosticism about X.</b><br /><br />Sure. But certainly we would not want to say that <i>every time</i> an agent is agnostic about X they also believe X. Your argument only establishes that someone in Jesse’s place may believe he is performing the relevant actions. This is not a possibility that I deny. My point is that it is not inevitable that Jesse believe he is performing the relevant action; which is just another way of saying that in the Jesse example I have described an intelligible possibility. <br /><br />You admit to having some difficulty imagining the case. I’ve tried the thought experiment out on a few lay people (i.e., non-philosophers) and they had little difficulty making sense of the example. Perhaps you’re having difficulty because you’re assuming that Jesse believes he is NOT performing the relevant action. But belief is not a binary relation. Being agnostic about X is different from believing X is false. Now, if you can make sense of the carbon copier intentionally making 10 copies even though he is unsure that he is doing so, then I cannot see why you should have any difficulty with the Jesse case. The cases are not alike in every respect, but they seem to be alike on precisely this point—that the respective agents are intentionally performing actions they don’t believe they are performing. <br /><br />Perhaps I can assist you in your efforts to visualize the example by localising Jesse’s agnosticism: <br /><br />Let us suppose that in the time leading up to the R&D trial, Jesse is able to try out his prosthetic arm and verify that it works. However, in our re-imagined example the anonymous letter says that the researchers have conspired to take over control of his arm just for the purpose of the trials because they don’t want to take the risk of him screwing up during the trial. (The researcher’s motivation for doing this is kind of like that of an artist who lip-syncs her own song during a live performance, just to be safe.) <br /><br />In the re-described case, Jesse believes he can perform the actions generally, but he is unsure that he is performing them on the particular occasion because he thinks it is possible that the scientist may be controlling his arm remotely. Even so, I insist that Jesse may genuinely try (motivated by the Pascalian train of thought limned in my previous comment) and succeed at performing the relevant actions. If this is an intelligible possibility, then I have more than enough to get my thought experiment going.AVERY ARCHERhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-34884824471769358532009-08-18T20:29:47.248+01:002009-08-18T20:29:47.248+01:00Just out of curiosity: let's say an amputee wh...Just out of curiosity: let's say an amputee who can still "feel" his arm is asked to wiggle his fingers. He complies with the request. Is there something he is doing intentionally? (There's a Zen koan in here somewhere.)<br /><br />By the way, recall studies by Wegner, et al. If I'm remembering correctly, what they show is that in cases where people intend to do something and it happens, they automatically develop the belief that the happening is something they have done, however implausible this might be. And there is, I think, a pretty clear sense in which someone can believe X despite being consciously and willfully committed to agnosticism about X. That is: having a belief is perfectly compatible with (1) deciding not to have the belief, and (2) deciding to act as if one had the belief for reasons that bypass the existence or non-existence of said belief.<br /><br />That is: I remain unconvinced that you've described a case where someone genuinely lacks the belief that he is doing something and yet is doing it intentionally.<br /><br />The case as you describe it--even if we accept your claim that Jesse really lacks the relevant belief--raises the question of what he is doing. I think it is simply bizarre to claim that he is intentionally moving his arm if (ex hypothesi) he in no way believes that he is moving his arm. But partly it's because I cannot imagine this case, so it's a bit hard to have clear intuitions about it. (This is why I hate thought experiments--they tend to simply confuse the issues.)<br /><br />I do recognize, however, that there is a possible problem for Setiya here: The claim that, when we are trying to do something without the belief that we are doing it, we must be doing something else in the belief that we are doing it, is problematic when it comes to basic actions. Ok. But I'm not convinced that the Prosthetic Limb example is analogous to the carbon copier case.<br /><br />The carbon copier's making of the carbon copies is intentional because he is, genuinely, trying to make ten carbon copies, although he is unsure whether he really is. He is, however, doing something--pressing as hard as he can on the top copy. But if Jesse genuinely does not believe that he is moving his arm, I do not see how he can be trying to move it. Perhaps what he is intentionally doing is going along with the funding review--the moving of his arm may then be intentional as part of that action (ah, now we're on Thompson ground). Here's how we check whether or not Jesse has the relevant belief: ask him to strangle a kitten.Roman Altshulerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06570099479055051251noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-32910616548339831242009-08-18T16:04:55.536+01:002009-08-18T16:04:55.536+01:00Hey Roman,
Thanks for the insightful comments!
I ...Hey Roman,<br />Thanks for the insightful comments!<br /><br />I am willing to grant that doubt need not exclude belief. However, it is equally certain that it sometimes does; for example, if my doubt leads me to make a conscious decision to remain agnostic on matter. So, let us suppose that Jesse makes a conscious decision to remain agnostic about whether or not he is controlling his arm. However, let us suppose that he proceeds to reason in the following Pascalian fashion: <br /><br /><i>Whether or not my arm is being controlled by my own thoughts, I have a vested interest in the continued funding of the research on prosthetic limbs. After all, I ultimately stand to gain from such research. Now, suppose the anonymous letter is true and that my trying is not the actual cause of my arm’s movements. Then nothing is lost since the remote device would have caused my arm to move. But suppose the letter is false, and I do not try to catch or throw the ball. Then I will surely fail the R&D trials (since there would be no remote device to fill in the gap) and the research funding will be cut. Either way, it makes sense to at least try to perform the relevant actions.</i><br /><br />I believe that such reasoning may be enough to motivate Jesse to try to catch and throw the ball. Moreover, since such reasoning is consistent with his agnosticism, then his trying is also consistent with his agnosticism. Moreover, given that the prosthetic arm is in fine working order (albeit unknown to Jesse) trying to perform the relevant actions is enough to cause the relevant movements in the prosthetic arm. Thus, his successfully performing the relevant actions is also perfectly consistent with his agnosticism. Now the question that remains is this: <i>are the actions that Jesse successfully performs intentional?</i> <br /><br />Since Jesse’s "<i>trying</i>" is motivated by a desire to pass the R&D trials and his belief that performing the various actions is a means to passing the R&D trials, it is clear that his actions are not accidental. Jesse meant to perform them. Moreover, since they result from a conscious decision on Jesse’s part, they are not reflex actions. (It looks to me as if we are quickly running out of options here.) We may of course invent some completely new type of action just to handle the Jesse case, but that strikes me as blatantly ad hoc. My suspicion is that unless we are already strongly motivated by some prior philosophical commitment, we would find it perfectly natural to say that Jesse’s catching and throwing the ball is intentional. In fact, behaviours like catching and throwing are typically taken as paradigm examples of intentional action. The reason is that they are the kind of actions one typically performs with a goal in mind (and Jesse certainly has a goal in mind when he performs them). If this is right, then Jesse’s intentionally catching and throwing the ball is perfectly consistent with his agnosticism about whether or not he is catching or throwing the ball.<br /><br />Finally, I should point out that given other claims that Setiya makes, your argument proves too much. If Jesse’s being unsure that he is catching and throwing the ball is always consistent with his believing that he is catching and throwing the ball, then by parity of reasoning, the same ought to be true of the carbon-copier. However, Setiya flatly denies that the carbon-copier believes he is making ten copies on the grounds that he is unsure that he is making ten copies. Thus, your suggestion that uncertainty is always consistent with belief (at least as far as intentional action is concerned) seems inconsistent with what Setiya himself says.AVERY ARCHERhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-32926282543573978402009-08-18T04:27:54.460+01:002009-08-18T04:27:54.460+01:00Hey Avery, I might be missing something, but I'...Hey Avery, I might be missing something, but I'm not seeing a counterexample here at all. The claim is called "Belief," not "Knowledge." Now there is--depending on your epistemic stance--a case for the argument that Jesse does not know whether he is performing the action. But Setiya explicitly states that he holds Anscombe's knowledge condition to be too strong, and he therefore shifts to belief. But I think it is pretty clear--at least in the normal sense of the word--that Jesse does believe he is moving his arm.<br /><br />The problem is in your assumption that doubt excludes belief. But it obviously doesn't. For one thing, I recognize that most (if not all) of my beliefs are fallible; but that does not prevent me from having beliefs. Having a belief is not a matter of having absolute certainty, which is why it is not ruled out by the possibility of doubt.<br /><br />Now I'm not sure just how you'd work this out fully: perhaps if your doubt is great enough, it does cancel out the belief. But that is just not the case in your example: if Jesse genuinely did not believe, even a little bit, that he was moving his arm, I can't imagine any reason why he would even try to do so! In your case, in fact, he is trying to move his arm. He is unsure about whether the arm is moving as a result of his trying, but he is not unsure enough to stop trying.<br /><br />And I think this actually backs Setiya nicely. Imagine that Jesse were actually convinced that his arm is being controlled by remote. In that case, he might think: "well, in any case, just for kicks, I'm going to perform the same mental activity that I would perform if I actually were moving my arm." But, intuitively, if this is his thought process--if it is even possible to carry out such a thought process, which I doubt--then he is no longer moving his arm intentionally.<br /><br />Incidentally, given that he can feel the position of his arm, and can feel it responding to his intentions or tryings or volitions or whatever, I'm not convinced that he does not, in some sense, have a belief that he is moving it regardless of what his explicit beliefs might be (it is, after all, possible to be wrong about what you believe).Roman Altshulerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06570099479055051251noreply@blogger.com