tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post3666376723742147170..comments2024-01-03T17:27:11.545+01:00Comments on The Space of Reasons: Introducing: Felicity ConditionsAVERY ARCHERhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-92021619301181984522010-10-06T17:03:03.088+00:002010-10-06T17:03:03.088+00:00Thanks for the feedback, Eric. I had not given muc...Thanks for the feedback, Eric. I had not given much thought to the attitude of admiration, so I'm thankful you called it to my attention.<br /><br />First off, by way of response to your question, the distinction that is most salient to my project is one between theoretical and practical propositional attitudes. Complications aside, the former refers to propositional attitudes that feature in belief-yielding normative transitions and the latter refers to propositional attitudes that feature in intention-yielding normative transitions. Moreover, the distinction between theoretical and practical propositional attitudes does not map unto the distinction between pro-attitudes and whatever the relevant comparison class to pro-attitudes is supposed to be. For example, while desire (which is typically conceived of as a type of "pro-attitude") is a practical propositional attitude, I am inclined to think that admiration (which many would also regard as a "pro-attitude") is a theoretical propositional attitude. Hence, there is nothing in my view that commits me to saying that the felicity-conditions of admiration, if it has felicity-conditions at all, are different from the truth-conditions of its propositional content. I am only really interested in making this claim about practical propositional attitudes.AVERY ARCHERhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-50025625548073149712010-10-04T12:03:48.318+00:002010-10-04T12:03:48.318+00:00Hi,
If I follow, a belief's truth-conditions (...Hi,<br />If I follow, a belief's truth-conditions (a species of attitude correctness-conditions) piggyback on the truth conditions of its propositional content, while a desire's felicity conditions are sui-generis correctness-conditions.<br /><br />However, what would you say about the relations between beliefs and pro-attitudes (e.g., admiration for Richard Nixon). If I come to believe that RN is undermining the constitutions, then how does this or can this have an inferential impact on my admiration? Is it that part of the correctness conditions of pro-attitudes (admiring RN) have to be inferential commitments to beliefs about RN (that he loves the Constitution).<br />But if we admit that the pro-attitude is partly constituted by an inferential connection to a belief which may affirm a proposition that is true or false, why not, for at least certain robust, "thick" pro-attitudes like admiration and loathing (and not, say, desiring a drink of water) that they have correctness-conditions of the propositional content of a propositional attitude? That is, cut out the middle man--the belief.<br /><br />Also, when you say "I have reservations about the claim that beliefs and desires always involve relations between persons and propositions. I hold that on at least some occasions, they may involve relations between persons and actual objects or states of affairs." I wholeheartedly agree.<br /><br />It seems you're back after a long hiatus. I hope you continue some more.<br />EricAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com