tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post1370953815728162495..comments2024-01-03T17:27:11.545+01:00Comments on The Space of Reasons: McDowell On VirtueAVERY ARCHERhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-84629474344407965422008-03-17T07:09:00.000+00:002008-03-17T07:09:00.000+00:00Hi Avery,I am sadly unschooled in the ways of McDo...Hi Avery,<BR/><BR/>I am sadly unschooled in the ways of McDowell's ethics at the moment, so I don't know how (or if) he deals with this problem. I agree with you, though, that there does seem to be some problem. McDowell seems to make responsibility depend on having knowledge of what one ought to do, but this seems like it should be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for responsibility. Hence if one holds, as McDowell seems to, that the virtuous agent's action is necessitated by his knowledge, then there seems to be no room for responsibility.<BR/><BR/>To some extent, though, I wonder how much of a problem this is. As non-virtuous agents, we are impressed by the virtuous ones and heave praise on them. But from the perspective of the virtuous agent, it seems, that praise is undeserved: the virtuous agent does exactly what his knowledge of the situation tells him to do. And keep in mind that the virtuous agent's judgments on moral matters is objectively superior to the judgment of non-virtuous agents. In other words it is objectively true that virtuous agents do not deserve praise.<BR/><BR/>So maybe there is a sense in which we need to be able to hold people responsible for deviating from virtue--perhaps in the hope of aiding in their (and our) improvement--but we don't actually need that notion of responsibility with regard to virtuous agents. (Of course there is another sense of responsibility which must apply to all agents alike: i.e., the sense in which to be responsible for an action is simply to be the originator of that action; but the virtuous agent, insofar as he acts intentionally for reasons, seems to satisfy that condition.)Roman Altshulerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06570099479055051251noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-44400563916192888322008-03-14T14:08:00.000+00:002008-03-14T14:08:00.000+00:00Roman,This is a very insightful reply. As I under...Roman,<BR/>This is a very insightful reply. As I understand it, your strategy is to deny that the virtuous and non-virtuous agents have the same knowledge, but to argue that this does not undermine the idea that the non-virtuous agent is responsible for her actions because she still has to choose between her reasons and her desires. This reply makes the agent’s choice the locus of moral responsibility. However, the virtuous agent (who, as you point out, simply has her desires silenced) exercises no such choice. The worry now becomes that the virtuous agent does not seem to be responsible for her actions, given this picture, since she never makes any comparable choice. <BR/><BR/>Admittedly, the fact that moral responsibility is cashed out in terms of the choice between reasons and desires in the case of the non-virtuous agent does not mean that it has to be cashed out in those terms for the virtuous agent as well. There could simply be two distinct ways of cashing out what it means to be a responsible agent. However, I believe two points should be noted in response to this suggestion. First, there are certain advantages to having a univocal account of moral responsibility, not the least of which is that one avoids the potential charge of introducing ad hoc distinctions or categories. Second, even if we allow for a multi-vocal account of moral responsibility, it is not clear that McDowell has any additional resources available for cashing out this idea given his rejection of the composite conception. McDowell’s disavowal of an appetitive component to virtue makes perceiving what one ought to do, on the part of the virtuous agent, sufficient for doing it; so that there is no (explanatory) gap between the two. The absence of such a gap not only fails to leave room for choice (as the locus of moral responsibility in the case of the virtuous agent), but it also seems to leave little room for any alternative account of moral responsibility.AVERY ARCHERhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14313322464414110953noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3949761534200395390.post-8083013479610559332008-03-13T09:39:00.000+00:002008-03-13T09:39:00.000+00:00Hi Avery,I like this train of thought, but I wonde...Hi Avery,<BR/><BR/>I like this train of thought, but I wonder what you think of the following response. To say that the non-virtuous person's knowledge is somehow different only leads to the dilemma you pose if the difference is responsibility-undermining. But is it?<BR/><BR/>Here's the key: What is lacking (which part is clouded or unfocused) in the knowledge of the non-virtuous person? I think we can get at this by breaking the virtuous person's knowledge into two parts. He knows that (1) a feature of a situation places a "to be done" requirement on him and, (2) this is *the only* reason for action provided by the situation.<BR/><BR/>The non-virtuous person, by contrast, does have <I>in a way</I> the same knowledge: he has knowledge of component (1). Where he loses focus, on the other hand, is that he doesn't correctly get component (2). McDowell notes that the virtuous person apprehends the relevant feature as providing *the only* reason for action because "this reason is apprehended, not as outweighing or overriding any reasons for acting in other ways, which would otherwise be constituted by other aspects of the situation..., but as silencing them." (56) The silencing of other potential reasons is part and parcel of the knowledge delivered by a virtuous sensitivity.<BR/><BR/>The non-virtuous person, on the other hand, sees what the situation requires of him, but this does not silence his other reasons. So he sees that he has a reason to act, but he also sees other reasons to act. Silly example: I am holding a wad of cotton candy in my hand, and see a child crying because he has dropped his cotton candy on the ground. As a virtuous agent, I perceive a reason to give him my cotton candy. This perception necessitates my action (see fn. 10, p. 56). But as a non-virtuous agent, I would perceive the same thing, but I would also perceive my desire to eat my cotton candy as a reason to keep it. That is, my knowledge is in a way the same, but it is also different because it includes an extra component.<BR/><BR/>But I think this eliminates your worry that, because the non-virtuous agent's knowledge is in some way different, he has "no choice but to act non-virtuously," as you say. The problem, rather, is that the non-virtuous agent <I>has</I> a choice. He chooses between doing what is required and doing what he desires. The virtuous person, on the other hand, has no choice at all.<BR/><BR/>This, by the way, is why the non-virtuous person might on occasion act virtuously, but he cannot be counted on to do so reliably (p. 51). In each situation he encounters, he will face competing reasons, raising the possibility that he will sometimes act on the wrong ones. The virtuous person, on the other hand, does not encounter those competing reasons at all, so he can reliably be counted on to act virtuously.Roman Altshulerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06570099479055051251noreply@blogger.com